On the Idea of and Necessity for a Metaphysics of Morals

Author(s):  
Mark Timmons

This chapter focuses on Section I of the general introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals in which Kant explains what a metaphysics of morals is, and why there must be one. To properly understand Kant’s views on these matters requires explaining Kant’s conception of philosophy and the place of metaphysics as a branch of philosophy. In spelling this out, the chapter discusses key distinctions between theoretical and practical cognition, empirical (a posteriori) versus rational (a priori) sources of cognition, and the analytic/synthetic distinction as Kant understood it. For Kant, a metaphysics of morals is that branch of philosophy concerned with those synthetic a priori propositions and principles fundamental to morality. The chapter also explains the role of anthropology in a metaphysics of morals.

2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 1589-1595 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth T.M. Leermakers ◽  
Edith H. van den Hooven ◽  
Oscar H. Franco ◽  
Vincent W.V. Jaddoe ◽  
Henriëtte A. Moll ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Paul Burger

Hume and Kant destroyed the belief in the apriori de re, i.e. the rationalist’s doctrine of direct awareness of necessary facts about the nature of being. Later on, analytical philosophy told us that there are only two general classes of statements, synthetics a posteriori and analytics a priori. Quine eventually rejected the a priori in general and advanced a radical empiricism. However, both moderate and radical empiricism has recently been challenged by realistic minded philosophers. They have argued that ontological topics such as the nature of properties, laws or causation remain strongly undetermined by semantic ascent and Quinean ontological commitment, and announced an ontological turn. Are not ontological or metaphysical explanations a priori explanations? Despite his preferred talk in terms of a posteriori realism and inference of the best explanation, Armstrong’s defence of universals looks very much like an apriori one. Others, such as Barry Smith, explicitly defend that there are synthetic propositions a priori de re. I believe in both: Kant was right in claiming that an understanding of what metaphysics can teach us is dependent upon a clear concept of the synthetic a priori, but—against Kant— synthetics a priori de re are legitimate. In this paper I will defend synthetics a priori de re. However, I will reject the rationalist’s appeal to direct awareness of necessary facts as well as undeniableness or infallibility as necessary conditions for a prioris. Instead I will claim that all synthetics a priori express hypothetical truths.


2020 ◽  
pp. 156-167
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian ◽  
Timothy Williamson

This chapter replies to Boghossian’s defence of the epistemological depth of the a priori–a posteriori distinction in Chapter 9 against the author’s critique in Chapter 8. It shows that nothing essential to the argument depends on the distinction between inner and outer experience. It then explains how Boghossian provides no workable alternative to the account in Chapter 8 of the role of imagination in generating knowledge in the key examples, and why the absence of such an alternative leaves Boghossian in danger of drifting into very extensive scepticism about mathematical knowledge. It is also noted that epistemological externalism does not figure as a premise in the key arguments of Chapter 8, although they may offer support for such externalism.


Reasoning ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 101-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian

What happens when we reason our way from one proposition to another? This process is usually called “inference” and this chapter examines its nature. It revisits the author’s earlier attempts to explain the nature of the process of inference, and tries to further clarify why we need the type of “intellectualist” account of that process that he has been pursuing. In the course of doing so, the chapter traces some unexpected connections between our topic and the distinction between a priori and a posteriori justification, and tries to draw some general methodological morals about the role of phenomenology in the philosophy of mind.


2014 ◽  
Vol 44 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 759-788
Author(s):  
Courtney David Fugate

This paper shows that Kant’s investigation into mathematical purposiveness was central to the development of his understanding of synthetic a priori knowledge. Specifically, it provides a clear historical explanation as to why Kant points to mathematics as an exemplary case of the synthetic a priori, argues that his early analysis of mathematical purposiveness provides a clue to the metaphysical context and motives from which his understanding of synthetic a-priori knowledge emerged, and provides an analysis of the underlying structure of mathematical purposiveness itself, which can be described as unintentional, but also as objective and unlimited.


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 85-95
Author(s):  
G. D. Gefan

Among the problems of mathematical education, the article highlights: (1) insufficient attention paid to the fundamental, structure-forming role of mathematics; (2) speculative learning, its isolation from practice. The concept of theoretical-empirical dualism in teaching is formulated as the unity of the abstract-theoretical and experimental-empirical cognitive activity of students. According to the author, a priori and a posteriori mathematical knowledge should be distinguished. A priori knowledge either seems to an individual to be completely obvious, indisputable, or he assimilates it uncritically, “on faith”. A posteriori mathematical knowledge subjectively arises in the process of student’s intense theoretical and practical activity, and is being actively and comprehensively verified experimentally – either using mathematical applications, or through mathematical experiments. The empirical component of teaching mathematics implies a variety of forms and methods of active (including computer) and professionally oriented learning, giving experience in independent formulation of problems, joint search for ways to solve them, interaction and teamwork. Particular attention is paid to the use of mathematical experiments in those frequent cases when it is necessary to replace or supplement complex evidence, illustrate new knowledge, and give research skills. Monte Carlo mathematical experiments are demonstrated, which serve, in particular, as a bright, figurative, and convincing form of reinforcing theoretical knowledge in the field of stochastic branches of mathematics. The research work of students is considered as the highest stage of the students’ theoretical-empirical activity. The article proposes subjects of research activities of students in the process or upon completion of the study of probabilistic and statistical disciplines.


Author(s):  
Hilary Kornblith

This article focuses on naturalistic approaches to philosophical methodology. It begins with an overview of naturalism, its relationship with views about the a priori, and the implications of a philosopher’s commitment to naturalism for proper method in philosophy. It then considers the disagreement among naturalists about the tenability of the a priori/a posteriori distinction with respect to naturalism, before turning to a discussion of the use of science to address philosophical questions. It also looks at work in epistemology which draws on results in the cognitive sciences as a way of understanding the nature of knowledge, with particular emphasis on the role of Alvin Goldman in getting epistemologists to pay attention to the import of empirical work for understanding epistemological issues. Finally, it explores experimental philosophy as a methodological approach to philosophical questions and comments on the debate over the legitimacy of armchair methods in philosophy.


1997 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 267-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin D. Sumrall

Morphological data can be used effectively in phylogenetic analyses to determine relationships among echinoderm clades. These data in the form of characters are simply hypotheses that any observed morphological state among taxa results from a single character state transformation and is therefore, homologous. All such character states must be scored as potentially homologous unless the hypothesis of homology can be rejected by the tests of similarity, conjunction (a priori), or character congruence (a posteriori). Fossils are not always more incomplete than extant forms and incompleteness originates from non-preservation and long phylogenetic branches. The greatest strength of fossil data lies in its ability to effectively shorten long phylogenetic branches by occurring on the tree nearer to the nodes than extant terminal taxa and thus circumventing positively misleading results encountered in parsimony analysis under long branch conditions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Konstantin Pollok

Abstract I draw attention to a 12-page Vorarbeit to Kant’s Prolegomena from the so-called Scheffner-Nachlaß and argue that the parallel Kant draws there between the possibility of theoretical and practical synthetic a priori propositions provides important insight into the development of his account of practical autonomy in the Groundwork. Based on a brief sketch of the role synthetic a priori propositions play in the development of Kant’s critical philosophy, I conclude that for Kant the objective validity of any science depends on the objective validity of a number of synthetic a priori propositions.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document