Breaking the Mirror: Alain Badiou’s Reading of Jacques Lacan

In this article, I focus on Alain Badiou’s idiosyncratic interpretation of Jacques Lacan and highlight his conceptual points of divergence with the psychoanalyst. I elaborate on Badiou’s distinction between philosophy, antiphilosophy, and sophistry as well as the notions of sense, ab-sense, and non-sense that he proposed in the book There’s No Such Thing as a Sexual Relationship: Two Lessons on Lacan as well as in his seminar on Lacan. Unlike Lacan, who affirmed that philosophy is subject to the fantasy of the One, Badiou claimed that the One exists merely as a result of an operation of counting. In this manner, he contested Lacan’s conviction that philosophy forecloses the real. I argue that Badiou’s main point of divergence with Lacan is centred on the notion of the subject and on the localization of the void in relation to the subject. I also touch upon philosophy’s relation to the symbolic, namely its ability to raise powerlessness to logical impossibility.

THE GRAND INQUISITOR: THE PATHS OF FREEDOM

This paper analyzes the antitheistic argument of Ivan Karamazov in the context of theodicy. We focus on the chapter The Grand Inquisitor, which, as we demonstrate, represents the ultimate argumentative point of Ivan’s "rebellion" against God. Logical impossibility of justifying evil in the world leads Ivan not only to the conclusion that evil is an unerasable mark of God’s mistake appearing while making his creation (man and the world), but also that the basis of that evil is one of the most appreciated human virtues: freedom. After Alyosha introduces Christ (thesis) into an argument on theodicy, as an instance that can and has the right to forgive evil and thus cancel its effects, Ivan responds with his dialectical counterpart (antithesis): The Grand inquisitor. Synthesis in this dialectical struggle, as we demonstrate, does not lead to any logically acceptable solution. On the contrary. We are left with the paradox: freedom has, at the same time, led to theodicy and to an accusation against Christ.

Broken Physics: A Conjunction-Fallacy Effect in Intuitive Physical Reasoning

One remarkable aspect of human cognition is our ability to reason about physical events. This article provides novel evidence that intuitive physics is subject to a peculiar error, the classic conjunction fallacy, in which people rate the probability of a conjunction of two events as more likely than one constituent (a logical impossibility). Participants viewed videos of physical scenarios and judged the probability that either a single event or a conjunction of two events would occur. In Experiment 1 ( n = 60), participants consistently rated conjunction events as more likely than single events for the same scenes. Experiment 2 ( n = 180) extended these results to rule out several alternative explanations. Experiment 3 ( n = 100) generalized the finding to different scenes. This demonstration of conjunction errors contradicts claims that such errors should not appear in intuitive physics and presents a serious challenge to current theories of mental simulation in physical reasoning.

THE ALLEGED MURDER OF HRETHRIC IN BEOWULF

A scenario well known to Beowulf scholars alleges that after Beowulf has slain the monsters and gone home, Hrothulf, nephew of the Danish king Hrothgar, will murder prince Hrethric to gain the throne when the old king dies. This story, that many Anglo-Saxonists assume is integral to the ancient legend of these kings, is a modern misreading of the poet's allusions to events associated with the Scylding dynasty — a legendary history that the poet arguably takes care to follow. The present essay, in two parts, first shows how the idea of Hrothulf's treachery arose and became canonical under the influence of prestigious English and American scholars, then finds fault with this idea, refuting its “proof” from Saxo Grammaticus and showing how some Anglo-Saxonists have doubted that Beowulf supports an interpretation making Hrothulf a murderer. But when the poet's allusions to future treachery are ambiguous, at least for modern readers, in order to exonerate Hrothulf fully one must go to traditions about the Scylding dynasty outside the poem. Scandinavian regnal lists (including one that Saxo himself incorporates) consistently contradict the event the Saxo passage has been used to prove, as they agree on a sequence of Scylding rulers with names corresponding to those of persons in Beowulf. Attention to this traditional sequence exposes Hrothulf's murder of Hrethric as a logical impossibility. Moreover, the early medieval method of selecting rulers suggests that neither did Hrothulf usurp the throne of Denmark. In sum, careful scrutiny of the best Scandinavian evidence and rejection of the worst reveals Beowulf's “treacherous Hrothulf” to be a scholarly fantasy.

The truth of the prophecy and miracles in the religion philosophy

In this research, we have attempted to shed light on one of the main topics dealt with by the philosophy of religion, revelation, prophecy and miracles. I will focus on this research on the most important aspects of the study of contemporary Arab writers: Adib Saab, Sawdust. The central question we will ask is: Is revelation possible? Is prophecy translated and miracles? What is the validity of revelation and prophethood miracles? Are miracles only for prophets? Or else? We find that the writer is difficult to prove the issue of revelation through the statement of the quality of the divine discourse directed to humans from the tongue of God, and on the issue of miracles in the opinion of Adib Saab that miracles (wonders) is only the natural law itself. Al-Khasht agrees with the view that revelation and prophecy can be obtained. There is no logical impossibility in addressing God to His creatures, and if the quality of the speech directed by God differed to His creatures, either in the matter of miracles he goes on to say that miracles are not a creation of natural law, Which is familiar with nature, and while we find Nashar goes to support the issue of revelation, but warns of the need to distinguish between revelation in monotheistic religions and visions of the ruling. As for the issue of miracles, the narration is either a reason to prove the prophecy of a prophet or to prove a wisdom. Miracles are nothing but God's act in nature, and if we do not understand it now we may understand it tomorrow

“He Liked to Hear the Music of Others”

Those seeking to understand Bach and his music in the context of his time face an apparently intractable situation: studying Bach's music in reference only to itself seems a logical impossibility. However, relating Bach to his German contemporaries will produce only misunderstandings. This chapter outlines some means for making the situation tractable by identifying the premises required for understanding Bach and his German contemporaries, rather than one or the other. It proposes taking a kind of ethnological perspective on Bach's music and the different cultural webs into which it has been incorporated in the past and in which it is embedded in the present.

The Necessity of Private Language: A Conceptual Confusion Latent in Diverse Episodes of the History of Psychology / Potrzeba języka prywatnego: zamieszanie pojęciowe zawarte w różnorodnych wątkach historii psychologii

The present paper aims to show how Wittgenstein’s so-called ‘private language argument’ (PLA) affects diverse psychological theories. To this end, it starts by describing the main lines of the PLA and explaining why the idea of a private language constitutes a logical impossibility. Then, it is shown that the psychological theories of Descartes, Locke, Husserl, James, Fodor and Chomsky presuppose the existence of a private language, so that these theories lack internal consistency. Lastly, it is clarified why PLA, far from turning Wittgenstein into a behaviourist, involves a critique of behaviourism

Autonomy and presupposition in architecture: Lebbeus Woods' Berlin and Sarajevo projects

The architectural theories of Lebbeus Woods present a number of philosophical problems. Of particular interest in this paper is Woods' thinking about autonomy and self-determinism in architecture. He claims that the architect should ‘recognise his own autonomy’ before ‘designing for other self-determining individuals’. The logical impossibility inherent in the juxtaposition of these claims is investigated with reference to the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein.Wittgenstein provides a critique of metaphysics that is based on a strong valuing of socio-cultural context. Woods, on the other hand, proposes theoretical accounts of architecture that contain the fallacious appeal to autonomy. The appeal, however logically false, is critical to the theoretical position cast in terms of ‘heterarchy’. The appeal also supports the presupposition of society and culture that in turn allows for a sense of architectural solution. In the case of Woods' proposals for Berlin and Sarajevo projects, it is shown that the sense of architectural solution cannot amount to a real solution to the socio-cultural problems facing the people of these war torn cities.