Vietnam syndrome: impact on US foreign policy

1998 ◽  
Vol 35 (10) ◽  
pp. 35-5928-35-5928
Author(s):  
David Hastings Dunn

Commencing from an observation by Freedman that Donald Rumsfeld’s legacy as US Secretary for Defense was comparable with that of Robert McNamara, and that where the latter begat the ‘Vietnam syndrome’ , the former would leave behind the ‘Iraq syndrome’. Analysis of discourse under President Obama reveals that the effects of Iraq are more profound than Freedman indicated. In the Obama era the use of force itself was ever more in doubt. In limiting US commitment to fighting for core interests and formal allies, the Obama administration broke with the main post-war tradition of US foreign policy. This made the use or threat of force more difficult, as the appetite for risk was blunted by its experience in Iraq. Obama’s position was unhelpful in embracing the implications of the limitations of American power. US ‘risk aversion’ risked failing both the US and the world.


Author(s):  
Baturay Yurtbay

The Vietnam War killed and wounded many soldiers and civilians. US foreign policy began to shift after the War’s, end including discussions on the level of power to be used for future wars or conflicts. The United States experienced considerable anxiety over its failures in Vietnam, which was coined the Vietnam Syndrome by the media and various political sciences scholars. The Gulf War, the first serious use of US military power after the Vietnam War, began with discussions about the suitable use of force and how the Vietnam War Syndrome could be overcome. While the Vietnam War was a huge failure for the United States, it also paved the way for new discussions on US foreign policy dealing with appropriate use of force, including last resort uses and US vital interests. These discussions are considered as the corner stone for the US success in the Gulf War. This study will briefly explain the effects and consequences of the Vietnam War and the Gulf War as well as analyse US foreign policy discussions between the Vietnam War and the Gulf War. While examining US foreign policy and the US intervention in the Gulf War, this research will mainly focus on the Shultz doctrine and the Weinberger doctrine. This study will show that the Vietnam War started many discussions on  the use of  force and its application in future wars that were part of the US Gulf War military strategy. Even though the United States experienced failure in the Vietnam War, the lessons taken helped to govern future conflicts and the most important clues were seen in the Gulf War.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-21
Author(s):  
Francis Fukuyama

Professor Fukuyama, B.A. Classics, Cornell University 1974, spoke at Cornell on April 21, 2008, at the invitation of the Einaudi Center for International Studies. The Board of the Cornell International Affairs Review had the privilege of meeting with him during his visit. The following article, produced here with his permission, is an edited transcript of this talk. The board of the Cornell International Affairs Review thanks Professor Fukuyama for his support to our mission.


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