The formation of national party systems: federalism and party competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States

2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (01) ◽  
pp. 43-0573-43-0573
2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 1076-1077
Author(s):  
Radhika Desai

The Formation of National Party Systems: Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States, Pradeep K. Chhibber and Ken Kollman, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, pp. xvi, 276.Mining electoral data to arrive at theories about the relationship between political party performance and party system determination and electoral and governmental institutions forms the main stream of political science. And one of its most enduring puzzles is the explanation of the patterns and diversities of party systems. With the famous “Duverger's Law” about single-member plurality systems and two-party political systems forming its point of departure, political scientists have attempted to substantiate their discipline's status as a “science” by producing theories about relationships between measurable political variables.


2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
CATHIE JO MARTIN ◽  
DUANE SWANK

This paper investigates the political determinants of corporatist and pluralist employers' associations and reflects on the origins of the varieties of capitalism in the early decades of the 20th century. We hypothesize that proportional, multiparty systems tend to enable employers' associations to develop into social corporatist organizations, whereas nonproportional, two-party systems are conducive to the formation of pluralist associations. Moreover, we suggest that federalism tends to reinforce incentives for pluralist organization. We assess our hypotheses through quantitative analysis of data from 1900 to the 1930s from 16 nations and case studies of the origins of peak employers' associations in Denmark and the United States. Our statistical analysis suggests that proportional, multiparty systems foster, and federalism works against, social corporatist business organization; employers' organization is also greater where the mobilization of labor, traditions of coordination, and economic development are higher. These factors also largely explain pre-World War II patterns of national coordination of capitalism. Case histories of the origins of employers' associations in Denmark and the United States further confirm the causal importance of political factors. Although Danish and American employers had similar interests in creating cooperative national industrial policies, trajectories of associational development were constrained by the structure of party competition, as well as by preindustrial traditions for coordination.


1974 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 682-700 ◽  
Author(s):  
David J. Elkins

Most measures of party competition were designed for the United States or other two-party systems. The measure proposed here is intended for multiparty as well as two-party systems. It is a formalization of the notion of uncertainty: election outcomes are competitive to the degree we are uncertain who will win. By ascertaining through survey research the degree of party loyalty over time, one can calculate the chances of alternative outcomes in hypothetical replications of any given election. Since the chance that a losing party might have won is one measure of the importance of that party, this approach to party competition also provides a precise indicator of the number of parties in the system (i.e., whether it is two-party, three party, etc.). The method is applied here to data on Canadian federal elections in 1965 and 1968.


1981 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Mughan

The question of party identification's cross-national validity revolves around the issue of whether or not it can be meaningfully distinguished from immediate voting preference in European national contexts. Comparing this relationship in the American and British party systems, however, this article demonstrates that the two forms of party support are behaviourally similar not in the case of national contexts, but of parties that are linked to the host society's cleavage structure. Moreover, it suggests that their behavioural similarity in the case of this type of party is a function of the ideological distance separating one from the other rather than of the two forms of party support tapping the same dimension of party loyalty. But, whatever the reason for the similarity, the conclusion cannot be avoided that party identification cannot serve the same range of powerful theoretical functions in Europe that it does in the United States because the former's party systems all reflect one or more long-standing, sometimes bitter, social divisions in the electorate.


1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 583-595 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikko Mattila

The study of government popularity functions has been popular among political scientists since the pioneering work of the early 1970s. Most of the studies have concentrated on data from the United States or from Great Britain. The reason for this has probably been the availability of data over long periods of time in these countries, and the fact that in two-party systems the effects of economic changes on government popularity seem to be stronger than in countries with multi-party government coalitions. However, some studies have also shown that in countries with multi-party governments the effects of economic conditions are similar, although possibly slightly less strong.


1995 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas W Rae

This is an essay about the use of districting systems to regulate electoral outcomes and the evolution of party systems. By changing the number of seats from each district, a balance can be struck between the often conflicting goals of minority representation and defractionalization. Defractionalization is the process of forming broad-based governing majorities. Special attention is given to the electoral systems of Italy, Spain, and the United States. In the case of the United States, the author recommends a proportional representation system that mixes high-magnitude districts that encourage minority representation and low-magnitude districts that promote defractionalization.


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