Memperkecil District Magnitude, Menuju Multipartai Sederhana di Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia

<p><em>Sejak memasuki Era Reformasi, Indonesia melalui amandemen Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (UUD 1945) telah meneguhkan komitmen terhadap sistem pemerintahan presidensial, namun sistem kepartaian yang terbangun (multipartisme ekstrem) justru tidak kompatibel dengan sistem tersebut. Penelitian ini bertujuan memaparkan inkompatibilitas tersebut sepanjang perjalanannya hingga masa sekarang. Dengan metode penelitian doktrinal dan pendekatan sejarah di dalamnya, penelitian ini menemukan konsekuensi multipartisme ekstrem yang tidak menguntungkan bagi pemerintahan Indonesia mewujud ke dalam beberapa bentuk, mulai dari impeachment sampai dengan koalisi yang justru menyandera. Ini memberi sinyal bahwa secara subtil sesuatu perlu dilakukan untuk penyederhanaan sistem multipartai di Indonesia, termasuk dengan memperkecil apa yang dinamakan district magnitude.</em></p><p> <strong><em>Kata kunci</em></strong><em>: Presidensialisme; Multipartai; District Magnitude.</em></p>

Electoral Rules and Corruption

A large literature reviews the effects of constitutional arrangements and electoral rules on various aspects of QoG. The state of the debate, so far, is not one that provides straightforward answers regarding the important institutions, the magnitude of the effects, or even their direction. Through a meta-analysis of the relevant literature, we seek in this chapter to evaluate the relationship between electoral rules and corruption. The results of the meta-analysis suggest support for an individual accountability mechanism that transcends the crude majoritarian–proportional distinction. We show that absence of corruption can be positively correlated with systems in which district magnitude is at its lowest (plurality systems) and its highest (proportional systems). The important electoral system features appear to be those that cultivate a “personal vote,” strengthening accountability between voters and individual legislators.

District magnitude and electoral mobilization: how uneven electoral systems shift the focus of campaign efforts by political parties

This paper shows how an uneven electoral system in Japan shapes political parties' mobilization strategies by utilizing a majoritarian electoral system with heterogeneous district magnitudes, which in turn contributes to the gap in turnout across districts. Scholars have long debated the relationship between electoral systems and turnout; it is known that countries with proportional representation electoral systems – those with larger district magnitude – tend to have higher turnout rates than countries with majoritarian electoral systems, especially single-member district (SMD) systems. The current discussion on turnout and district magnitude of an electoral system assumes a monotonic relationship between these factors: the larger the district magnitude of the electoral system, the more (or less) participatory the electorate, due to competitiveness and mobilization efforts by political parties and other relevant groups. In contrast, this paper shows a mixed relationship between district magnitude of the electoral system and party mobilization and subsequent turnout, investigating a majoritarian electoral system with uneven district magnitude in the Japanese Upper House. During the survey period, the party system in Japan consisted of two major parties and a few smaller parties; consequently, the two major parties focused their efforts on SMDs in order to maximize their seat share, while smaller parties focused their resource on districts electing more than two members (where they have some chance to elect their party's candidates). In combination, these party strategies have resulted in the lowest mobilization and turnout rates in districts with two members.

Portugal

This chapter focuses on Portugal and its districted, closed-list proportional representation system of elections to the Assembly of the Republic. The closed party lists imply that individual candidates have little to benefit from cultivating a personal vote. Parties control the order in which their members are elected and can be expected to be relatively free to deploy their personnel in a manner that enhances the collective reputation of the party. On the other hand, Portugal’s electoral system is one in which geographic location of votes matters to seat maximization, because instead of nationwide proportional representation, the country has several regional districts of varying, population density, and district magnitude. The results show some tendency of the major parties to use both the expertise and electoral–constituency models in assigning members to legislative committees, although stronger in the Socialist Party than in the Social Democratic Party.

‘It’s a Long Way from Kuusamo to Kuhmo’: Mapping Candidates’ Electoral Constituencies in the Finnish Open-List Single Preference Voting System

This article seeks an insight into the nature of intraparty competition in an open-list single preference voting system, and it does so by analysing the distribution of votes for Centre Party candidates in the 40 or so municipalities making up the northern Finnish constituency of Oulu in each of the five general elections between 2003 and 2019. It builds on Grofman’s distinction between a geographical constituency and a candidate’s electoral constituency to map the ecology of candidate support in a constituency with (1) a larger than average district magnitude (M); (2) a significantly larger than average territorial magnitude (T); and (3) a substantially larger than average Centre party magnitude (P). Setting M, T and P within a party organisational framework, the article identifies (1) a significant disparity between levels of intraparty competition at district and sub-district levels; (2) several contextual factors that act more as disincentives than incentives to engage in personal vote seeking across the electoral district.

Wahlsystemreform in Deutschland

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.

Using geoinformation tools for redistricting: Slovenian experiences

Electoral districts are an important component of the electoral system, as they have a significant impact on election results. Due to the uneven spatial distribution of electoral support political parties receive, district magnitude and the geography of electoral districts can have a decisive influence on the electoral viability of individual parties and candidates. Districting and redistricting are not a simple bureaucratic process but a politically very sensitive process with outcomes that can have far-reaching political consequences. Geoinformation tools can have a very important role in electoral district planning. In this article we aim to present the key advantages and disadvantages of their use. The presented results are derived from practical experience gained over the course of developing a new system of electoral districts in Slovenia.