Corporate governance failures: the role of institutional investors in the global financial crisis

2012 ◽  
Vol 49 (07) ◽  
pp. 49-3968-49-3968
2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ching-Lung Chen ◽  
Pei-Yu Weng ◽  
Yu-Chih Lin

This study uses unbalanced panel data to construct the empirical regressions, and examines the role of the global financial crisis and institutional ownership on the earnings informativeness of firm with income smoothing. The result reveals that the earnings informativeness of income smoothing decreased after the occurrence of the crisis. High institutional ownership also reduces the informativeness of earnings for firms with income smoothing and supports the institutional investors’ opportunism hypothesis. Yet, this result is prominent when the institutional ownership is held by the qualified foreign rather than local institutional investors. This study implements several diagnostic checks and demonstrates that the results are robust to various specifications.


2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 438-446
Author(s):  
Ronald Henry Mynhardt

Corporate governance can be defined as: the set of processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions affecting the way a company is directed, administered or controlled. Suggestions were investigated that the global financial crisis revealed severe shortcomings in corporate governance. Research was conducted to establish whether these suggestions are accurate. The study found that it appeared that corporate governance has failed and action needs to be taken. The study recommends that a world supervisory body on corporate governance be established. It also proposes that a summit be called to discuss and create such an authority. In addition, the formulation of a set of universal corporate governance standards for implementation by the members was suggested


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-321
Author(s):  
Iris H-Y Chiu

In the wake of the global financial crisis, the trajectory of legal reforms is likely to turn towards more transparency regulation. This article argues that transparency regulation will take on a new role of surveillance as intelligence and data mining expand in the wholesale financial sector, supporting the creation of designated systemic risk oversight regulators.The role of market discipline, which has been acknowledged to be weak leading up to the financial crisis, is likely to be eclipsed by a more technocratic governance in the financial sector. In this article, however, concerns are raised about the expansion of technocratic surveillance and whether financial sector participants would internalise the discipline of regulatory control. Certain endemic features of the financial sector will pose challenges for financial regulation even in the surveillance age.


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