Hutton and Butler

2004 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
News Media ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Hard Copy ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
The Road ◽  
Distinguished Group

These chapters offer penetrating insights into the events and controversies that have dominated the news agenda for the last two years. Never has the path to a British war been mapped so fully and swiftly as the road to Baghdad in 2002–3. Between them, the Hutton and Butler reports lifted the lid on the most intimate workings of government and those who strive to convert information into a weapon — whether they be a Prime Minister in Downing Street, an MI6 agent in the field, an intelligence analyst in Whitehall, or a journalist attempting to fuse fragments into hard copy. Within days of Lord Butler reporting on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, on British intelligence assessments of their quantity and lethality and on the ingredients of the Blair Cabinet's decision to go to war, the British Academy brought together a distinguished group of scholars and practitioners to probe the deeper themes at play in the rush of events and inquests. The chapters examine: the legal issues raised by the manner and content of Lord Hutton's inquiry; the light both Hutton and Butler shed on the Blair style of government; and the matter of trust between government, the governed and the news media.

What We Know Now

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. G. Runciman
Keyword(s):  
Iraq War ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Suez Canal ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Tony Blair ◽  
Intelligence Services ◽  
British Prime Minister ◽  
The Government ◽  
The U.S

This chapter discusses the information provided by the Hutton Report and the Butler Report concerning the bases of the British government's decision to join the U.S. in overturning Saddam Hussein for his alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It suggests that nothing revealed in the reports could bring an agreement to whether British Prime Minister Tony Blair was right in his decision, but those who have read the reports could surely conclude that the government, the intelligence services, and the BBC fell short of what have been expected of them at a time when Britain was on the brink of being taken into a war. It discusses the similarities between the Iraq War and the Suez Canal conflict.

The Iran “Threat” In a Kafkaesque World

2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward S. Herman ◽  
David Peterson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
News Media ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Energy Agency ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Multilateral Institutions

From June 2003 to August 2012, the International Atomic Energy Agency published thirty-eight full written reports on Iran's nuclear program and conducted numerous inspections in the country. Yet although the Agency has never determined that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, Iran has never been able to free itself from the relentless U.S. campaign against its nuclear program. This article shows how the United States has mobilized the multilateral institutions to place Iran's nuclear program on the international stage and kept it there. It also examines the parallel role played by the news media, which have resumed their role of a decade ago when they helped Washington make a fraudulent case for invading Iraq on “weapons of mass destruction” grounds. The essay contends that the alleged Iranian nuclear weapons threat is a U.S. and Israeli propaganda construct intended to mask their own real threat to attack Iran.

A2. PA PRIME MINISTER MAHMUD ABBAS AND ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER ARIEL SHARON, STATEMENTS FOLLOWING THE AQABA SUMMIT, AQABA, JORDAN, 4 JUNE 2003 (EXCERPTS).

2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-151
Keyword(s):  
Prime Minister ◽  
Jewish State ◽  
The Road ◽  
Road Map ◽  
Associated Press ◽  
Occupied Territories ◽  
Arab States ◽  
President Bush

The quadrilateral meeting at Aqaba, intended to ““kick off implementation”” of the road map, was attended by King Abdallah, Prime Minister Abbas, Prime Minister Sharon, and President Bush. All four leaders made statements at the end of the meeting, but only those by Abbas and Sharon are reproduced below. President Bush's statement was noteworthy for its mention of Israel as a ““vibrant Jewish state”” (““America is strongly committed and I am strongly committed to Israel's security as a vibrant Jewish state””) and of Palestinian ““hopes”” for a ““viable”” state, and for reiterating that the Arab states ““have promised to cut off assistance and the flow of money and weapons to terrorists groups and to help Prime Minister Abbas rid Palestinian areas of terrorism.”” The statements by Abbas and Sharon were drafted with U.S. officials prior to the meeting. Though Abbas did not comply with the Israeli demand of Palestinian acknowledgment of Israel as a ““Jewish state,”” his speech provoked indignation in the occupied territories for its reference to ““the suffering of the Jews”” without mention of Palestinian suffering, its reiterated call for ending the ““armed intifada,”” and its ““renunciation”” of terrorism. Sharon resisted U.S. suggestions to refer to ““settlements,”” but did mention ““unauthorized outposts.”” In reference to Sharon's mention of ““territorial contiguity”” for a ““viable”” Palestinian state, a spokesman indicated that the contiguity would be ensured by ““bridges and tunnels.”” The text of the statements, transcribed by eMediaMill- Works and carried by the Associated Press, was posted on the Washington Post's Website.

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