scholarly journals Sanitized, made to lie supine and left fanged! The final version of the 2010 Protection of State Information Bill / Secrecy Bill, and its threats to the civil liberty of freedom of expression in South Africa

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 63-80
Author(s):  
Siboniso Prosper Welcome Luthuli
Author(s):  
Carrol Clarkson

Carrol Clarkson’s chapter wrestles with the contentious question of Coetzee’s relation to the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa of the 1970s and early 1980s, which took its philosophical bearings from Frantz Fanon and found expression in the writings of Steve Biko. Clarkson focuses on the ways in which Coetzee departed from the ideas about writing and resistance that were circulating in his contemporary South Africa, particularly as articulated by novelist Nadine Gordimer. Clarkson discusses two related literary-critical problems: an ethics and politics of representation, and an ethics and politics of address, showing how Coetzee explores a tension between freedom of expression and responsibility to the other. In the slippage from saying to addressing we are led to further thought about modes and sites of consciousness—and hence accountabilities—in the interlocutory contact zones of the post-colony. The chapter invites a sharper appreciation of what a postcolonial philosophy might be.


2011 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacobus C.W. Van Rooyen

The issue that this article dealt with is whether, in South African law, speech that infringes upon the religious feelings of an individual is protected by the dignity clause in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The Constitution, as well as the Broadcasting Code, prohibits language that advocates hatred, inter alia, based on religion and that constitutes incitement to cause harm. Dignity, which is a central Constitutional right, relates to the sense of self worth which a person has. A Court has held that religious feelings, national pride and language do not form part of dignity, for purposes of protection in law. The Broadcasting Complaints Commission has, similarly, decided that a point of view seriously derogatory of ‘Calvinistic people’ blaming (some of) them as being hypocritical and even acting criminally is not protected by dignity. It would have to be accompanied by the advocacy of hatred as defined previously. The author, however, pointed out that on occasion different facts might found a finding in law that religion is so closely connected to dignity, that it will indeed be regarded as part thereof.


Obiter ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna Botha

In South African Human Rights Commission v Qwelane (hereinafter “Qwelane”) the constitutionality of the threshold test for the hate speech prohibition in section 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (hereinafter the “Equality Act”) was challenged. Although the court had no difficulty in finding that the publication in question fell squarely within the parameters of hate speech, the judgment is both incoherent and flawed. The court’s conjunctive interpretation of the section 10(1) requirements for hate speech also differs from the disjunctive interpretation given to the same provision in Herselman v Geleba (ECD (unreported) 2011-09-01 Case No 231/09 hereinafter “Herselman”) by the Eastern Cape High Court. The consequence is a “fragmented jurisprudence” which impacts on legal certainty, and which is especially dangerous when the legislation in question is critical to the achievement of the constitutional mandate (Daniels v Campbell NO 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC) par 104 hereinafter “Daniels”).This note demonstrates that the Qwelane court misapplied a number of key principles. These include: the court’s mandate in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter the “Constitution”); the need to strike an appropriate balance between competing rights in the constitutional framework; the importance of definitional certainty for a hate speech threshold test; the meaning to be ascribed to the terms “hate”, “hurt” and “harm” in the context of hate speech legislation; and the role of international law when interpreting legislation intended to give effect to international obligations.The consequence of these errors for hate speech regulation in South Africa is profound.


1960 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-131
Author(s):  
W. M. Macmillan
Keyword(s):  

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 504-518
Author(s):  
Simphiwe P Phungula

The 21st century has an increase in the use of the internet as a means of trading. The use of the internet has also influenced the use of social media as a means of communication. This communication extends to the employer–employee relationship in the workplace. However – in South Africa – due to the rapid use of social media both in and out of the workplace, it has become blurry of what constitutes social media misconduct for which an employee may be disciplined. This is exacerbated by the lack of specific legislation dealing with employees and social media misconduct in South Africa. This article deals with the blessings and the curse of using social media as a means of communication in the workplace. It reveals the difficulties faced by both employers and employees when determining to what extent the behaviour of an employee can constitute adequate grounds for dismissal in relation to that employee’s social media misconduct. Recommendations are made on the way forward.


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