scholarly journals The phenomenology of guiltt: Some remarks on Jaspers' and Hegel's notion of guilt

2020 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 643-675
Author(s):  
Tanja Todorović
Keyword(s):  
Metaphysical Foundation ◽  
Kant's Ethics

Jaspers inquires into the problem of guilt in closer relation with the idea of communication, which finds its metaphysical foundation in the unspecified idea of humanity. His distinction between the four types of guilt can find its foundation in metaphysical guilt. In his philosophical conception, Jaspers manages to adopt certain insights of Kant's ethics; in this context we shall emphasize the connection between moral and metaphysical guilt. In the framework of Hegel's critique of Kant we shall explicate how the four types of guilt that Jaspers distinguishes (moral, metaphysical, criminal, and political) can be reduced to moral and legal guilt.

scholarly journals Kantian Ethics and the Animal Turn. On the Contemporary Defence of Kant’s Indirect Duty View

Animals ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 512
Author(s):  
Samuel Camenzind
Keyword(s):  
Animal Rights ◽  
Ethical Framework ◽  
Arthur Schopenhauer ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Turn On ◽  
Conceptual Clarity ◽  
Moral Relationship ◽  
Human Animal ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
Animal Question

Criticism of Kant’s position on our moral relationship with animals dates back to the work of Arthur Schopenhauer and Leonard Nelson, but historically Kantian scholars have shown limited interest in the human-animal relationship as such. This situation changed in the mid-1990s with the arrival of several publications arguing for the direct moral considerability of animals within the Kantian ethical framework. Against this, another contemporary Kantian approach has continued to defend Kant’s indirect duty view. In this approach it is argued, first, that it is impossible to establish direct duties to animals, and second, that this is also unnecessary because the Kantian notion that we have indirect duties to animals has far-reaching practical consequences and is to that extent adequate. This paper explores the argument of the far-reaching duties regarding animals in Kant’s ethics and seeks to show that Kantians underestimate essential differences between Kant and his rivals today (i.e., proponents of animal rights and utilitarians) on a practical and fundamental level. It also argues that Kant’s indirect duty view has not been defended convincingly: the defence tends to neglect theory-immanent problems in Kant’s ethics connected with unfounded value assumptions and unconvincing arguments for the denial of animals’ moral status. However, it is suggested that although the human-animal relationship was not a central concern of Kant’s, examination of the animal question within the framework of Kant’s ethics helps us to develop conceptual clarity about his duty concept and the limitations of the reciprocity argument.

Recent work on Kant's ethics

1999 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 209-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Stratton-Lake
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Kant's Ethics

scholarly journals Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Timmermann
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Conflict ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Ethical Duty ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
Explicit Discussion

Abstract: This paper explores the possibility of moral conflict in Kant’s ethics. An analysis of the only explicit discussion of the topic in his published writings confirms that there is no room for genuine moral dilemmas. Conflict is limited to nonconclusive ‘grounds’ of obligation. They arise only in the sphere of ethical duty and, though defeasible, ought to be construed as the result of valid arguments an agent correctly judges to apply in the situation at hand. While it is difficult to determine in theory what makes some of them stronger than others, these ‘grounds’ can account for practical residue in conflict cases and for a plausible form of agent regret. The principle that ‘ought implies can’ survives intact.

scholarly journals Change and Moral Development in Kant’s Ethics

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-28
Author(s):  
Kyle Curran
Keyword(s):  
Moral Development ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Change ◽  
Kant's Ethics

This paper is concerned with an ambiguous aspect of Kant’s ethics, namely, how moral change is possible. Kant conceives that change is possible, indeed desirable, without making clear the mechanism by which this change occurs. I conclude that one’s moral development must come about through the autonomous rationality of humanity. This allows for the moral law to be held at all times and for the rejection of immoral sentiments and inclinations. Further, it is constant soulsearching that allows one to keep a check on their maxims, facilitating the development of a moral disposition.

scholarly journals Foruroligende etik i Heinrich von Kleists »Michael Kohlhaas«

2009 ◽  
Vol 36 (106) ◽  
pp. 70-95
Author(s):  
Maria Jørgsen
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Central Place ◽  
The Self ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
The Sublime ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Louis Xvi ◽  
Kant's Ethics

Disquieting Ethics in »Michael Kohlhaas« by Heinrich von Kleist:This article argues that the concept of evil takes a central place in the exploration of the Kantian ethics in Heinrich von Kleist’s novella »Michael Kohlhaas«.Maria Jørgensen argues that not only is the famous duty to which Kohlhaas finds himself obliged conceived in accordance with Kant’s ethics of duty, but also the description of Kohlhaas’ subjectivity in general is constructed by means of Kantian terms. Kleist’s text makes use of concepts such as duty, freedom, pathology, universality and the sublime in order to construct Kohlhaas as an inherently decentered subject. Furthermore Jørgensen argues that the emptying of the concept of the Good in Kantian ethics surfaces in Kleist’s novella as a hitherto unnoticed tendency to a certain tautologisation in Kohlhaas’ qualitative judgments.In the final section of the article the evil act in »Michael Kohlhaas« as an act of freedom, »Aktus der Freiheit«, is investigated with a departure in the Kantian concept of diabolical evil in Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft. If Kohlhaas’ first attempt to act ethically is contaminated by the self-interest which sticks to his initial duty to secure redress for the wrongs done to him and his fellow citizens by the Junker von Tronka, his last act of refusing to negotiate with the Elector of Saxony functions as a purely ethical act in Kantian terms. Kohlhaas’ act can be seen as an ethical act as it neglects the subject’s pathology, which according to Kant can only be done by an act of reason. Furthermore the act is in keeping with the criteria which Kant, according to Alenka Zupančič, delivers in the famous footnote on the execution of Louis XVI in Metaphysik der Sitten: The act is characterized by being purely formal, it arises from a maxim, and it is first of all an act of freedom. This article thus argues that »Michael Kohlhaas« evidently contains a fulfilled ethical act in Kantian terms, but that this act must be found in quite another place than previously assumed.

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