Problematizzazione, contesa e rivalutazione del bello nell’arte, tra relativismo filosofico, pratica artistica e senso comune

Aesthetic perception is today a confused and controversial experience. In common sense relativistic conception of beauty, coexists with the consideration of the so-called “masterpieces” as works in which there is a stable aesthetic value. Philosophical and scientific relativism seems to have definitively set aside the conception of beauty not only as a universal value, but also as the essence of art, as it is counted among those universal metaphysical values, which have long been questioned. But some philosophers, such as Severino, say the opposite. Today seems to be a tendency to rediscover beauty above all in art, as a contemplative perception. Would the eventual return of art to beauty mean a return to universal metaphysical values? The difference between Kantian adherent beauty and free beauty is analyzed. The first is linked to metaphysical values, as an expression of an idea. The second, free beauty, on the other hand, has no metaphysical characteristics because it is not linked to a concept, therefore an expression of empirical harmonies. But also with regard to free beauty, the Kantian idea that sentiment can perceive its universality as an intersubjective value, is today difficult to accept both theoretically and empirically. This happens because today sentiment is no longer cultivated in the perception of beauty through canons, which are also disqualified for the pretense of universality in determined forms. Here, too, a distinction must be made between classical anthropometric canons and archaic non-naturalistic canons. We discover that the former are affected by a metaphysical foundation, while the latter reveal a different structure with other functions. According to Florenskij, the canon is not oppressive but liberating. On these suggestions and on empirical evidence we theorize that the (non-naturalistic) canon constitutes a guide for the recognition of a polyvalence of expressive language in which feeling coordinates with the other functions of consciousness, leading to transcend language itself in a non-metaphysical dimension. This suggests that this polyvalent structure that emerges from the canons is associated with beauty, as aimed at its realization.

Circularity and Insufficiency Worries

This chapter addresses circularity and insufficiency worries that have been raised against Locke’s same consciousness account of personal identity. The chapter distinguishes different versions of circularity problems and shows that Locke has resources to respond to Joseph Butler’s circularity objection. The more pressing worry concerns the question of whether sameness of consciousness is sufficient for personal identity, which is the so-called insufficiency worry. A response to this question calls for an examination of whether sameness of consciousness can ontologically ground personal identity. The chapter proposes that Locke has resources to accept, on the basis of probable reasoning, that same consciousness that has a metaphysical foundation that most likely has relational structure. The advantage of this reading is that it brings to light that he not merely criticizes substance accounts of identity, but also that he has the resources to develop a plausible—though probable—alternative that avoids circularity and insufficiency.

Formation of the Ontology of a Modern Subject. Origins and Articulation

The subject of the article is the process of forming a new ontological paradigm of the subject – the modern subject as a center of transformative activity aimed at the world (nature) – the object. Today, along with the classical concepts (M. Heidegger, M. Foucault) linking the genesis of the modern type of subject with the philosophy of Descartes, studies (P. Hajdu, A. De Libera), in which his Christian origins and nature are grounded, are gaining more and more in­fluence. The article focuses on the ontological dimension of this genesis, the author shows that in the process of forming the ontology of the Christian paradigm of the subject, three stages can be distinguished: 1) the formation of Christian ideas about God as a subject of being and at the same time a loving Person, whose incarnation removes the barrier between the divine and the hu­man; 2) articulation of ontological concepts in the form of doctrinal principles of Christianity; 3) conceptualization of the doctrine in the text of the Symbol of Faith, which provides a categorical apparatus and a specific vocabulary for ontological discourse of a new type, one of the central meanings of which is the new subject. The process of general secularization of the Christian doctrine in the rational discourses of modern philosophy, primarily in the concept of Descartes and German classical idealism, led to the consolidation of the Chris­tian type of subjectivity for a person as an existential center of a new ontologi­cal paradigm, whose activity turns into a new metaphysical foundation of the world of objects.

Can God Promise Us a New Past? A Response to Lebens and Goldschmidt

Samuel Lebens and Tyron Goldschmidt provided original theodicies, which suggest that at one time God will change the past, either by erasing/substituting the sins of humans or erasing the whole entirety of evils. Both theodicies imply the idea that God can completely change the past without leaving any traces. In this paper, I argue that Lebens’ and Goldschmidt’s preferred model, which they call the scene-changing theory, is problematic. First, its complex metaphysical foundation could be replaced with presentism (roughly, the view in the ontology of time that only present things exist) without losing any substantial heuristics. Second, their theory either implies a controversial theory of truthmaking under presentistic and hyper-presentistic ontology or implies controversial views on the counting of events under presentistic and hyper-presentistic ontology. Thirdly, I will argue that any theory of elimination/substitution of evils of the past implies that there are unnecessary evils, which is inconsistent with God’s goodness.

The phenomenology of guiltt: Some remarks on Jaspers' and Hegel's notion of guilt

Jaspers inquires into the problem of guilt in closer relation with the idea of communication, which finds its metaphysical foundation in the unspecified idea of humanity. His distinction between the four types of guilt can find its foundation in metaphysical guilt. In his philosophical conception, Jaspers manages to adopt certain insights of Kant's ethics; in this context we shall emphasize the connection between moral and metaphysical guilt. In the framework of Hegel's critique of Kant we shall explicate how the four types of guilt that Jaspers distinguishes (moral, metaphysical, criminal, and political) can be reduced to moral and legal guilt.

Way of Kun: the metaphysical foundation of Zhuxi’s female ethics

Confucianism has a system of Ethical argumentation that is based on Three Cardinal Principles and Five Constant Virtues, directed towards the cultivation of virtue. Neo-Confucianism, especially Lixue 理学 that is initiated by Chengyi 程颐 and developed by Zhuxi 朱熹, puts great emphasis on the theory of cultivation that usually converges instead of being emanative, tinged with the characteristic of the Way of Kun 坤道 that is directed towards the Virtue of Kun 坤德. This cultivation of the mutual dependence of knowing and doing leads to the subordination of the Way of Qian 乾道 and a corresponding change in the relation between the Virtue of Kun and the Virtue of Qian in a range of language levels, as the metaphysical foundation of Zhuxi’s female ethics.

Beyond Metaphysics

It is pointed out that some important issues in ethics, for example, abortion, contraception, and questions about future populations, require a rational metaphysical foundation, whereas, all too often, philosophers working in the field of ethics have based their accounts on shaky metaphysical premises in which no consideration is made of the unborn and the dead, whose reality has been too quickly dismissed. Some examples of this fact are offered, including the curious example of Derek Parfit, who has argued both for and against taking into consideration, in one’s ethical deliberations, possible persons who might or might not exist, depending on the decisions we make. The study concludes with an examination the role one’s attitude to death plays in the good life by looking at the example of how Socrates famously approached the prospect of his own death.