scholarly journals The Implementation of the ECN+ Directive in Hungary and Lessons Beyond

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 55-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin J. Cseres

In order to facilitate national competition authorities (NCAs) in their application of EU competition rules, the EU legislator adopted Directive 2019/1/EU. The Directive’s aim is to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers of competition law and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. The so-called ECN+ Directive introduces minimum harmonisation rules allowing competition authorities to have common investigative, decision-making (notably fining decisions) and enforcement powers. The Directive, furthermore, sets minimum safeguards for the NCAs’ independence, accountability and resources as well as harmonizes leniency programmes including the coordination of national leniency programmes with each other and with that of the European Commission. This paper critically analyzes the legal and policy developments that paved the way for the adoption of this Directive. Moreover, it examines the changes the implementation of the Directive is likely to generate in current Hungarian law and policy of competition protection. The focus of the paper’s assessment is on the institutional aspects of the Directive and the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in particular the mechanisms for ensuring independence and accountability of the NCAs. Through the assessment of the Hungarian implementation, the paper aims to shed light on a broader context of the Directive and the enforcement of EU competition law in EU Member States. The paper shows that the implementation of the Directive may fail to translate into (more) effective enforcement without an effective institutional capacity on the side of the NCAs, and in the broader legal and constitutional context of competition law and its multilevel enforcement

2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-283
Author(s):  
Chris Townley ◽  
Alexander H. Türk

The allocation of legislative and executive competences in multilevel governance structures affects who controls norms. Over the last two decades we see a general trend in EU law, towards “flexibility, mixity and differentiation.” Yet many think that EU competition policy and enforcement marches to a different tune. Competence is rarely discussed there and, when it is, most assume that uniformity is desirable. This article discusses the EU constitutional system as it relates to competition policy and enforcement. It investigates what choices the EU Treaties make about diversity. As with many constitutional arrangements, the EU Treaties sometimes leave space for others to decide. In these spaces we advocate answers, based on our understanding of the constitutional settlement between the EU and the Member States. This has major implications for, amongst others: the Commission’s power to relieve the Member States’ national competition authorities (NCAs) of their competence to apply Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); the vires of EU merger control outside of the remit of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU; Commission efforts to make the NCAs more independent of political influence; and the resolution of conflicts between EU and national competition rules.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens-Uwe Franck ◽  
Nils Stock

Abstract If both national competition law and Article 101 TFEU apply to an agreement, the former must not set rules that are stricter than the latter. Member States remain free, though, to impose stricter rules if they are not classified as ‘competition law’. We analyse relevant jurisprudence by the English and French courts that have dealt with potential conflicts between, on the one hand, EU competition law and, on the other hand, the common law restraint of trade doctrine and the pratiques restrictives de concurrence under French commercial law. We develop criteria that allow (national) ‘competition law’ to be distinguished from similar regulatory interventions into agreements that pursue purposes distinct from Article 101 TFEU and which, therefore, must not be regarded as ‘competition law’. This article illustrates and elaborates on the challenges for the implementation of our approach by focusing on the ban on the use of parity clauses by hotel booking platforms in France, Austria, Italy, and Belgium. We map a possible way forward to prevent further regulatory fragmentation in the internal market with regard to the regulation of platform-to-business agreements.


Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter examines the obligations of Member States in relation to EU competition law. Specifically, it considers the obligations that Article 4(3) TEU and Articles 37 and 106 TFEU place upon Member States. Article 4(3) requires all Member States to take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties, and to avoid any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the EU’s objectives. Article 106 particularly obligates Member States to refrain from enacting or maintaining measures contrary to the rules provided in Article 18 and Articles 101 to 109 of the TFEU. Article 37 is concerned with the procurement of goods.


Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter provides a brief overview of EU and UK competition law and the institutions involved in formulating, interpreting and applying competition law. It also explains the relationship between EU competition law and the domestic competition laws of the Member States, in particular in the light of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003. The rules of the European Economic Area are briefly referred to, and the trend on the part of Member States to adopt domestic competition rules modelled on those in the EU is also noted. Three diagrams at the end of the chapter explain the institutional structure of EU and UK competition law.


2021 ◽  
pp. 224-257
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter examines the obligations of Member States in relation to EU competition law. Specifically, it considers the obligations that Article 4(3) TEU and Articles 37 and 106 TFEU place upon Member States. Article 4(3) requires all Member States to take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties, and to avoid any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the EUs objectives. Article 106 particularly obligates Member States to refrain from enacting or maintaining measures, contrary to the rules provided in Article 18 and Articles 101 to 109 of the TFEU. Article 37 is concerned with state monopolies of a commercial character.


Author(s):  
Holzwarth Johannes

This chapter explores the cooperation between the European Commission and Member States’ courts that apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The risk of inconsistent interpretations of EU competition rules renders cooperation between the Commission and Member State courts crucial, particularly due to the role that such courts play when it comes to the effective enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU at the national level: in the era of decentralisation, it is the national courts that will ultimately be called upon to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU either directly, or when reviewing national authorities’ decisions based on those provisions. The central role that the Commission retains for the enforcement of EU competition law means that it has a particularly strong interest in ensuring effective cooperation with national courts. Moreover, the importance of cooperation between the Commission and Member State courts is further increasing due to the rise of private enforcement. This type of enforcement is generally associated with civil actions and damages awarded by national courts or tribunals.


2021 ◽  
pp. 49-82
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter provides a brief overview of EU and UK competition law and the institutions involved in formulating, interpreting and applying competition law in those jurisdictions. It also explains the relationship between EU competition law and the domestic competition laws of the Member States, in particular in the light of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003. The rules of the European Economic Area are briefly referred to, and the trend on the part of Member States to adopt domestic competition rules modelled on those in the EU is also noted. Three diagrams at the end of the chapter explain the institutional structure of EU and UK competition law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (18) ◽  
pp. 181-207
Author(s):  
Kamil Dobosz

The paper presents four pillars of competition law that can be recognised in the European Union and Member States, namely EU competition law, national competition law sensu stricto, national competition law sensu largo and competition rules sensu largissimo. In order to demonstrate that this multi-faceted and complex system is able to work in an orderly manner, it is considered in relation to various concepts, particularly unity, uniformity and effectiveness. Nevertheless, the concept of unity serves as a focal point for the observations. The perspective of the EU single market plays a part also, enhancing the call for unity. With regard to discussed threats for unity, possible solutions are proposed in the final part of the article.


Author(s):  
Anna Piszcz

Modern Polish competition law has become highly regulated and codified over the twenty five years of its existence and this article will provide readers with information relating to its recent developments of 2015. Separate subsections present a review of provisions on remedies in infringement decisions as well as settlements. A considerable part of this paper is designed to outline the peculiarities that characterize Poland’s new provisions on fines. Further on, the paper introduces readers to newest trends in the area of concentration control between undertakings. In addition, an assessment of recent developments and suggestions for a further development of Polish competition law are reviewed in the EU context. The conscious intention of the author is to analyse whether the EU competition law pattern, often regarded as a model for Member States, has been used to develop Polish competition law. Has the latter been amended to look more, or less like EU competition law? Has Polish competition law shown the capacity to absorb the best elements of EU competition law into itself? How is the outcome aligned with the declared direction of these amendments?


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