Conclusion

Author(s):  
Michelle Bentley

OBAMA’S FOREIGN policy on Syria put the chemical weapons taboo front and centre of international politics. This has always been a prominent feature of international discourse. But now, where the taboo constituted (a) an imperative for, and justification of, US foreign policy, and (b) the basis of key diplomatic negotiations, so the norm came to dominate the entire crisis. As such, this would seem to substantiate the inherent claim behind the taboo, i.e. that chemical weapons are so offensive that possession and use cannot be tolerated. Furthermore, that violation cannot take place without a significant and norm-driven response from the international community, and especially from its hegemon. This view, however, is far too simplistic. Specifically, it ignores two core dynamics of the taboo’s use (where these map onto the two parts to this book):...

Author(s):  
Michelle Bentley

Chapter 2 applies the strategic interpretation outlined previously to US foreign policy on Syria, explicitly understood as a reference to Obama’s redline. It demonstrates that this is not the hardline ultimatum it was made out to be; but is in fact a calculated construct that expresses Obama’s own preferences concerning US involvement in the crisis. Specifically, it analyses Obama’s real intentions in setting the redline to reveal that these have been misinterpreted. More specifically, that pre-existing ideas surrounding the chemical weapons taboo have caused Obama’s statement to be misconstrued as a be-all-and-end-all of US foreign policy on Syria. It examines the wider policy context at the time to demonstrate that this interpretation was diametrically opposed to Obama’s professed position and that the redline actually comprises a much softer and moderate allusion to the taboo.


2008 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
KAREN GRAM-SKJOLDAGER ◽  
ØYVIND TØNNESSON

AbstractScandinavia (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) is frequently seen as a democratic ‘island of peace’ in international politics and the three states are seen as ardent supporters of an ‘international community’ under the umbrella of the United Nations as well as its predecessor, the League of Nations. This article seeks to challenge this idealised, unitary conception of Scandinavian peace politics by exploring how different strands of internationalism, as transnational phenomena, developed from the outbreak of the First World War until the three states became members of the League. Initially, that development was more or less independent of official foreign policy. The article explains how and to what degree new internationalist ideas were eventually merged with traditional neutralist Scandinavian foreign policies.


Author(s):  
Michelle Bentley

Chapter 6 demonstrates that Syria is not simply a case of misinterpretation, but one in which the taboo has intensified the conflict. The conflict is worse and more violent as a direct consequence of using the taboo as the basis of US foreign policy. It looks at the physically and politically destructive ways in which the taboo has fed the tensions underpinning the crisis, specifically where these are identified as effects that would not have occurred had the taboo not been prioritised above all other concerns. The chapter then concludes with a more comprehensive analysis of how the taboo is detrimental to international politics and whether it should even be kept as part of IR discourse.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-21
Author(s):  
Francis Fukuyama

Professor Fukuyama, B.A. Classics, Cornell University 1974, spoke at Cornell on April 21, 2008, at the invitation of the Einaudi Center for International Studies. The Board of the Cornell International Affairs Review had the privilege of meeting with him during his visit. The following article, produced here with his permission, is an edited transcript of this talk. The board of the Cornell International Affairs Review thanks Professor Fukuyama for his support to our mission.


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