scholarly journals Intuitive physics and intuitive psychology (“theory of mind”) in offspring of mothers with psychoses

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebeka Marothi ◽  
Szabolcs Keri
Keyword(s):  
Bipolar Disorder ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Motor Performance ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Social Adaptation ◽  
Abnormal Development ◽  
Folk Physics ◽  
Intuitive Physics ◽  
Psychology Theory

Offspring of individuals with psychoses sometimes display an abnormal development of cognition, language, motor performance, social adaptation, and emotional functions. The aim of this study was to investigate the ability of children of mothers with schizophrenia (n=28) and bipolar disorder (n=23) to understand mental states of others using the Eyes Test (folk psychology or “theory of mind”) and physical causal interactions of inanimate objects (folk psychics). Compared with healthy controls (n=29), the children of mothers with schizophrenia displayed significantly impaired performances on the Eyes Test but not on the folk physics test. The children of mothers with bipolar disorder did not differ from the controls and outperformed the children of mothers with schizophrenia on the folk physics test. These results suggest that the attribution of mental states, but not the interpretation of causal interaction of objects, is impaired in offspring of individuals with schizophrenia, which may contribute to social dysfunctions.

scholarly journals Intuitive physics and intuitive psychology (“theory of mind”) in offspring of mothers with psychoses

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebeka Marothi ◽  
Szabolcs Keri
Keyword(s):  
Bipolar Disorder ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Motor Performance ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Social Adaptation ◽  
Abnormal Development ◽  
Folk Physics ◽  
Intuitive Physics ◽  
Psychology Theory

Offspring of individuals with psychoses sometimes display an abnormal development of cognition, language, motor performance, social adaptation, and emotional functions. The aim of this study was to investigate the ability of children of mothers with schizophrenia (n=28) and bipolar disorder (n=23) to understand mental states of others using the Eyes Test (folk psychology or “theory of mind”) and physical causal interactions of inanimate objects (folk psychics). Compared with healthy controls (n=29), the children of mothers with schizophrenia displayed significantly impaired performances on the Eyes Test but not on the folk physics test. The children of mothers with bipolar disorder did not differ from the controls and outperformed the children of mothers with schizophrenia on the folk physics test. These results suggest that the attribution of mental states, but not the interpretation of causal interaction of objects, is impaired in offspring of individuals with schizophrenia, which may contribute to social dysfunctions.

scholarly journals Theory of Mind in ADHD. A Proposal to Improve Working Memory through the Stimulation of the Theory of Mind

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (24) ◽  
pp. 9286
Author(s):  
Rocío Lavigne ◽  
Antonia González-Cuenca ◽  
Marta Romero-González ◽  
Marta Sánchez
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Social Adaptation ◽  
Neuropsychological Battery ◽  
Intelligence Scale ◽  
Verbal Comprehension ◽  
Significant Relationships ◽  
Low Performance ◽  
Stimulation Of

The aim of this study was to investigate the relationships between Theory of Mind (ToM), Working Memory (WM), and Verbal Comprehension (VC). Performance of these variables was evaluated in 44 elementary students (6–12 years) diagnosed with ADHD. Their performance in all variables was collected through the Neuropsychological Battery (NEPSY-II) and the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children IV. The results showed that fifty percent of the participants were below the 25th percentile in ToM and that this low performance was not related to age. In addition, analyses showed statistically significant relationships between WM, VC, and ToM. Analysis of the effect of WM and VC on ToM showed that only WM explained the variance in participant performance in ToM. These results led us to raise the need to include ToM among the skills to be stimulated in programs for the treatment of ADHD, accompanying other skills related to social adaptation that are usually included in such programs. Likewise, considering that ToM implies putting into practice skills such as considering different points of view, attending to relevant aspects of the context, making decisions, inferring mental states, and predicting behaviors, we believe that through the stimulation of ToM, WM would also be stimulated.

The psychology of folk psychology

1993 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alvin I. Goldman
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Visual Object ◽  
Memory Representation ◽  
Visual Object Recognition ◽  
Qualitative Properties ◽  
Qualitative Phenomenological

AbstractFolk psychology, the naive understanding of mental state concepts, requires a model of how people ascribe mental states to themselves. Competent speakers associate a distinctive memory representation (a category representation, CR) with each mentalistic word in their lexicon. A decision to ascribe such a word to oneself depends on matching to the CR an instance representation (IR) of one's current state. As in visual object recognition, evidence about a CR's content includes the IRs that are or are not available to trigger a match. This poses serious problems for functionalism, the theory-of-mind approach to the meaning of mental terms. A simple functionalist model is inadequate because (1) the relational and subjunctive (what would have happened) information it requires concerning target states is not generally available and (2) it could lead to combinatorial explosion. A modified functionalist model can appeal to qualitative (phenomenological) properties, but the earlier problems still reappear. Qualitative properties are important for sensations, propositional attitudes, and their contents, providing a model that need not refer to functional (causal-relational) properties at all. The introspectionist character of the proposed model does not imply that ascribing mental states to oneself is infallible or complete; nor is the model refuted by empirical research on introspective reports. Empirical research on “theory of mind” does not support any strict version of functionalism but only an understanding of mentalistic words that may depend on phenomenological or experiential qualities.

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