3. History and Contemporary Trends in Conventional Arms Export Controls

While defence industrial production is increasingly transnationalised, the control of arms exports still takes place almost exclusively on a national level. With the example of the German export control regime, this work analyses if the current situation yields arms export control risks that could undermine German security policy principles. Furhermore, inferences about IR theory are drawn based on the current regulation and its implementation. Looking at three particular case studies, this work finds that transnational production and trade indeed creates a number of arms diversion risks, however, these risks are predominantly a result of political choice rather than a phenomenon of hyper-globalisation. This work contributes to key discourses in International Security.

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Arms Export Controls and Proliferation

Journal of Conflict Resolution ◽

10.1177/0022002700044006011 ◽

2000 ◽

Vol 44 (6) ◽

pp. 885-895 ◽

Cited By ~ 20

Author(s):

Paul Levine ◽

Ron Smith

Keyword(s):

Export Controls ◽

Arms Export

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Case: Sharing Parts and Services Among NATO Members

10.1007/978-94-6265-471-6_10 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 175-186

Author(s):

Semra Türkalp ◽

Bastiaan Dekkers

Keyword(s):

Export Control ◽

Export Controls ◽

Deviant Behaviour ◽

Member States ◽

Control Laws ◽

Transfer Of Technology ◽

Operational Readiness ◽

Close Cooperation ◽

Arms Export ◽

Internal Pressures

AbstractNATO’s goals require close cooperation of Member States on operational readiness, interoperability of their systems, material supplies, transfer of technology and joint R&D projects. A common approach on the application and implementation of arms export controls, however, is largely lacking. This chapter questions the absence of application and implementation of arms export controls in the context of the material logistical support and services provided by the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA). Three root causes of deviant behaviour of the Member States with the arms export controls are identified and analysed: (1) fragmentation of the arms export control laws and regulations; (2) a lack of leadership commitment and organisational culture of compliance; and (3) a combination of external and internal pressures leads to a forced prioritization of operational readiness above compliance. Next, a response is formulated to effectively counter deviant behaviour such as non-compliance with arms export controls by implementing a mixture of soft and hard controls. We advise the NSPA to create a culture of compliance within the NATO Partnership Program’s community based on ethical values and virtues. This requires social consensus, leadership commitment and a common agreement on and formalization of the basic rules of export control.

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Sweden’s Arms Export Controls: Balancing Support and Restraint

Law and the Arms Trade ◽

10.5040/9781509922321.ch-008 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Mark Bromley ◽

D Cops ◽

N Duquet ◽

G Gourdin

Keyword(s):

Export Controls ◽

Arms Export

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Export controls may harm global cyber research

Emerald Expert Briefings ◽

10.1108/oxan-db199906 ◽

2015 ◽

Keyword(s):

Cyber Security ◽

Dual Use ◽

Export Controls ◽

Content Type ◽

Human Rights Abuses ◽

Security Technologies ◽

International Stability ◽

The Us ◽

Arms Export ◽

The Impact

Subject The impact of the new additions to the Wassenaar Arrangement. Significance The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is taking public comments on its proposed implementation of the cyber security provisions of the the most recent additions to the Wassenaar Arrangement on arms-export controls. The Wassenaar Arrangement is a multilateral agreement to manage the international trade in conventional arms and certain dual-use goods and technologies to contribute to international stability and prevent human rights abuses. In December 2013, it added two types of cyber security technologies to its control lists -- the first such restriction on the export of commercially-available and widely-used software since the creation of the Arrangement in 1996. Impacts Governments not participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement may turn to alternative suppliers. Using export controls as a proxy for regulating the technology's use may limit research into cyber vulnerabilities. The easily transferable nature of software could undermine the effectiveness of export control regimes.

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