Arms Export Controls under Siege of Globalisation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John N. T. Helferich

While defence industrial production is increasingly transnationalised, the control of arms exports still takes place almost exclusively on a national level. With the example of the German export control regime, this work analyses if the current situation yields arms export control risks that could undermine German security policy principles. Furhermore, inferences about IR theory are drawn based on the current regulation and its implementation. Looking at three particular case studies, this work finds that transnational production and trade indeed creates a number of arms diversion risks, however, these risks are predominantly a result of political choice rather than a phenomenon of hyper-globalisation. This work contributes to key discourses in International Security.

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 579-599
Author(s):  
Cindy Whang

ABSTRACT On 13 August 2018, US President Donald Trump signed a legislation called the ‘Export Controls Act of 2018’ (ECA) that is important for reinvigorating the export control regime in the USA. This paper argues that contents of the ECA will not only impact the USA but also the way that the ECA is structured will potentially have a long-lasting influence on international export control regimes and the role that export controls play in international trade. International export control regimes were established post-World War II as a trade measure to pursue common strategic and national security goals among allied countries. Due to the sensitive nature of national security issues, international export control agreements were structured as non-binding agreements that heavily relied on the consensus of participating countries in formulating export control lists that the participating countries could then adopt in their domestic regulations. The cohesiveness of the global export control regimes has been based on the cornerstones of the consensus-building and list-based standards. The USA established its export control regimes to complement these international export control regimes and has been a strong proponent of requesting countries to adopt the international export control lists into domestic regulations. With the passage of the ECA, the infusion of economic policy considerations such as maintaining the USA’s technological leadership through adding a category of emerging and foundational technology has changed the long-standing export control narrative. Through the changes made to the US ECA, the scope of national security subject to export control regimes has expanded from being focused on military-oriented goods and technology into one that now includes commercial technology. While the changes made through the ECA serve to protect the USA’s technological interests, the statute could also undermine important elements of the global export control regime that the international community has established in the past seventy years post-World War II.


2021 ◽  
pp. 175-186
Author(s):  
Semra Türkalp ◽  
Bastiaan Dekkers

AbstractNATO’s goals require close cooperation of Member States on operational readiness, interoperability of their systems, material supplies, transfer of technology and joint R&D projects. A common approach on the application and implementation of arms export controls, however, is largely lacking. This chapter questions the absence of application and implementation of arms export controls in the context of the material logistical support and services provided by the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA). Three root causes of deviant behaviour of the Member States with the arms export controls are identified and analysed: (1) fragmentation of the arms export control laws and regulations; (2) a lack of leadership commitment and organisational culture of compliance; and (3) a combination of external and internal pressures leads to a forced prioritization of operational readiness above compliance. Next, a response is formulated to effectively counter deviant behaviour such as non-compliance with arms export controls by implementing a mixture of soft and hard controls. We advise the NSPA to create a culture of compliance within the NATO Partnership Program’s community based on ethical values and virtues. This requires social consensus, leadership commitment and a common agreement on and formalization of the basic rules of export control.


2007 ◽  
Vol 89 (866) ◽  
pp. 239-245 ◽  

AbstractAmbassador Maurits R. Jochems is currently Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations in the International Secretariat of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). His functions include responsibility for the Alliance's work in the field of civil emergency planning. As a Dutch Foreign Service career diplomat, he has been seconded to NATO since August 2005. Before taking up his current position he was Director of International Security Policy in the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dealing with operations, NATO and EU security policy issues, UN disarmament and arms control, OSCE matters and arms export policy. He has also served at Dutch embassies in Kingston, Bonn, Beirut, Brussels (NATO) and Rome.


2002 ◽  
Vol 58 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 205-242
Author(s):  
A. Baskaran

Multilateral export control regimes such as the London Club and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) aim to prevent the flow of complex dual-use technologies to certain ‘target’ countries. The underlying belief has been that these regimes would be able to delay or cripple strategic weapon programmes in ‘target’ countries. However, little attention has been paid to understand the factors that influence the effectiveness of these regimes. In recent years, the limitations of export controls have become increasingly clear. This paper introduces a conceptual framework and analyses the case of India'S space and missile programmes to trace the factors that determine the effectiveness of export control regimes and to understand why these regimes, particularly the MTCR are increasingly ineffective on certain ‘target’ countries.


2003 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 33

The current world climate has reinforced the need for vigilance in ensuring that goods originating from Australia are not diverted for use in a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme. Australia?s export control system plays a vital role in ensuring that we uphold our commitment to being a responsible exporter of defence and strategic goods and that any items exported are consistent with our strategic and security policy objectives.


Politics ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 175-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Major

The article aims to explore the utility of Europeanisation as a concept to grasp the interactions between national and European levels. The article illustrates how the EU impacts on the national level of policy, polity and the politics of Member States and assesses how the role of nation states within the European political system has changed as a result. First, the existing definitions of Europeanisation are critically assessed, contextualised and delimited. Initially developed for communitised policy areas in the first pillar, Europeanisation is defined as an interactive, ongoing and mutually constitutive process of ‘Europeanising’ and ‘Europeanised’ countries, linking national and European levels. Defining Europeanisation as ‘domestic change’, the article then discusses mechanisms, objects and forms, as well as the criteria and conditions of change. The article subsequently seeks to clarify the validity of the Europeanisation concept in capturing the increasing interwovenness of national and European spheres in intergovernmental policy fields situated in the second pillar of the EU, that is, foreign and security policy. Inherent methodological challenges, mainly due to the deficient delimitation of Europeanisation and the intergovernmental character of this policy field are discussed as well as the particularities of its applicability in this unique policy area.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 161-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamed Alavi ◽  
Tatsiana Khamichonak

Abstract Export controls for dual-use items are an important constituent element of both the security policies of state exporters and WMD non-proliferation efforts. Dual-use goods and technologies can be used for both civil and military purposes, which requires careful oversight over their export to countries that are considered unfriendly or have ambiguous foreign policy attitudes. By their very nature, dual-use items may be used both to further legitimate ends, like promoting technological development and strengthening economic ties, and to aid in unwarranted acts. State exporters are faced with the responsibility of balancing the security objectives pertaining to exports of dual-use items with the competitiveness of local economies. The paper discusses the EU export control regime and EU membership in international export control groups. In doing so, comparative and normative research methods are chosen to analyze existing literature on Council Regulation 428/2009 and other international export control groups, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group (AG) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The paper will conclude by identifying shortcomings and addressing possible amendments to the regulation.


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