Ukraine’s integration into the world arms market

Hostilities in eastern Ukraine have highlighted the need for accelerated transformation of Ukrainian armed forces and strengthening country’s defense capabilities. Ukraine is an active consumer and exporter of weapons, so it needs to improve constantly its position in the international arms market, which, by the way, unlike most markets suffering from the COVID-19 pandemic, is constantly growing. The study aims to assess the prospects of Ukraine’s integration into the world arms market to secure its armed forces and achieve the highest possible level of arms exports. Methods of comparative analysis and integrated approach were used in the study. The obtained results demonstrated that Ukrainian arms export has fallen dramatically in recent years (from 1501 million USD in 2012 to 115 million USD in 2020); the largest importers were China (36% of Ukraine’s total arms exports), Russia (20%), and Thailand (17%). The main explanation for this is the necessity of transition to more technological weapons. Concerning weapon imports, Turkey, the USA, Great Britain, Poland, and Bulgaria became the main suppliers. It is about ammunition, electronics, including electronic warfare stations, means of communication, sniper rifles, grenade launchers, etc. The study substantiated that Ukraine should implement joint projects with other countries to fully develop its high-tech weapons in accordance with the latest military technologies.

State Department Controls on Exports of Defense Articles and Defense Services

Chapter 2 covers U.S. government controls on exports, reexports, and transfers of “U.S.-origin” goods, software, and technology, and the provision of services, that are military in nature. These are governed principally by the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which are administered by the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC). The chapter explains: which items are subject to the ITAR; the basis and criteria for the ITAR’s restrictions; the requirement to register with DDTC if you export or manufacture items subject to the ITAR or if you are involved in other activities regulated by the ITAR; how to determine whether your product or technology is covered and, if so, whether you will need a license to export or reexport it; how to get a license if one is required; how to clear and document the actual export; the potential penalties for violating the rules; and reporting requirements related to political contributions, fees, and commissions paid in connection with certain sales, . The chapter also explains how the ITAR relate to the regulatory regimes covered in other parts of the book.

Introduction

This year’s volume of the Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies (NL ARMS) offers an interdisciplinary view on the domain of Compliance and Integrity in International Military Trade (CIIMT), integrating defence economics, international law, arms export control frameworks and policies, information management, organizational sciences and ethics. Although in academia, and from an interdisciplinary perspective, CIIMT constitutes a novel research domain, across private and public defence-related sectors, the subject evokes high levels of attention and interest, instigating a need for critical thinking, reflection and creativity to address ensuing multi-faceted issues and problems. From 2017, the Faculty of Military Sciences (FMS) at the Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA) has offered an in-house MSc programme on CIIMT, which, by integrating practice-based and scientific-based knowledge, aims to contribute to this need. The NL ARMS 2021 comprises, amongst others, contributions from students and lecturers partaking in this programme.

Case: Sharing Parts and Services Among NATO Members

NATO’s goals require close cooperation of Member States on operational readiness, interoperability of their systems, material supplies, transfer of technology and joint R&D projects. A common approach on the application and implementation of arms export controls, however, is largely lacking. This chapter questions the absence of application and implementation of arms export controls in the context of the material logistical support and services provided by the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA). Three root causes of deviant behaviour of the Member States with the arms export controls are identified and analysed: (1) fragmentation of the arms export control laws and regulations; (2) a lack of leadership commitment and organisational culture of compliance; and (3) a combination of external and internal pressures leads to a forced prioritization of operational readiness above compliance. Next, a response is formulated to effectively counter deviant behaviour such as non-compliance with arms export controls by implementing a mixture of soft and hard controls. We advise the NSPA to create a culture of compliance within the NATO Partnership Program’s community based on ethical values and virtues. This requires social consensus, leadership commitment and a common agreement on and formalization of the basic rules of export control.

Why Reagan was not impeached

In the aftermath of Watergate and Vietnam, Congressional investigations uncovered the largely unknown activities of the CIA and other agencies, which included arming and interfering in the domestic politics of regimes in both Central America and Iran. These programmes had also involved supporting reactionary regimes in ways that some saw as drawing the United States into conflicts, like Vietnam, without public knowledge or consent. In 1987, it was revealed that the Reagan administration had operated a clandestine policy in Nicaragua that evaded the restrictions placed upon the executive by the Boland Amendment in terms of aid given to the Nicaraguan Contras and that National Security Council (NSC) staff had lied to Congress and concealed these illegal actions. They had solicited funds from foreign allies and smuggled arms to the Contra insurgents in support of their efforts to topple the Sandinista regime. Contrary to the Arms Export Control Act and to its own publicly stated policy, the administration had also sold arms, particularly missiles, to Iran, which had been branded a sponsor of international terrorism since the Iranian revolution, and which was currently at war with its neighbour, Iraq. Such deals had formed part of ‘arms for hostages’ negotiations that were also contrary to official policy. Finally, it was disclosed that profits from the arms sales had been diverted to fund the Contras and hence to evade Congressional restrictions on funding. This article explores why these illegal actions did not result in President Reagan’s impeachment. It considers the merits of the administration’s claims that this was a ‘rogue operation’ by zealots within the NSC, and the success of its efforts to present Reagan as eager to cooperate with efforts to discover the truth of what had happened. It reviews the interactions between the Tower Commission, Congressional investigations and Office of Independent Counsel probe (Lawrence Walsh) and shows how these contributed to Reagan’s ‘escape’ from impeachment. It reviews the argument that Reagan’s underlying health problems contributed to his lax management of NSC operations and it considers the importance of televised testimony, particularly that of Oliver North, in shaping public opinion in the administration’s favour. Finally, it considers how this significant episode in 1980s politics foreshadowed major trends in US politics that can be seen as culminating in the present, acute partisan divide, Donald Trump’s double impeachment, and a manifest decline in public trust and respect for American political institutions.

The European Turn in France’s Arms Export

This article analyzes a new trend in the arms export policy of modern France – an increasing share of European countries in the geographical structure of sales. Based on statistics and examples, regional priorities of French export before Emmanuel Macron’s presidency are identified; the reasons for the turn towards Europe at present stage and its possible limits are studied. The author draws attention to the fact that until recently, the Middle East and Asia have been key partners of France, providing two thirds of international demand for the products of French defense industry. However, today their role is declining in favor of the EU countries: Belgium, Romania, Greece, etc., with which Paris has signed a series of major contracts in 2018–2021. This development primarily stems from a difficult foreign policy context forcing the EU members to allocate more funds for defense needs, as well as from temporary difficulties in France’s relations with Middle Eastern clients. The author concludes that the «Europeanization» of sales is likely to continue but it is too early to talk about a full reorientation of French exports towards Europe. A more realistic task Paris de facto solves is to balance its export structure by diversifying the range of customers.

Weapons from the South: Democratization, Civil Society, and Brazil's Arms Exports

What explains the existence of humanitarian concerns in decisions involving arms transfers? This paper examines the potential influence of democratization and civil society activities on arms transfer policies and practice through a case study on Brazil. Brazil's re-democratization in 1985 provides an opportunity to test whether a change of regime type influences arms export behavior and whether civil society groups can influence it in newly democratized countries. Based on evidence collected mainly through archival research at Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and semi-structured interviews, this paper argues that transitioning to democracy had an immediate effect on arms transfer policies and practice in Brazil. After the end of Brazil's military regime, arms export policies and practice changed due mainly to reputational concerns: a stricter arms control could provide reputational gains to Brazil in an international norm environment where liberal values were perceived to be cascading. In addition to this immediate effect, democratic institutions created better conditions for the emergence of civil society groups campaigning for a stricter arms control, which emerged in the late 1990s. The paper studies a campaign and network led by the civil society group Viva Rio, which led to the introduction of a stricter policy on arms sales to most Latin American and Caribbean countries. These findings imply that democratization has both short- and long-term effects on arms transfers and that democratic institutions can influence state behavior regarding arms transfers even in countries with little tradition of civil society groups working with arms control.

Germany and «Libyan problem» during 2010-s

Germany has been growing political and military activity in Northern Africa and Sahel region by the mid 2010s. FRG and its EU partners faced the great number of instability risks which are projected from zones of armed conflicts located in northern part of Africa. The key elements of the corridor of instability which has connected the fragile states in Sahel and Northern Africa were the «Libyan door» (the upper part) and «Malian gates» (the lower one). But in the 2010s FRG faced the absence of opportunities for itself to be directly involved in the resolution of «Libyan problem». That is why in 2012-2019 Germany had been trying only to fence «Libyan problem» in. This perimeter has four segments. German contribution to the creation of Western one (the strengthening of Tunisian and Algerian borders with Libya) and especially Eastern segment (the same with Egypt) was rather limited and consisted of arms export to these countries. The article explores the evolution of German participation to the resolution of Mali armed conflict (first of all FRG`s military contribution to EUTM Mali and MINUSMA missions). This one and also German participation in the reform of Niger`s security sector was the creation of Southern segment of the perimeter. By 2020 Germany has deepened cooperation on «Libyan problem» not only with regional players but also world powers. During Merkel`s visit to Moscow (January 11, 2020) the scheme of future Berlin conference on Libya was declared. This format was established on January 19, 2020. Germany became the coordinator of inter-Libyan dialogue (between the Government of national consensus in the West of the country and Libyan national army in the East) and supported it by the launch of the EU mission «IRINI». The article concludes about the perspectives of German policy towards Libya considering COVID-19 pandemics.