scholarly journals Réplica ao artigo “Van Fraassen, a inferência da melhor explicação e a matrix realista”, de Alessio Gava

Problemata ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-170
Author(s):  
Marcos Rodrigues da Silva ◽  
Debora Minikokski
Keyword(s):  
Van Fraassen

Images of van Fraassen

Metascience ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-312
Author(s):  
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Keyword(s):  
Van Fraassen

The Empirical Stance ? Bas van Fraassen

2006 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 177-177
Author(s):  
John Ross Churchill
Keyword(s):  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Bas Van Fraassen ◽  
Empirical Stance

Seeing the Unobservable: Van Fraassen and the Limits of Experience

Synthese ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 140 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Alspector-Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Van Fraassen

scholarly journals Datos, fenómenos y representación: sobre el estructuralismo empirista de van Fraassen

2015 ◽  
Vol 64 (157) ◽  
pp. 137-149
Author(s):  
José Luis Rolleri
Keyword(s):  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Bas Van Fraassen

<p>En este escrito se analizan ciertos conceptos del estructuralismo empirista de Bas van Fraassen, en particular, el de representación, para intentar una crítica a su posición con respecto al vínculo entre los modelos de las teorías y, en última instancia, el mundo físico por medio de los modelos de datos, a los cuales van Fraassen les adjudica el papel de representantes de los fenómenos. Al final se delinea, a muy grandes rasgos, una alternativa conceptualista.</p>

scholarly journals INFINITARY TABLEAU FOR SEMANTIC TRUTH

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
TOBY MEADOWS
Keyword(s):  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Direct Proof ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Easy Method ◽  
Theories Of Truth ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Image Position

AbstractWe provide infinitary proof theories for three common semantic theories of truth: strong Kleene, van Fraassen supervaluation and Cantini supervaluation. The value of these systems is that they provide an easy method of proving simple facts about semantic theories. Moreover we shall show that they also give us a simpler understanding of the computational complexity of these definitions and provide a direct proof that the closure ordinal for Kripke’s definition is $\omega _1^{CK}$. This work can be understood as an effort to provide a proof-theoretic counterpart to Welch’s game-theoretic (Welch, 2009).

scholarly journals Realism, empiricism and causal inquiry in International Relations: What is at stake?

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 562-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam R C Humphreys
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Bas Van Fraassen ◽  
Causal Mechanisms ◽  
Everyday World

Discussions of causal inquiry in International Relations are increasingly framed in terms of a contrast between rival philosophical positions, each with a putative methodological corollary — empiricism is associated with a search for patterns of covariation, while scientific realism is associated with a search for causal mechanisms. Scientific realism is, on this basis, claimed to open up avenues of causal inquiry that are unavailable to empiricists. This is misleading. Empiricism appears inferior only if its reformulation by contemporary philosophers of science, such as Bas van Fraassen, is ignored. I therefore develop a fuller account than has previously been provided in International Relations of Van Fraassen’s ‘constructive empiricism’ and how it differs from scientific realism. In light of that, I consider what is at stake in calls for the reconstitution of causal inquiry along scientific realist, rather than empiricist, lines. I argue that scientific realists have failed to make a compelling case that what matters is whether researchers are realists. Constructive empiricism and scientific realism differ only on narrow epistemological and metaphysical grounds that carry no clear implications for the conduct of causal inquiry. Yet, insofar as Van Fraassen has reformed empiricism to meet the scientific realist challenge, this has created a striking disjunction between mainstream practices of causal inquiry in International Relations and the vision of scientific practice that scientific realists and contemporary empiricists share, especially regarding the significance of regularities observed in everyday world politics. Although scientific realist calls for a philosophical revolution in International Relations are overstated, this disjunction demands further consideration.

I Wasn’t Talking about That

Aboutness ◽  
2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Yablo
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Epistemic Modals ◽  
Empirical Adequacy ◽  
Independent Factor ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Partial Truth ◽  
Truth Conditional ◽  
Ways Of Being

This chapter argues that partial truth is apt to strike us as sneaky, unclean, the last refuge of a scoundrel. But, whether a statement is partly true, or true in what it says about BLAH, may be all that we want to know. A statement S is partly true insofar as it has wholly true parts: wholly true implications whose subject matter is included in that of S. An account of subject matter will thus be needed, and of the relation (“aboutness”) that sentences bear to their subject matters, if we want to understand partial truth. Aboutness has been somewhat neglected in philosophy. But not entirely; think of Frege on identity, Kripke on counterparts, van Fraassen on empirical adequacy, Yalcin on epistemic modals, and Hempel on confirmation. Subject matter will be treated here as an independent factor in meaning, over and above truth-conditional content. Not completely independent, though, for what a sentence is about is tied up with its ways of being true and false.

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