The concepts of virtue after the „character – situation” debate

The article focuses on a currently hot debate in contemporary ethics that takes place between so-called situationists and the advocates of virtue ethics. The fundamental assumption made by virtue ethics is that developing and perfecting one’s moral character or moral virtues warrants one’s morally good action. Situationists claim that this assumption contradicts the results of the latest empirical studies. From this observation, they conclude that virtue ethics is based on an empirically inadequate moral psychology.In the first part of the article, I present the conceptions of virtue and moral character developed in response to the situationist criticism. I show to which degree these conceptions differ from the classical, so-called global approach in virtue ethics In the second part, based on the references to the latest empirical studies in social and cognitive psychology, I argue, against the situationist objection, that the classical notion of virtue meets the requirement of empirical adequacy. I mainly resort to the interactionist theory of personality by W. Mischel, R. Baumeister’s studies over self-control, D. Kahneman's conception of two-processual mind, and the studies over automatized processes by J. Bargh.

Longino's Concept of Values in Science

While classical neo-positivists reject any role for traditionally understood values in science, Kuhn identifies five specific values as criteria for assessing a scientific theory; this approach has been further developed by several other authors. This paper focuses on Helen Longino, who presents a significant contemporary critique of Kuhn’s concept. The most controversial aspect of Longino’s position is arguably her claim that the criterion of empirical adequacy is the least defensible basis for assessing theories. The de-emphasizing of the importance of external consistency as a value and the introduction of socio-political considerations into the processes of an assessment of scientific theories are also considered problematic issues. I provide arguments against Longino’s conception, identify some of its problems, and argue for refusal of her approach.

Presuppositions, implicatures, and contextual equivalence

Maximize Presupposition! (MP), as originally proposed in Heim (Semantik: Ein internationales Handbuch der zeitgenössischen Forschung, pp. 487–535, 1991) and developed in subsequent works, offers an account of the otherwise mysterious unassertability of a variety of sentences. At the core of MP is the idea that speakers are urged to use a sentence ψ over a sentence ϕ if ψ contributes the same new information as ϕ, yet carries a stronger presupposition. While MP has been refined in many ways throughout the years, most (if not all) of its formulations have retained this characterisation of the MP-competition. Recently, however, the empirical adequacy of this characterisation has been questioned in light of certain newly discovered cases that are infelicitous, despite meeting MP-competition conditions. This has led some researchers to broaden the scope of MP, extending it to competition between sentences which are not contextually equivalent (Spector and Sudo in Linguistics and Philosophy 40(5):473–517, 2017) and whose presuppositions are not satisfied in the context (Anvari in Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory 28, pp. 711–726, 2018; Manuscript, IJN-ENS, 2019). In this paper, we present a body of evidence showing that these formulations of MP are sometimes too liberal, sometimes too restrictive: they overgenerate infelicity for a variety of felicitous cases while leaving the infelicity of minimally different cases unaccounted for. We propose an alternative, implicature-based approach stemming from Magri (PhD dissertation, MIT, 2009), Meyer (PhD dissertation, MIT, 2013), and Marty (PhD dissertation, MIT, 2017), which reintroduces contextual equivalence and presupposition satisfaction in some form through the notion of relevance. This approach is shown to account for the classical and most of the novel cases. Yet some of the latter remain problematic for this approach as well. We end the paper with a systematic comparison of the different approaches to MP and MP-like phenomena, covering both the classical and the novel cases. All in all, the issue of how to properly restrict the competition for MP-like phenomena remains an important challenge for all accounts in the literature.

Situated Mental Representations

If we want to account for mental representations (MRs) as being used in scientific explanations and realized by neural correlates in biological systems, then we have to give up the traditional Fodorian view of rigid symbolic MRs. However, we do not have to throw out the baby with the bathwater and accept anti-representationalism. Instead this chapter offers a new account of mental representations as real, nonstable, use-dependent, and situated. As such, they can be pivotal constituents of scientific explanations. The chapter demonstrates the empirical adequacy of this account by discussing cases of birds and rats relying on what-where-when memory. It argues that we need to involve nonlinguistic MRs to adequately account for their abilities. In this way, the alternative theory presented here provides a detailed description of situated mental representations: it combines a functionalist account of MR with a relational dimension that can vary with the situation type and that allows for nonstatic constructions of MRs in specific contexts.

A simple measure for the empirical adequacy of a theoretical construct

A reliable measure to evaluate the predictive accuracy of a theoretical construct should be independent of the empirical setting in which the construct is tested. Effect size measures such as Cohen’s d, widely used for this very purpose today, instead plague this evaluation with ambiguity. Evaluating a theoretically postulated effect size in view of an empirically observed standard deviation—as Cohen’s d requires—is particularly inadequate when the empirical adequacy of a theoretical construct must be evaluated across empirical settings. As an improved measure, the similarity index compares the theoretically predicted effect size directly to the empirically observed effect size. Their similarity thus informs the construct’s empirical adequacy. Based on computer simulations, we propose a specific similarity interval as useful for theory-construction. We illustrate the similarity index using select findings from social and personality psychology, and describe its application in different empirical research designs.

Dynamical Phenomena and Their Models: Truth and Empirical Correctness

In the epistemological tradition, there are two main interpretations of the semantic relation that an empirical theory may bear to the real world. According to realism, the theory-world relationship should be conceived as truth; according to instrumentalism, instead, it should be limited to empirical adequacy. Then, depending on how empirical theories are conceived, either syntactically as a class of sentences, or semantically as a class of models, the concepts of truth and empirical adequacy assume different and specific forms. In this paper, we review two main conceptions of truth (one sentence-based and one model-based) and two of empirical adequacy (one sentence-based and one model-based), we point out their respective difficulties, and we give a first formulation of a new general view of the theory-world relationship, which we call Methodological Constructive Realism (MCR). We then show how the content of MCR can be further specified and expressed in a definite and precise form. The bulk of the paper shows in detail how it is possible to accomplish this goal for the special case of deterministic dynamical phenomena and their correlated deterministic models. This special version of MCR is formulated as an axiomatic extension of set theory, whose specific axioms constitute a formal ontology that provides an adequate framework for analyzing the two semantic relations of truth and empirical correctness, as well as their connections.

The Interpretive-Sensory Access Theory of Self-Knowledge: Empirical Adequacy and Scientific Fruitfulness

The interpretive-sensory access theory of self-knowledge claims that we come to know our own minds by turning our capacities for knowing other minds onto ourselves. Peter Carruthers argues that two of the theory’s advantages are empirical adequacy and scientific fruitfulness: it leaves few of the old discoveries unexplained and makes new predictions that provide a framework for new discoveries. A decade has now passed since the theory’s introduction. I review the most important developments during this time period regarding the two criteria: whether the theory’s six main predictions were supported, and whether the theory’s predictions contributed to new empirical studies. I argue that the interpretive-sensory access theory of self-knowledge remains empirically adequate and scientifically fruitful.

Cheater Detection Using the Unrelated Question Model

Randomized response techniques (RRTs) are useful survey tools for estimating the prevalence of sensitive issues, such as the prevalence of doping in elite sports. One type of RRT, the unrelated question model (UQM), has become widely used because of its psychological acceptability for study participants and its favorable statistical properties. One drawback of this model, however, is that it does not allow for detecting cheaters—individuals who disobey the survey instructions and instead give self-protecting responses. In this article, we present refined versions of the UQM designed to detect the prevalence of cheating responses. We provide explicit formulas to calculate the parameters of these refined UQM versions and show how the empirical adequacy of these versions can be tested. The Appendices contain R-code for all necessary calculations.