A Theory of Intertheoretic Reduction

Energy Physics

Abstract I develop an account of naturalness (that is, approximately: lack of extreme fine-tuning) in physics which demonstrates that naturalness assumptions are not restricted to narrow cases in high-energy physics but are a ubiquitous part of how interlevel relations are derived in physics. After exploring how and to what extent we might justify such assumptions on methodological grounds or through appeal to speculative future physics, I consider the apparent failure of naturalness in cosmology and in the Standard Model. I argue that any such naturalness failure threatens to undermine the entire structure of our understanding of intertheoretic reduction, and so risks a much larger crisis in physics than is sometimes suggested; I briefly review some currently-popular strategies that might avoid that crisis.

Phase Transitions: A Challenge for Intertheoretic Reduction?

Philosophy of Science ◽

10.1086/704974 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 86 (4) ◽

pp. 612-640 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Patricia Palacios

Keyword(s):

Phase Transitions ◽

Conceptual Progress and Word/World Relations: In Search of the Essence of Natural Kinds

Canadian Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.1080/00455091.1985.10716405 ◽

1985 ◽

Vol 15 (1) ◽

pp. 1-17 ◽

Cited By ~ 17

Author(s):

Paul M. Churchland

Keyword(s):

Scientific Realism ◽

Natural Kinds ◽

Problem Of Induction ◽

Natural Laws ◽

De Re ◽

Aim Of Science ◽

Conceptual Progress

The problem of natural kinds forms the busy crossroads where a number of larger problems meet: the problem of universals, the problem of induction and projectibility, the problem of natural laws and de re modalities, the problem of meaning and reference, the problem of intertheoretic reduction, the question of the aim of science, and the problem of scientific realism in general. Nor do these exhaust the list. Not surprisingly then, different writers confront a different ‘problem of natural kinds,’ depending on which background issue is for them the principal issue at stake. The issues of essentialism, meaning, and reference, for example, have tended to dominate recent discussions of natural kinds (Kripke [1972], Putnam [1975], [1981], Mellor [1977], Churchland [1979], Shapere [1982]). But evidently these are only part of the puzzle.

Two Concepts of Intertheoretic Reduction

The Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.2307/2024906 ◽

1973 ◽

Vol 70 (7) ◽

pp. 181 ◽

Cited By ~ 103

Author(s):

Thomas Nickles

Keyword(s):

Intertheoretic Reduction: A Neuroscientist's Field Guide

On the Contrary ◽

10.7551/mitpress/5123.003.0008 ◽

1998 ◽

Keyword(s):

Field Guide ◽

The Individualism-Holism Debate on Intertheoretic Reduction and the Argument from Multiple Realization

Philosophy of the Social Sciences ◽

10.1177/0048393102250306 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 33 (1) ◽

pp. 77-99 ◽

Cited By ~ 25

Author(s):

Julie Zahle

Keyword(s):

Multiple Realization ◽

Is Intertheoretic Reduction Feasible?

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science ◽

10.1093/bjps/33.1.17 ◽

1982 ◽

Vol 33 (1) ◽

pp. 17-40 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

KENNETH FRIEDMAN

Keyword(s):

Intertheoretic Reduction: A Neuroscientist’s Field Guide

Neurophilosophy and Alzheimer’s Disease ◽

10.1007/978-3-642-46759-2_3 ◽

1992 ◽

pp. 18-29 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

P. M. Churchland ◽

P. S. Churchland

Keyword(s):

Field Guide ◽

Intertheoretic Reduction

Bayesian Philosophy of Science ◽

10.1093/oso/9780199672110.003.0008 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 207-226

Author(s):

Jan Sprenger ◽

Stephan Hartmann

Keyword(s):

Statistical Mechanics ◽

Bayesian Analysis ◽

Posterior Probability ◽

The Other ◽

Epistemic Value ◽

The Right ◽

Successful Reduction

We reconsider the Generalized Nagel-Schaffner (GNS) model of reduction and argue that, contrary to a widely held view, it is the right analysis of intertheoretic reduction. In particular, it provides a convincing analysis of the reductive relationship between statistical mechanics and thermodynamics. Then we proceed to a Bayesian analysis of the epistemic value of reduction, showing that intertheoretic (GNS) reduction facilitates flow of confirmation between the reducing and the reduced theory. Specifically, we show that evidence which prior to reduction supported only one of the theories, comes to support the other theory as well. Moreover, a successful reduction increases both the prior and posterior probability of the conjunction of both theories.

Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part I: Historical and Scientific Setting

Dialogue ◽

10.1017/s0012217300023088 ◽

1981 ◽

Vol 20 (1) ◽

pp. 38-59 ◽

Cited By ~ 81

Author(s):

C.A. Hooker

Keyword(s):

General Theory ◽

Philosophy Of Science ◽

Significant Role ◽

Formal Analysis ◽

Theory Reduction ◽

Theoretical Domain ◽

Theory Of Theory

The Three Papers comprising this series, together with my earlier [34] also published in this journal, constitute an attempt to set out the major issues in the theoretical domain of reduction and to develop (tentatively) a general theory of theory reduction. The fourth paper, [34], though published separately from this trio, is integral to the presentation and should be read in conjunction with these papers. Even so, the presentation is limited in scope – roughly, to intertheoretic reduction among empirical theories – and informal in presentation – not least because a satisfying formal account of theories has yet to be offered. And despite the length, the treatment is still condensed; often corroborating and/or intuitively helpful detail has had to be consigned to footnotes or omitted. I approach the problem from within my own naturalistic realist philosophy of science and formal analysis of abstract hierarchy in theory. The sources for the former are [25], [29], [31], and [32] and those for the latter essentially [27] and [30]. Hierarchical notions played a significant role in the already published [34].