Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part I: Historical and Scientific Setting

Dialogue ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
C.A. Hooker

The Three Papers comprising this series, together with my earlier [34] also published in this journal, constitute an attempt to set out the major issues in the theoretical domain of reduction and to develop (tentatively) a general theory of theory reduction. The fourth paper, [34], though published separately from this trio, is integral to the presentation and should be read in conjunction with these papers. Even so, the presentation is limited in scope – roughly, to intertheoretic reduction among empirical theories – and informal in presentation – not least because a satisfying formal account of theories has yet to be offered. And despite the length, the treatment is still condensed; often corroborating and/or intuitively helpful detail has had to be consigned to footnotes or omitted. I approach the problem from within my own naturalistic realist philosophy of science and formal analysis of abstract hierarchy in theory. The sources for the former are [25], [29], [31], and [32] and those for the latter essentially [27] and [30]. Hierarchical notions played a significant role in the already published [34].

Author(s):  
Margaret Schabas

Keynes is best known as an economist but, in the tradition of John Stuart Mill and William Stanley Jevons, he also made significant contributions to inductive logic and the philosophy of science. Keynes’ only book explicitly on philosophy, A Treatise on Probability (1921), remains an important classic on the subject. It develops a non-frequentist interpretation of probability as the key to sound judgment and scientific reasoning. His General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) is the watershed of twentieth-century macroeconomics. While not, strictly speaking, a philosophical work, it nonetheless advances distinct readings of rationality, uncertainty and social justice.


Probability theory is a key tool of the physical, mathematical, and social sciences. It has also been playing an increasingly significant role in philosophy: in epistemology, philosophy of science, ethics, social philosophy, philosophy of religion, and elsewhere. This Handbook encapsulates and furthers the influence of philosophy on probability, and of probability on philosophy. Nearly forty articles summarize the state of play and present new insights in various areas of research at the intersection of these two fields. The volume begins with a primer on those parts of probability theory that we believe are most important for philosophers to know, and the rest is divided into seven main sections: history; formalism; alternatives to standard probability theory; interpretations and interpretive issues; probabilistic judgment and its applications; applications of probability: science; and applications of probability: philosophy.


Author(s):  
Jan Wolenski

Ajdukiewicz, like other typical members of the Lwów–Warsaw School, the main Polish analytic movement, was basically interested in logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, and philosophy of science. In the 1930s, he proposed a form of radical conventionalism, an extension of the conventionalism of Duhem and Poincaré. Later, he rejected this radical conventionalism in favour of a semantic epistemology. In the philosophy of science he tried to build a general theory of fallible inferences based on decision theory. Ajdukiewicz’s most important contribution to logic is his formal notation for syntactic categories.


Author(s):  
Hanoch Gutfreund ◽  
Jürgen Renn

This section discusses the development of Albert Einstein's ideas and attitudes as he struggled for eight years to come up with a general theory of relativity that would meet the physical and mathematical requirements laid down at the outset. It first considers Einstein's work on gravitation in Prague before analyzing three documents that played a significant role in his search for a theory of general relativity: the Zurich Notebook, the Einstein–Grossmann Entwurf paper, and the Einstein–Besso manuscript. It then looks at Einstein's completion of his general theory of relativity in Berlin in November 1915, along with his development of a new theory of gravitation within the framework of the special theory of relativity. It also examines the formulation of the basic idea that Einstein termed the “equivalence principle,” his Entwurf theory vs. David Hilbert's theory, and the 1916 manuscript of Einstein's work on the general theory of relativity.


2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Radder ◽  
Gerben Meynen

In the extensive, recent debates on free will, the pioneering experiments by Benjamin Libet continue to play a significant role. It is often claimed that these experiments demonstrate the illusory nature of freely willed actions. In this article, we provide a detailed analysis and evaluation of Libet’s experiments from a philosophy of science perspective. Our analysis focuses on Libet’s central notion of the “initiation” of freely willed processes by the brain. We examine four interpretations of the notion of initiation: in terms of a cause, a necessary condition, a correlation, and a regular succession. We argue that none of these four interpretations can be supported by the design and results of Libet’s experiments. In addition, we analyze two recent Libet-type experiments. Our general conclusion is that neither Libet’s original experiments nor later Libet-type experiments can justify the claim that allegedly freely willed processes are in fact initiated by the brain.


Author(s):  
Andreas Hüttemann ◽  
Alan Love

Reduction and reductionism have been central philosophical topics in analytic philosophy of science for more than six decades. Together they encompass a diversity of issues from metaphysics and epistemology. This article provides an introduction to the topic that illuminates how contemporary epistemological discussions took their shape historically and limns the contours of concrete cases of reduction in specific natural sciences. The unity of science and the impulse to accomplish compositional reduction in accord with a layer-cake vision of the sciences, the seminal contributions of Ernest Nagel on theory reduction and how they strongly conditioned subsequent philosophical discussions, and the detailed issues pertaining to different accounts of reduction that arise in both physical and biological science (e.g., limit-case and part-whole reduction in physics, the difference-making principle in genetics, and mechanisms in molecular biology) are explored. The conclusion argues that the epistemological heterogeneity and patchwork organization of the natural sciences encourages a pluralist stance about reduction.


1949 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. M. Martin

The purpose of this note is (i) to point out an important similarity between the nominalistic system discussed by Quine in his recent paper On universals and the system of logic (the system н) developed by the author in A homogeneous system for formal logic, (ii) to offer certain corrections to the latter, and (iii) to show that that system (н) is adequate for the general theory of ancestrale and for the definition of any general recursive function of natural numbers.Nominalism as a thesis in the philosophy of science, according to Quine, is the view that it is possible to construct a language adequate for the purposes of science, which in no wise admits classes, properties, relations, or other abstract objects as values for variables.


2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-21
Author(s):  
Márcio Rojas da Cruz ◽  
Gabriele Cornelli

Abstract Born to enable its creators to fulfill their needs, scientific technique has always played a significant role in human civilization. This is the context in which we glimpse the advent of modern technoscience, which has significantly contributed to the increment of human control over nature. This study aims to analyze, under the focus of bioethics, reflections on the philosophy of science as they relate to the neutrality of science and converge with epistemic rationality, as well as to relate those reflections to the process of making decisions in the administration of technoscience. The study has raised doubts about the capacity of technoscientific knowledge to legitimize and justify the decisions within the ambit of the national science and technology systems, thus signaling the need for promoting a link between technoscientific self-regulation and bioethic hetero-regulation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-76
Author(s):  
Mirosław Krukowski

Abstract The author presents the proposal for a map as a model based on the current concepts in the philosophy of science. It is the attempt to define a map within the general theory of the model – in its ontological, semantical, and epistemological aspect. Treating a map as a model of reality boils down to specifying several characteristics determining its character. The article primarily aims at broadening the discussion on what a map is and what defines it as a model of reality. A new definition has been proposed in effect of the deliberations based on the analysis of models’ typology in the sphere of philosophy.


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