5. The Monetary Policy Network

2018 ◽  
pp. 84-111
1991 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 711-734 ◽  
Author(s):  
William D. Coleman

AbstractMonetary policy in Canada is formulated and implemented in a state-directed policy network dominated by the Bank of Canada. State-directed networks embody a tension between democratic accountability and legitimacy on the one side and maintaining support from the business community on the other. This article assesses this tension in Canadian monetary policy, focussing on the relationships between the Bank of Canada and other actors. As a central bank, the Bank of Canada possesses a unique constitutional status, being tied to the government through a directive power of the minister of finance. The Bank has also developed close working relationships with financial institutions for the implementation of monetary policy. In reviewing these relationships, the article identifies problems related to the Bank's political accountability and its ability to maintain legitimacy. The article then reviews some reforms that might address these problems: making the Bank more independent, subjecting it to closer control by the minister of finance and endowing it with a council-based internal governing system.


Author(s):  
Gene Park ◽  
Saori N. Katada ◽  
Giacomo Chiozza ◽  
Yoshiko Kojo

Bolder economic policy could have addressed the persistent bouts of deflation in post-bubble Japan, claims this book. Despite warnings from economists, intense political pressure, and unconventional policy options to address this problem, Japan's central bank, the Bank of Japan (BOJ), resisted taking the bold actions that this book claims would have significantly helped. With Prime Minister Abe Shinzō's return to power, Japan finally shifted course at the start of 2013 with the launch of Abenomics—an economic agenda to reflate the economy—and Abe's appointment of new leadership at the BOJ. The BOJ's resistance to experimenting with bolder policy stemmed from entrenched policy ideas that were hostile to activist monetary policy. The book explains how these policy ideas evolved over the course of the BOJ's long history and gained dominance because of the closed nature of the broader policy network. The explanatory power of policy ideas and networks suggests a basic inadequacy in the dominant framework for analysis of the politics of monetary policy derived from the literature on central bank independence. This approach privileges the interaction between political principals and their supposed agents, central bankers; but this book shows clearly that central bankers' views, shaped by ideas and institutions, can be decisive in determining monetary policy. Through a combination of institutional analysis, quantitative empirical tests, in-depth case studies, and structured comparison of Japan with other countries, the book shows that, ultimately, the decision to adopt aggressive monetary policy depends largely on the bankers' established policy ideas and policy network.


Author(s):  
Gene Park ◽  
Saori N. Katada ◽  
Giacomo Chiozza ◽  
Yoshiko Kojo

This chapter focuses on the formal monetary policy process specified by the Bank of Japan Law (New BOJ Law), identifying the central actors in the monetary policy network. The New BOJ Law, which came into effect in April 1998, has placed the Policy Board at the center of the BOJ's monetary policymaking. Formally, the Policy Board is not only independent, but it sits atop the entire BOJ organization. In practice, however, the larger BOJ organization has exercised influence in key ways over the composition of the Policy Board and monetary deliberations. Central to this influence is the ability of the BOJ to maintain a relatively closed monetary policy network that limited dissenting views. The key groups in the policy network are the Prime Minister's Office, the Diet, the BOJ Policy Board, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the BOJ itself.


Author(s):  
Gene Park ◽  
Saori N. Katada ◽  
Giacomo Chiozza ◽  
Yoshiko Kojo

This chapter addresses how Prime Minister Abe Shinzō circumvented the monetary policy network by changing the membership of the Policy Board and how he reoriented monetary policy to reflect his reflationary priorities. Upon coming to power, Prime Minister Abe launched his Abenomics agenda based on a strategy of “three arrows”: expansionary monetary policy, flexible fiscal policy (stimulus followed by longer-term fiscal consolidation), and supply-side focused structural reforms. To push his agenda further and to lock changes in, Prime Minister Abe changed the leadership at the Bank of Japan (BOJ). He appointed Kuroda Haruhiko, a former Ministry of Finance (MOF) vice minister of international affairs who had long been an outspoken critic of the BOJ, as governor. Upon becoming governor, Kuroda moved the Policy Board to embrace an aggressive approach to combating deflation. Since the start of Governor Kuroda's much bolder deployment of unconventional monetary policy, a number of economic measures have shown improvement.


2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vítor Gaspar ◽  
Otmar Issing ◽  
Oreste Tristani ◽  
David Vestin

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