11. Kantian Constructivism in Ethics

Author(s):  
Julia Markovits ◽  
Kenneth Walden

Author(s):  
Nathaniel Jezzi

<p>John Rawls’s 1980 Dewey Lectures are widely acknowledged to represent the locus classicus for contemporary discussions of moral constructivism. Nevertheless, few published works have engaged with the significant interpretive challenges one finds in these lectures, and those that have fail to offer a satisfactory reading of the view that Rawls presents there or the place the lectures occupy in the development of Rawls's thinking. Indeed, there is a surprising lack of consensus about how best to interpret the constructivism of these lectures. In this paper, I argue that the constructivism presented in the Dewey Lectures is best understood as involving the view that moral truth is correspondence with procedurally-determined, stance-dependent facts. Employing Rawls’s discussion of rational intuitionism as a foil, I defend this reading against textual discrepancies from within the lectures, as well as those one finds across Rawls’s other works. In addition to settling interpretive disputes, I draw out the ways in which this understanding of Kantian constructivism fits within the broader comparative project in ‘moral theory’ that Rawls inherits from Sidgwick.</p>


Philosophy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred D'Agostino

Objectivity has two aspects. It means, in the metaphysical sense, a correspondence between a statement and the way the world is independently of human conceptual activities. It refers, in the methodological sense, to products of processes of inquiry disciplined by the demand to exclude all that would render those products dependent on prejudice or bias. Already in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, we see that the convergence from multiple unbiased perspectives that we expect from a methodologically objective process might be seen as evidence of correspondence with underlying independent realities. In some domains, convergence may be all that’s on offer, there being no mind-independent reality with which correspondence might be sought. This was the view of John Rawls, as for example in his “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory.” Among the many unquestioned certainties of the postwar scientistic settlement was that the pursuit of objectivity in science, ethics, and the professions was the key to the success of these enterprises. This was disturbed by scholarly developments, of which the profoundest was the feminist critique of objectivity from the mid-1970s. Another important development was the sociological and historiographical interrogation of objectivity, as manifested in “the strong programme” or “social studies of science,” but most strikingly exemplified in Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison’s Objectivity, which gave the idea of objectivity a history that showed how much intellectual work had to be done to develop an idea that we later came to take for granted. Of course, the fact of the historical contingency and social entanglement of “objectivity” shows nothing about its usefulness, indeed effectiveness. It may, despite its historicity, still be effective in disciplining our inquiries. Among the more interesting aspects of the concept of objectivity is its perhaps essentially contestable character as a concept, as shown in its multiple manifestations, as identified by Heather Douglas, “The Irreducible Complexity of Objectivity.” As Daston put it (“Objectivity and the Escape from Perspective,” p. 598), “its thick layering of oddly matched meanings . . . betrays signs of a complicated and contingent history.” While the idea of objectivity has played an important philosophical role, its general cultural significance spiked in the aftermath of the 2016 US presidential election. Oxford University Press has noted this phenomenon. “After much discussion, debate, and research, the Oxford Dictionaries Word of the Year 2016 is post-truth—an adjective defined as ‘relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.’”


Respect ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 121-139
Author(s):  
Carla Bagnoli

Carla Bagnoli argues that Kant’s conception of respect as a moral feeling is crucial to any constructivist theory of practical reason because it provides the only satisfactory account of how moral commands carry subjective authority—how they are experienced as binding by finite agents endowed with rationality. Without positing a moral feeling of respect, a constructivist theory can account for objective moral obligations, but it cannot explain why finite agents can take an interest in action. This account centered on the moral feeling of respect is defended in contrast to the mechanisms of the “reflective endorsement” of moral ends or actions, which has been proposed by prominent Kantian constructivists. The theory of respect as a moral feeling is an integral and eliminable element of Kantian constructivism, whose absence compromises the constructivist account of practical reason and undermines its objectivist aspirations.


Ratio Juris ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla Bagnoli

Philosophia ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 1229-1246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla Bagnoli

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