“Mountain of Tongues” The Languages of the Caucasus in Arabic-Islamic Sources

The paper is devoted to the linguistic diversity of the Caucasus as reflected in the writing of Arab-Muslim geographers and historians. Dealing with the locus classicus jabal al-alsun ‘mountain of tongues’ in the output of Arab-Muslim authors, the author juxtaposes the current state of the study of Caucasus polyglossia with the description of the jumble of languages in the works of Ibn al-Faqīh, al-Mas‘ūdī, Abū al-Fidā’, al-Muhallabī and other authors. Outlining some parallels in Graeco-Roman historians, the author concludes that the diversity of languages spoken in the Caucasus as described by Arab-Muslim geographers appears to be in concord with the degree of the linguistic diversity as conceived today in areal-typological studies.

The bahuvrīhi Compound Between Zeroing and Contrastive Accentuation: Vedic Sanskrit Model and Pāṇini’s Model

This article aims to explore how Pāṇini’s model of the bahuvrīhi compound may be diachronically correlated to the bahuvrīhi compound as attested in the Vedic Sanskrit language, thus accounting for the two Pāṇinian requisites: zero-ending for all the constituents and accentuation on the first constituent, contrastively employed in relation to the determinative compounds. Since Pāṇini’s work is based on the Brahmanical scholarly tradition, the sources of his bahuvrīhi model are also to be found in the Brahmanical scholarly milieux. The locus classicus is the case of índraśatru, which starts off the process of uniformation and regulation of bahuvrīhi compound stressed on the first constituent. The same scholarly-discussed índraśatru compound is mentioned in the late Rigvedic textual layer (R̥V 1.32.6; 1.32.10), as an expressive poetic device. Therefore, the two Pāṇinian characteristic traits of the bahuvrīhi compound are inherited from a peculiar blend of poetic language and linguistic exegesis.

Causality and determination revisited

It seems to be a platitude that there must be a close connection between causality and the laws of nature: the laws somehow cover in general what happens in each specific case of causation. But so-called singularists disagree, and it is often thought that the locus classicus for that kind of dissent is Anscombe's famous Causality & Determination. Moreover, it is often thought that Anscombe's rejection of determinism is premised on singularism. In this paper, I show that this is a mistake: Anscombe is not a singularist, but in fact only objects to a very specific, Humean understanding of the generality of laws of nature and their importance to causality. I argue that Anscombe provides us with the contours of a radically different understanding of the generality of the laws, which I suggest can be fruitfully developed in terms of recently popular dispositional accounts. And as I will show, it is this account of laws of nature (and not singularism) that allows for the possibility of indeterminism.

LIABILITY OF THE STATE FOR RAPE BY A POLICEMAN: THE SAGA TAKES A NEW DIRECTION Minister of Safety and Security v F 2011 3 SA 487 (SCA)

The locus classicus and trend-setting decision for the vicarious liability of the state for the rape of a woman by a police official, is certainly K v Minister of Safety and Security. Here the plaintiff (K), a young woman, became stranded late at night. Three on-duty police officials, dressed in full uniform, offered to take her home in a police vehicle. On the way she was raped by all three of them. O’Regan J held that the state was vicariously liable for the conduct of the policemen. According to the standard test for vicarious liability, which was formulated in Minister of Police v Rabie, an employer may only escape vicarious liability if the employee, viewed subjectively, has not only exclusively promoted his own interests, but, viewed objectively, has also disengaged himself from the duties of his contract of employment to such an extent that a sufficiently close connection between the employee’s conduct and his employment is absent. Applying this test as informed by the constitutional Bill of Rights, O’Regan J found that although the policemen exclusively promoted their own interests by raping the plaintiff, a “sufficiently close connection” nevertheless existed between the conduct of the police and their work to hold their employer vicariously liable, for the following reasons: there was a constitutional and statutory duty on the state as well as the policemen to prevent crime and to protect members of public; the policemen offered to help the plaintiff and she acted reasonably by accepting the offer and trusting them; and the conduct of the policemen consisted simultaneously of a commissio (the brutal rape) and an omissio (their failure to protect her against the rape).

NOVUS ACTUS AND BEYOND: ATTRIBUTING CAUSAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS

Glanville Williams's influential 1989 article on causation, “Finis for Novus Actus?”, addressed two pertinent questions: (1) when, and on what grounds, may a person be judged to bear causal responsibility for harms most immediately brought about by the subsequent action of another person (the locus classicus of the novus actus interveniens doctrine), and (2) how should questions of causation be resolved in cases where the potential cause in question constitutes an omission? This article revisits these questions through an engagement with some of the major causation cases decided in the criminal courts in the past decade. The discussion of these cases is set in the broader context of a critique of H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré's influential doctrinal-theoretical framework for findings of legal causation, the autonomy doctrine, on which Williams had built his arguments.

O EXERCÍCIO DA MORTE (MELÉTE THANÁTOU) NO PRAKTIKÓS DE EVÁGRIO PÔNTICO

Neste artigo, apresentaremos alguns aspectos do exercício da morte (meléte thanátou) ou lembrança da morte (mnéme thanátou) em Evágrio Pôntico (346d.c.-400d.c.), traduzindo e comentando dois capítulos do Praktikós, o 29 e o 52. Tal exercício tem como locus clássicus o diálogo platônico em que Sócrates encontra seu fim, o Fédon (63b – 69e; 80e-81a). Assim, tendo como horizonte suas características neste diálogo, o presente artigo analisa os textos de Evágrio indicando torções, inovações e continuidades frente ao texto platônico. O roteiro que seguiremos será primeiro (1) uma apresentação sumária do modo como o exercício aparece no Fédon, depois, (2) uma rápida visão geral dos textos ascéticos dos inicios do monasticismo cristão (especialmente como ele aparece na Vida de Santo Antão, de Atanásio), para por fim, (3) analisar os textos de Evágrio mencionados. Podemos perceber ao longo da pesquisa uma distinção clara entre Platão e Evágrio: os aspectos epistêmicos, centrais no Fédon, não estão presentes nos textos de Evágrio indicados acima. Na medida em que o exercício da morte se vincula à parte prática da obra de Evágrio, os assuntos epistêmicos são pouco centrais na descrição do exercício em questão, mesmo que o télos de toda ascese seja algum tipo de conhecimento, a gnósis. Há ainda outra diferença importante, apesar de secundária. Além disso, nos textos de Evágrio analisados, o exercício da morte é também um exercício de imaginação que leva à urgência para com a ascese: Em Evágrio, deve-se ter em mente uma possível proximidade da morte para que a vida excelente seja vivida urgentemente.

De la o factură de electricitate la supremația dreptului european: astfel s-a născut doctrina Costa c. Enel

Whilst Costa vs. ENEL is the locus classicus for most accounts of the primacy of European law, the story of that lawsuit is still relatively unknown. What drove Flaminio Costa to sue his electricity provider over a bill of as little as ₤1.925 (about €22 in 2020)? Why did the Small-claims Court of Milan decide to involve both the Italian Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice in such a „petty” lawsuit? Why did those two courts hand down such different rulings? How did the lawsuit end when it came back from Luxembourg? Relying upon previously undisclosed court documents and interviews with some of the actors involved, this paper seeks to shed some light on the less-known aspects of the Costa v ENEL lawsuit, against the background of electricity nationalization in Italy at the height of the Cold War, and to assess the contribution of that lawsuit and of its „architect”, Gian Galeazzo Stendardi, to the approfondissement of the doctrine of primacy of European law.

Who Are Those in Authority? Early Muslim Exegesis of the Qur’anic Ulū’l-Amr

The term ulū’l-amr (those in authority) is central to the Muslim understanding of leadership, although it has been understood differently by different scholars. The term appears twice in the Qur’an, namely in verses 59 and 83 of chapter 4 (sūrat al-Nisā’), which serve as the cornerstone and starting point of the entire religious, social, and political structure of Islam. This article carefully examines early Muslim exegesis of the Qur’anic ulū’l-amr and how the two verses have become the locus classicus of intra-Muslim polemics. The main point of this article is to trace the early development of the meaning of ulū’l-amr in the exegetical works (tafsīr) of both Sunni and Shi‘i Qur’an commentators during the first 600 years of Islamic history. It will be argued that it is chiefly in the tafsīr tradition that the meaning and identity of ulū’l-amr is negotiated, promoted, and contested. The diversity of Muslim interpretations and the different trajectories of Sunni and Shi‘i exegesis, as well as the process of exegetical systematization, are highlighted. While Sunni exegetes seem to engage with one another internally, Shi‘i commentators tend to polemicize Sunni exegesis to uphold their version of ulū’l-amr as infallible imams (leaders).

¿Voluntad o razón en el origen del orden político? La respuesta de la teología política medieval y contemporánea.

La pregunta planteada en el título de este trabajo reitera una alternativa que se ha transformado en un locus classicus de la teoría política: ¿el orden político forma parte de la constitución racional de la realidad y, por ello, no necesita ser creado pues basta con descubrir su existencia como una entidad más entre los entes de la naturaleza? ¿O ese orden político solo existe cuando es instituido por el hombre y, por ello, es el resultado de un acto de la voluntad humana? No analizaré aquí cada una de esas dos posiciones, naturalista la primera y voluntarista la segunda, sino que intentaré mostrar cuál fue la respuesta de la teología política de Egidio Romano y de Carl Schmitt a la pregunta por el origen del Estado.

Three Kantian Accounts of Concept Formation

This article has two aims. First, I offer a philological analysis of a key passage from Kant’s Logic: § 6. § 6 is widely regarded as the locus classicus for Kant’s theory of concept formation. However, I show that the part of this section that is most cited and discussed by scholars should not be attributed to Kant, as it is not corroborated by any of his Reflexionen. Second, I attempt to identify Jäsche’s source for this unsupported passage. Ultimately, I conclude that the unsupported passage in § 6 was based on a set of student notes that was similar to the Wiener and Warschauer logic notebooks. However, I also argue that it would be a mistake to regard this passage as the final or definitive statement of Kant’s views about concept formation.