scholarly journals Set Theory INC# ∞# Based on Innitary Intuitionistic Logic with Restricted Modus Ponens Rule. Hyper Inductive Denitions. Application in Transcendental Number Theory. Generalized Lindemann-Weierstrass Theorem

Author(s):  
Jaykov Foukzon

In this paper intuitionistic set theory INC#∞# in infinitary set theoretical language is considered. External induction principle in nonstandard intuitionistic arithmetic were derived. Non trivial application in number theory is considered.The Goldbach-Euler theorem is obtained without any references to Catalan conjecture. Main results are: (i) number ee is transcendental; (ii) the both numbers e + π and e − π are irrational.

Author(s):  
Jaykov Foukzon

In this paper intuitionistic set theory INC# ∞# in infinitary set theoretical language is considered. External induction principle in nonstandard intuitionistic arithmetic were derived. Non trivial application in number theory is considered.The Goldbach-Euler theorem is obtained without anyreferences to Catalan conjecture.


Author(s):  
Jaykov Foukzon

In this article Russell’s paradox and Cantor’s paradox resolved successfully using intuitionistic logic with restricted modus ponens rule.


1997 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 506-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
Satoko Titani

Gentzen's sequential system LJ of intuitionistic logic has two symbols of implication. One is the logical symbol → and the other is the metalogical symbol ⇒ in sequentsConsidering the logical system LJ as a mathematical object, we understand that the logical symbols ∧, ∨, →, ¬, ∀, ∃ are operators on formulas, and ⇒ is a relation. That is, φ ⇒ Ψ is a metalogical sentence which is true or false, on the understanding that our metalogic is a classical logic. In other words, we discuss the logical system LJ in the classical set theory ZFC, in which φ ⇒ Ψ is a sentence.The aim of this paper is to formulate an intuitionistic set theory together with its metatheory. In Takeuti and Titani [6], we formulated an intuitionistic set theory together with its metatheory based on intuitionistic logic. In this paper we postulate that the metatheory is based on classical logic.Let Ω be a cHa. Ω can be a truth value set of a model of LJ. Then the logical symbols ∧, ∨, →, ¬, ∀x, ∃x are interpreted as operators on Ω, and the sentence φ ⇒ Ψ is interpreted as 1 (true) or 0 (false). This means that the metalogical symbol ⇒ also can be expressed as a logical operators such that φ ⇒ Ψ is interpreted as 1 or 0.


2008 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 1315-1327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Mccarty

AbstractWe call a logic regular for a semantics when the satisfaction predicate for at least one of its nontheorems is closed under double negation. Such intuitionistic theories as second-order Heyting arithmetic HAS and the intuitionistic set theory IZF prove completeness for no regular logics, no matter how simple or complicated. Any extensions of those theories proving completeness for regular logics are classical, i.e., they derive the tertium non datur. When an intuitionistic metatheory features anticlassical principles or recognizes that a logic regular for a semantics is nonclassical, it proves explicitly that the logic is incomplete with respect to that semantics. Logics regular relative to Tarski, Beth and Kripke semantics form a large collection that includes propositional and predicate intuitionistic, intermediate and classical logics. These results are corollaries of a single theorem. A variant of its proof yields a generalization of the Gödel-Kreisel Theorem linking weak completeness for intuitionistic predicate logic to Markov's Principle.


2003 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. 1401-1409
Author(s):  
E. Muñoz Garcia ◽  
◽  
R. Pérez-Marco ◽  

1942 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bernays

The foundation of analysis does not require the full generality of set theory but can be accomplished within a more restricted frame. Just as for number theory we need not introduce a set of all finite ordinals but only a class of all finite ordinals, all sets which occur being finite, so likewise for analysis we need not have a set of all real numbers but only a class of them, and the sets with which we have to deal are either finite or enumerable.We begin with the definitions of infinity and enumerability and with some consideration of these concepts on the basis of the axioms I—III, IV, V a, V b, which, as we shall see later, are sufficient for general set theory. Let us recall that the axioms I—III and V a suffice for establishing number theory, in particular for the iteration theorem, and for the theorems on finiteness.


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