The Posidonian Argument

*In this chapter I discuss the reception of a design argument by Cicero in the works of Holbach and Voltaire. This argument was directed against both the system of chance and the system of necessity. The chapter distinguishes three interpretations of this argument: (1) a prima facie interpretation; (2) a ‘neglected’ interpretation and (3) a ‘transcendental interpretation.’ It shows that in the early modern period Cicero’s argument was very widely discussed and its significance was not merely as a design argument; it connected scientific practice, even progress in science, to providential final causes. To show this I focus on Boyle and Locke before turning to Newton. In the final section, I return to Voltaire’s response to Holbach and show how Voltaire adapts the argument and uses Newton.

God

A look at the first of Razi’s five principles, a perfectly good and all powerful deity. Razi establishes the existence of God on the grounds of fairly traditional arguments, especially the design argument. He is particularly concerned to explain how God can be both the source of order and goodness in the universe, and absolved of blame for disorder and suffering. To solve this problem he postulates another “active” principle alongside God, namely a foolish universal Soul, which receives wisdom by having God’s light emanated upon it. Another topic in focus in this chapter is the eternity of the world, which Razi denies. On this topic the work On Metaphysics is discussed, and its probable authenticity defended.

Persuasion by Design? Design Theory Between Aesthetics and Rhetoric

This article deals primarily with object design from a production-theoretical perspective. It is focused on the question of the rhetorical achievement of design, i.e., its persuasiveness, which was already discussed by Buchanan and Krippendorf in 1985. To this day, the relationship between aesthetic and rhetorical calculuses in the design process is controversial in theoretical discussion. The solution to the problem: Aesthetics and rhetoric combine in the appeal structure (1) at the moment of creation of design and (2) at the moment of the user's decision for an object. In these processes, the design argument results from the combination of aestheticized gestalt and rhetorical appeal of an object.

Does Berkeley's Immaterialism Support Toland's Spinozism? The Posidonian Argument and the Eleventh Objection

This paper argues that a debate between Toland and Clarke is the intellectual context to help understand the motive behind the critic and the significance of Berkeley's response to the critic in PHK 60-66. These, in turn, are responding to Boyle's adaptation of a neglected design argument by Cicero. The paper shows that there is an intimate connection between these claims of natural science and a once famous design argument. In particular, that in the early modern period the connection between the scientific revolution and a certain commitment to final causes, and god's design, is more than merely contingent. The details of PHK 60-66 support the idea that the critic is responding to concerns that by echoing features of Toland's argument Berkeley undermines the Newtonian edifice Clarke has constructed.

The design argument salvaged? Assessing the contemporary argument from improbability

Some features within the physical universe appear to be so well-ordered that they have been regarded as evidence of the existence of a supernatural being who has designed them. This history of the so-called design argument is millennia-long, and various formulations of the argument have been presented. In this paper, I explore one contemporary version of the design argument proposed by the Intelligent Design movement, and analyze its advantages and disadvantages in comparison to one of the most famous classical versions of the argument.

Elliot Sober: The Design Argument

The Design Argument, by Elliot Sober. Cambridge University Press, 2018. Pp. 94. $18.00 (paperback).

Between Relativism and Design: The Limits of Hume's Secularity

Challenging the common image of Hume as a thoroughly secular philosopher, I argue that Hume occasionally relied on the design argument to defend the objectivity of values. Hume acknowledged that rejecting design might open the door to aesthetic, ethical, and epistemic relativism. To avoid this prospect, he allowed himself to repurpose the language of providential naturalists like Hutcheson and claim that “nature,” rather than God, has attuned our faculties to objective standards of morals, beauty, and truth. Historians of philosophy have treated such passages as merely figurative, as they conflict with fundamental principles in Hume's philosophy. I argue instead, from an intellectual historical perspective, that Hume nonetheless expects the passages to be read literally, since only the literal reading helps his case against relativism. Rather than recasting Hume as a defender of design, however, I argue that his appeals to design were less an integral part of his philosophy than a provisional compromise, a response to intractable tensions in the history of secularism.