The Fourth Paralogism

2021 ◽  
pp. 190-206
Author(s):  
Ian Proops
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
The Other ◽  
Middle Term ◽  
External Objects ◽  
Transcendental Illusion ◽  
The One

This chapter examines Kant’s diagnosis of the fourth paralogism. This paralogism argues for the differential certainty of our knowledge of external objects, on the one hand, and our knowledge of our own existence, on the other. The chapter argues that the paralogism does not wear its equivocal middle term, ‘existence outside us’, on its sleeve. An effort is made to reformulate the paralogism so that this phrase can be seen to be the true locus of the equivocation. The chapter then goes on to discuss a range of related issues, including: anti-materialism, monism, Kant’s rejection of external-world scepticism, and the role played by transcendental illusion in encouraging the paralogism. The chapter closes with some reflections on architectonic and method as these topics relate to the Paralogisms.

Herbert Mac Cabe’s Philosophical Anthropology

Politeia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 238-260
Author(s):  
Franco Manni ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Anthropology ◽  
External World ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Language System ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Individual Human

From the ideas of Aristotle, De Saussure and Wittgenstein, philosopher Herbert McCabe elaborated an original anthropology. 'Meaning' means: the role played by a part towards the whole. Senses are bodily organs and sensations allow an animal to get fragments of the external world which become 'meaningful' for the behaviour of the whole animal Besides sensations, humans are ‘linguistic animals’ because through words they are able to 'communicate', that is, to share a peculiar kind of meanings: concepts. Whereas, sense-images are stored physically in our brain and cannot be shared, even though we can relate to sense-images by words (speech coincides with thought). However, concepts do not belong to the individual human being qua individual, but to an interpersonal entity: the language system. Therefore, on the one hand, to store images is a sense-power and an operation of the brain, whereas the brain (quite paradoxically!) is not in itself the organ of thought. On the other hand, concepts do not exist on their own.

THE ALHACENIAN ACCOUNT OF SPATIAL PERCEPTION AND ITS EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

2005 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. MARK SMITH
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Visual Information ◽  
Spatial Perception ◽  
Crystalline Lens ◽  
The Other ◽  
External Objects ◽  
Latin West ◽  
Visual Imaging ◽  
The One ◽  
The Brain

From the late thirteenth to the early seventeenth century, the process of visual imaging was understood in the Latin West as an essentially subjective act initiated by the eye and completed by the brain. The crystalline lens took center stage in this act, its role determined by its peculiar physical and sensitive capacities. As a physical body, on the one hand, it was disposed to accept the physical impressions of light and color radiating to it from external objects. As a sensitive body, on the other hand, it was enabled by the visual spirit flowing to it from the brain to feel those impressions visually. Acting as a sentient selector of visual information, the lens transformed the brute physical impressions of light and color into visual impressions. These, in turn, gave rise to perceptual “depictions” that were passed back along the stream of visual spirits to the brain. Known in Scholastic parlance as “intentional species,” these depictions served as virtual representations of their generating objects. As such, they provided the wherewithal not only for perception, but also for conception and cognition.

Stroud's Dream Argument Critique

Philosophy ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 68 (266) ◽  
pp. 473-482
Author(s):  
John O. Nelson
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
External World ◽  
The Other ◽  
Significant Feature ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
The World ◽  
Traditional Assumption ◽  
The Senses ◽  
The One ◽  
Philosophical Scepticism

In his recent work, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud proposes to carry out an in-depth critique of the attempt by philosophers to invalidate all knowledge of an external world on the basis of Descartes' dream argument. His more particular aims in this endeavour are to uncover significant features of any such scepticism and to disclose in the process fundamental aspects of ‘human knowledge’ itself. Thus, among other features of knowledge that his study discloses, he thinks, is, echoing Kant, the idea ‘that a completely general distinction between everything we get through the senses, on the one hand, and what is true or not true of the external world, on the other, would cut us off forever from knowledge of the world around us.’ And a significant feature of Cartesian dream scepticism he believes to have uncovered is that its ‘effectiveness’ rests upon the philosopher's traditional assumption of an objectively existent world that is understandable ‘from a detached “external” viewpoint.’

XXXIV.—Foundations of Relativity: Parts I and II

1948 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-335
Author(s):  
A. G. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Physical Theory ◽  
Ordered Set ◽  
External World ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theory Of Relativity ◽  
Logical Theory ◽  
The Third ◽  
Basic Assumptions ◽  
Mathematical Symbols ◽  
The One

Relativity is the study of matter in motion, and the basis of a theory of relativity can be either physical, mathematical, or logical. It is physical if some of the elementary objects and relations are concepts derived from the external world and if certain of their properties are assumed as physically obvious. If, however, the elementary objects, etc. are defined as mathematical symbols and relations, and if the subsequent theorems are mathematical deductions from these definitions, then the theory may be described as mathematical. Lastly, the basis of a theory is logical if certain terms are undefined—and clearly stated as such—and if the theory is then developed strictly deductively from an explicit set of axioms and definitions. Analogous examples taken from geometry are the Euclidean, algebraic, and projective theories. The first, as developed by Euclid, has a physical basis, while the second is mathematical, a point being defined as an ordered set of numbers (co-ordinates) and a line as the class of points satisfying a linear equation. The third is logical, the undefined elements being point and line (an undefined class of points) and the axioms being those of incidence, extension, etc. Usually a physical theory comes first, to be followed by a mathematical and then by a logical theory, this last being so constructed that it includes previous theories when its undefined elements are replaced on the one hand by the conceptual physical objects and on the other hand by the symbolic mathematical objects. The construction of such a logical theory is not merely a matter of academic interest, for it can be regarded as an analysis of the previous theories. It tests, for example, the consistency and independence of their basic assumptions and definitions. It also indicates how a theory can be modified, with as little change as possible, so as to include some feature previously excluded. This can be particularly useful in the case of a physical theory which has been constructed to correspond as closely as possible to the external world, for such a theory may need continual modification to keep in step with observational data. For this reason the axioms of a logical theory should be not only consistent and independent but also simple, i.e. indivisible.

scholarly journals Imagination and Creativity: Cultural–Historical Approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
G.G. Kravtsov ◽  
E.E. Kravtsova
Keyword(s):  
Present Situation ◽  
The Other ◽  
External Reality ◽  
Experimental Proof ◽  
Training And Education ◽  
Historical Approach ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Inner Work ◽  
External Objects ◽  
The One

Consideration of the concept of imagination in the context of cultural-historical psychology led to the conclusion that there are two differently directed processes. One process involves making sense of things in the outside world and the present situation, that is, it means understanding and rethinking external objects and situations. Another process involves the construction of a new image that allows you to see and understand the surrounding reality in a new way. This allows the authors to say that, on the one hand, imagination is aimed at acting with external reality, and, on the other hand, the inner work of creating a new subject of imagination. Based on the analysis of empirical materials studying the development of imagination and creativity, the authors obtained experimental proof of the idea of L.S. Vygotsky that images of imagination are realized in creativity and come to the conclusion about the possibility of purposeful development of creativity in ontogenesis. Authors connect the purposeful development of creativity with theatrical pedagogy, in which training and education are realized with the help of theatrical methods. Theatrical methods, according to the authors, are methods by which you can set an imaginary situation and, at the same time, these are methods that allow the viewer to be included in theatrical action.

Subject-Object Relation in Mullâ Sadrâ’s Theory of Knowledge

1998 ◽  
pp. 170-175
Author(s):  
Ali Mesbah
Keyword(s):  
Mental Imagery ◽  
External World ◽  
Object Relation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Objective Reality ◽  
Mulla Sadra ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind

Dividing knowledge to knowledge by presence and knowledge by representation, Mullâ Sadrâ treats the subject-object relation with regard to each one of them differently. In the former, the subject is united with the object, or rather they are one, and the reality of knowledge is this very unity. In this type of knowledge, there is no medium. Such unity culminates, on the one hand, in knowledge by presence comprehensively and completely conveying the objective reality, and in its untransferability on the other. By contrast, in knowledge by representation, the subject experiences another kind of relation to the object of knowledge thanks to the presence of a medium in the subject’s mind, called "mental form." Mullâ Sadrâ considers mental forms as the mental existence of the same quiddities (mâhîyyât) existing in the external world. The only difference is that they have another type of existence. In this essay, I argue that this approach is congruent with the principality of quiddity, which is rejected by Mullâ Sadrâ. To be consistent with the basic pillar of Mullâ Sadrâ’s philosophy, viz., the principle of existence, I hold that one should begin with the continuity of existence through mental, imagery and external worlds from which the mind abstracts the same quiddity, not vice versa.

The Science of Society and the Concept of Complexity

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 171-184
Author(s):  
Alexander Yu. Antonovski ◽  
Raisa E. Barash ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Communication ◽  
External World ◽  
Interdisciplinary Studies ◽  
The Other ◽  
Education Law ◽  
Binary Opposition ◽  
Russian Science ◽  
The World ◽  
Human Psyche ◽  
The One

This article is dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the publication of Niklas Luhmann’s book The Science of Society. The system-communicative approach to the analysis of science is reconstructed with a focus on the relation of science to its highly complex external world. The problem of complexity is posed as a key one and is considered in the context of the communicative “reduction of the complexity” of the external world, which science actualizes through its unique binary opposition (truth/falsehood distinction). The complexity of the world that science is facing disintegrates into two large areas. On the one hand, science processes its own external world, i.e., nature, society, the human psyche, as its object and thus fulfills a unique function, the pursuance of research. Scientific communication in this case can be integrated in the form of transdisciplinary studies. On the other hand, science has to respond to the complexity of the internal (i.e., social) external world of the communicative system of science, namely, to interfaced communicative systems of the embracing system of world society (politics, economy, religion, education, law, etc.). In the latter case, science does not fulfill a function but delivers achievements on request to the above-mentioned communicative systems in exchange for resources for interdisciplinary studies, which are occasional and cannot serve for integrating scientific communication on a systematic basis. We will propose some corrections to this theory and apply it to the situation in Russian science.

Occam’s Razor, Dogmatism, Skepticism, and Skeptical Dogmatism

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Walker
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
External World ◽  
The Other ◽  
Common Sense View ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Occam’S Razor ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
Occam's Razor

Underdetermination arguments for skepticism maintain that our common sense view of the external world is no better, evidentially speaking, than some skeptical competitors. An important and well-known response by dogmatists, those who believe our commonsense view is justified, appeals to abduction or inference to the best explanation. The predominant version of this strategy, going back at least to Locke, invokes Occam’s razor: dogmatists claim the common sense view is simpler than any of its skeptical alternatives and so has more to recommend it, evidentially speaking. This dispute has overshadowed another possible view: skeptical dogmatism. Skeptical dogmatists hold that we are justified in believing that the common sense view is probably false. I argue that skeptical dogmatism presents some interesting complications to the dialectic between the dogmatist and the skeptic. On the one hand, even if the dogmatist’s use of Occam’s razor is sufficient to rebut skepticism, in itself it is not sufficient to refute skeptical dogmatism. On the other hand, skeptics themselves, ironically, must, given the assumptions of the paper, appeal to something like Occam’s razor in order to avoid capitulating to skeptical dogmatism.

Note on Selection of Coordinate Systems for Geodynamics

1975 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 395-407
Author(s):  
S. Henriksen
Keyword(s):  
Sea Level ◽  
The Other ◽  
Coordinate Systems ◽  
Mean Sea Level ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The One ◽  
Static Systems ◽  
Selection Of

The first question to be answered, in seeking coordinate systems for geodynamics, is: what is geodynamics? The answer is, of course, that geodynamics is that part of geophysics which is concerned with movements of the Earth, as opposed to geostatics which is the physics of the stationary Earth. But as far as we know, there is no stationary Earth – epur sic monere. So geodynamics is actually coextensive with geophysics, and coordinate systems suitable for the one should be suitable for the other. At the present time, there are not many coordinate systems, if any, that can be identified with a static Earth. Certainly the only coordinate of aeronomic (atmospheric) interest is the height, and this is usually either as geodynamic height or as pressure. In oceanology, the most important coordinate is depth, and this, like heights in the atmosphere, is expressed as metric depth from mean sea level, as geodynamic depth, or as pressure. Only for the earth do we find “static” systems in use, ana even here there is real question as to whether the systems are dynamic or static. So it would seem that our answer to the question, of what kind, of coordinate systems are we seeking, must be that we are looking for the same systems as are used in geophysics, and these systems are dynamic in nature already – that is, their definition involvestime.

Stories and the Self

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Krause ◽  
Markus Appel
Keyword(s):  
Meta Analysis ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Lower Degree ◽  
Contrast Effects ◽  
Self Perception ◽  
Self Perceptions ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Implicit And Explicit

Abstract. Two experiments examined the influence of stories on recipients’ self-perceptions. Extending prior theory and research, our focus was on assimilation effects (i.e., changes in self-perception in line with a protagonist’s traits) as well as on contrast effects (i.e., changes in self-perception in contrast to a protagonist’s traits). In Experiment 1 ( N = 113), implicit and explicit conscientiousness were assessed after participants read a story about either a diligent or a negligent student. Moderation analyses showed that highly transported participants and participants with lower counterarguing scores assimilate the depicted traits of a story protagonist, as indicated by explicit, self-reported conscientiousness ratings. Participants, who were more critical toward a story (i.e., higher counterarguing) and with a lower degree of transportation, showed contrast effects. In Experiment 2 ( N = 103), we manipulated transportation and counterarguing, but we could not identify an effect on participants’ self-ascribed level of conscientiousness. A mini meta-analysis across both experiments revealed significant positive overall associations between transportation and counterarguing on the one hand and story-consistent self-reported conscientiousness on the other hand.

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