Farmland lease, high-rent threat and contract instability: evidence from China

PurposeThe purpose is to understand why contract instability occurs when small landowners lease their land to large landholders.Design/methodology/approachThe authors develop a contract theoretical model to understand the stability problem in the farmland lease contract in China, where most landowners are small landholders.FindingsResults from the doubly robust estimation method used on randomly selected interview data from 552 households in nine provinces of China indicate that contract instability can arise endogenously when large landholders sign a contract. The authors conclude that a suitable rent control regime or contract enforcement may be necessary to promote a large-scale farmland transfer in China.Originality/valueThe authors develop a contract theoretical model and apply it to the land rental market in China. Data used are original and collected from farmers located in nine provinces of China.

Melakan Row Houses from the Ground Up

Chapter 4 deals with the old townhouses and shophouses of Melaka’s World Heritage site. It first traces the reasons for their decline in the post-war period. Things started to change in the 1990s with the repeal of rent control. This period coincided with the revaluation of these buildings as heritage and economic assets, but not without side effects, such as illegal demolitions, the displacement of residents, and tourism gentrification. The authorities have always been reluctant to interfere with private property, but during the application for the World Heritage inscription they were forced to step in with stricter conservation rules. Instead of a homogeneous approach, this chapter displays the diversity of discourses and practices of conservation as encountered on the ground.