Systems engineering and assurance modeling (SEAM): A web-based solution for integrated mission assurance

We present an overview of the Systems Engineering and Assurance Modeling (SEAM) platform, a web-browser-based tool which is designed to help engineers evaluate the radiation vulnerabilities and develop an assurance approach for electronic parts in space systems. The SEAM framework consists of three interconnected modeling tools, a SysML compatible system description tool, a Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) visual argument tool, and Bayesian Net and Fault Tree extraction and export tools. The SysML and GSN sections also have a coverage check application that ensures that every radiation fault identified on the SysML side is also addressed in the assurance case in GSN. The SEAM platform works on space systems of any degree of radiation hardness but is especially helpful for assessing radiation performance in systems with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) electronic components.

Effectiveness and Value of Space Vehicle Thermal Vacuum Testing

Environmental testing of spacecraft flight hardware is performed to detect design and workmanship defects and verify mission requirements prior to launch. At the space vehicle level of assembly, the thermal vacuum test simulates an environment particularly well-suited for verifying mission performance requirements. In this paper, the test objectives of the space vehicle thermal vacuum test are reviewed and an assessment is made of the effectiveness and value of the test. Recent thermal vacuum test data is used to determine how the uniqueness of the thermal vacuum test environment achieves test purposes and how the test ensures mission assurance for space vehicles.

Who Hath Measured the (Proving) Ground: Variation in Offensive Capabilities Test and Evaluation

Multiple recent high-profile cyber intrusion and attack incidents have demonstrated serious weaponeering failures in which offensive tooling has not performed as the operators, planners, and designers had likely anticipated, leading to detection, degraded mission outcomes, and political blowback. These failures may be evaluated as resulting from multiple factors, in part through engineering errors introduced within the development lifecycle, as well as from immature command & control (C2), planning and the operational oversight processes. These cases suggest that despite the different identified failure modes in capabilities generation and employment, a common root cause of operational blunders may be identified in the lack of effective controlled range testing of exploit and implant capabilities packages prior to fielding and use in the wild. Observed evidence to date strongly indicates multiple intrusion sets pursue only limited—and in some case—no validation measures prior to executing live fires against target systems and networks. We seek to describe and explain apparent variations in adoption of munitions effectiveness testing for cyberweapons. We examine requirements, objectives, and benefits of capabilities validation efforts, balanced against resource investment, organizational integration, process agility, operational responsiveness, and other costs. We propose a model for analysis of mission assurance contributions provided by the cyber proving ground and consider this model in light of specific observed adversary behaviors indicating programmatic practices. We further explore the implications for the employment of such validation measures as a fundamental element of developing norms for responsible state cyber operations. Paper presented at the 15th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (ICCWS 2020). Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia. 12-13 March 2020.