Multiple recent high-profile cyber intrusion and attack incidents have demonstrated serious weaponeering failures in which offensive tooling has not performed as the operators, planners, and designers had likely anticipated, leading to detection, degraded mission outcomes, and political blowback. These failures may be evaluated as resulting from multiple factors, in part through engineering errors introduced within the development lifecycle, as well as from immature command & control (C2), planning and the operational oversight processes. These cases suggest that despite the different identified failure modes in capabilities generation and employment, a common root cause of operational blunders may be identified in the lack of effective controlled range testing of exploit and implant capabilities packages prior to fielding and use in the wild. Observed evidence to date strongly indicates multiple intrusion sets pursue only limited—and in some case—no validation measures prior to executing live fires against target systems and networks. We seek to describe and explain apparent variations in adoption of munitions effectiveness testing for cyberweapons. We examine requirements, objectives, and benefits of capabilities validation efforts, balanced against resource investment, organizational integration, process agility, operational responsiveness, and other costs. We propose a model for analysis of mission assurance contributions provided by the cyber proving ground and consider this model in light of specific observed adversary behaviors indicating programmatic practices. We further explore the implications for the employment of such validation measures as a fundamental element of developing norms for responsible state cyber operations. Paper presented at the 15th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (ICCWS 2020). Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia. 12-13 March 2020.