An Examination of Factors Driving Big 4 Audit Fee Premiums: Evidence from India's Audit Market

SYNOPSIS This study examines fee premiums earned by Big 4 auditors in India and identifies the primary reason for such fee premiums. There are three primary drivers of Big 4 fee premiums. Big 4 auditors charge a fee premium for their reputation, for providing a superior quality of audit, and for indemnifying losses for a company's stakeholders. Since the risk of auditor litigation in India is relatively low, Big 4 premiums in India would not be driven by the need for auditors to indemnify losses. The results indicate that Big 4 auditors earn significantly higher fees in India and also that their clients enjoy significantly higher earnings response coefficients compared to non-Big 4 clients. However, there is no difference in the quality of audit provided by Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors as measured by the magnitude of reported discretionary accruals.

The Effects of Critical Audit Matter Removal and Duration on Jurors' Assessments of Auditor Negligence

SUMMARY A primary concern facing the PCAOB's requirement of disclosing critical audit matters (CAMs) is increased auditor litigation risk. Evidence with Key Audit Matters from the U.K. indicates auditors may subsequently remove a CAM or continue to report the same CAM for several years. Therefore, we investigate the effects of CAM removal and duration on jurors' assessments of auditor negligence when there is a subsequent material misstatement due to fraud in the account related to the CAM. Using the Culpable Control Model, we predict jurors will assess higher auditor negligence when a CAM is removed than when a CAM is reported and when a CAM is reported for multiple years than for one year. Results from two experiments support our expectations, although results vary depending on complexity of the misstated account. Overall, our findings highlight a quandary for audit firms, where subsequent removal of a CAM increases auditor liability.

Auditor Litigation and the Penalties on U.S. Client Firms after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act

This study examines the relation between auditor litigation and the market and legal penalties imposed on sued audit clients after the private securities litigation reform act (PSLRA). A sample of accounting-related lawsuits is used in the regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns, settlement amount, and probability of settlement on auditor litigation and other variables. The results indicate a negative relation between auditor litigation and the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of litigation against the client firm. Another result from the study is a positive relation between auditor litigation and the legal penalty on the client firm. Specifically, the results indicate higher likelihood of settlement and larger settlement sizes for securities lawsuits in which the auditor is also sued. Our study contributes to the debate on the merit of litigation against auditors after the PSLRA. The findings imply that lawsuits against auditors appear to be a signal of audit failure and higher financial reporting risk. As audit failures erode investor confidence in the capital markets, the present study provides valuable evidence on the market and legal system’s perception of the merit of auditor litigation. The findings should be of interest to regulators and market participants given the increase in securities lawsuits against audit firms and the substantial reputational consequences of such lawsuits on audit firms and client firms.

Securities class actions of Chinese companies

This paper provides the first empirical evidence documenting the determinants and outcomes of private securities class action lawsuits filed in the US and Canada against Chinese companies and their auditors. Our findings show that, in the global context, Chinese companies are positively associated with their auditors being defendants and experiencing an adverse outcome (for example, related government enforcement actions and/or settlement payments to terminate class actions). A group of companies from outside the US with low country level audit quality, the Chinese companies, and the overall global sample were compared. For the low country level audit quality comparison group, we found that a restatement was negatively associated with auditors being defendants; this is a new finding. Two unique Chinese characteristics are that reverse mergers are positively associated with auditor litigation and bankruptcy has no association with auditor litigation. Aggregate Chinese companies’ settlements are positively associated with the occurrence of an auditor settlement and with class period length. Auditor settlements are associated with several factors. No mainland China CPA firm has ever paid to settle a private securities class action filed in the US or Canada; this also is a new finding. Several factors explain this last result.