An Examination of Factors Driving Big 4 Audit Fee Premiums: Evidence from India's Audit Market

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 43-58
Author(s):  
Joshy Jacob ◽  
Naman Desai ◽  
Sobhesh Kumar Agarwalla
Keyword(s):  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Primary Reason ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Earnings Response ◽  
Auditor Litigation

SYNOPSIS This study examines fee premiums earned by Big 4 auditors in India and identifies the primary reason for such fee premiums. There are three primary drivers of Big 4 fee premiums. Big 4 auditors charge a fee premium for their reputation, for providing a superior quality of audit, and for indemnifying losses for a company's stakeholders. Since the risk of auditor litigation in India is relatively low, Big 4 premiums in India would not be driven by the need for auditors to indemnify losses. The results indicate that Big 4 auditors earn significantly higher fees in India and also that their clients enjoy significantly higher earnings response coefficients compared to non-Big 4 clients. However, there is no difference in the quality of audit provided by Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors as measured by the magnitude of reported discretionary accruals.

Who Did the Audit? Audit Quality and Disclosures of Other Audit Participants in PCAOB Filings

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (5) ◽  
pp. 1939-1967 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Callaway Dee ◽  
Ayalew Lulseged ◽  
Tianming Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Market Reaction ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Multivariate Model ◽  
Significant Decline ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Absolute Value ◽  
Earnings Response ◽  
First Time

ABSTRACT We empirically test whether audit quality is affected when part of an SEC issuer's audit is outsourced to auditors other than the principal auditor (“participating auditors”). We find a significantly negative market reaction and a significant decline in earnings response coefficients (ERCs) for experimental issuers disclosed for the first time as having participating auditors involved in their audits. However, we find no market reaction and no decline in ERCs for a matching sample of issuers that are not disclosed as using participating auditors, nor for issuers disclosed for the second or third time as using participating auditors. We also find actual audit quality as measured by absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals is lower for the experimental issuers, although we find no difference in audit fees paid by the experimental and matching issuers in a multivariate model. Our findings suggest that the PCAOB's proposed rule requiring disclosure of the use of other auditors in addition to the principal auditor would provide information useful to investors in assessing audit quality for SEC issuers.

Spatial Competition in Local Audit Markets and the Fallout on Deloitte from the 2007 PCAOB Censure

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Spatial Competition ◽  
Spatial Location ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Face ◽  
Market Leader

SUMMARY We examine whether Deloitte's spatial location in local audit markets affected the firm's adverse fallout—in terms of decreased ability to retain new clients and maintain audit fees—from the 2007 PCAOB censure. We motivate our inquiry by the notion that auditor-client alignment and auditor-closest-competitor distance can help differentiate the incumbent Big 4 auditor from other Big 4 auditors and thus provide market power, i.e., inhibit clients from shopping for another supplier because of the lack of a similar Big 4 provider in the local audit market. Consequently, it seems reasonable that the increase in switching risk and loss of fee growth suffered by Deloitte following the 2007 PCAOB censure will be lower in local markets where Deloitte was the market leader and its market share distance from its closest competitor was greater. Our findings suggest that the decline in Deloitte's audit fee growth rate following the 2007 PCAOB censure was concentrated in the pharmaceutical industry, although the client loss rate appears to have occurred more broadly (across all cities and industries). Collectively, our findings suggest that audit quality issues override auditor market power, i.e., differentiation does not provide Big 4 firms market power in the face of adverse regulatory action. JEL Classifications: G18; L51; M42; M49.

Auditor Industry Specialization and Earnings Quality

2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Balsam ◽  
Jagan Krishnan ◽  
Joon S. Yang
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Brand Name ◽  
Absolute Level ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Auditor Industry Specialization ◽  
Earnings Response

This study examines the association between measures of earnings quality and auditor industry specialization. Prior work has examined the association between auditor brand name and earnings quality, using auditor brand name to proxy for audit quality. Recent work has hypothesized that auditor industry specialization also contributes to audit quality. Extending this literature, we compare the absolute level of discretionary accruals (DAC) and earnings response coefficients (ERC) of firms audited by industry specialists with those of firms not audited by industry specialists. We restrict our study to clients of Big 6 (and later Big 5) auditors to control for brand name. Because industry specialization is unobservable, we use multiple proxies for it. After controlling for variables established in prior work to be related to DAC and the ERC, we find clients of industry specialist auditors have lower DAC and higher ERC than clients of nonspecialist auditors. This finding is consistent with clients of industry specialists having higher earnings quality than clients of nonspecialists.

What values more? Agency costs or accrual quality

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jagjit S. Saini ◽  
Onur Arugaslan ◽  
James DeMello
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Single Class ◽  
Accrual Quality ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Earnings Informativeness ◽  
Earnings Response ◽  
Dual Class

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine what is weighted more by the investors when valuing a dual-class firm’s stock – greater agency costs or better accrual quality of the dual-class firm in contrast to the single-class firm. Design/methodology/approach Using the financial data of firms issuing multiple classes of stock (hereafter dual-class firms) and firms issuing single class of stock (hereafter single-class firms), the authors measure the effect of firm’s ownership structure (dual class versus single class) on the earnings response coefficients (ERCs) of prior, current and future period earnings. Findings The authors find that investors care more about agency costs than the quality of accruals in evaluating the earnings of dual-class firms. Specifically, the authors find that current annual returns of the firm are negatively associated with dual-class ownership structure and that earnings informativeness and predictability are decreasing in dual-class ownership of the firm as reflected in decreasing ERCs. Originality/value This study adds to prior literature on dual-class ownership which reports greater agency costs and better accrual quality at dual-class firms in contrast to single-class firms. This study contributes to the literature on earnings informativeness and predictability by evaluating the effect of ownership structure on the ERCs of the firm. Investors should be careful when valuing a dual-class firm and should consider agency costs in addition to accrual quality of reported earnings at such firms.

Audit prices and Big 4 fee premiums: further evidence from Thailand

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thanyawee Pratoomsuwan
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Using Data

Purpose Because there is mixed evidence regarding Big N fee premiums across countries, the purpose of this paper is to re-examine the phenomenon of audit price differentiations in the market for auditing services in Thailand. Although Hay et al. (2006) and Hay (2013) reviewed over 80 audit fee papers from 20 countries over 25 years, 13 of which were based in emerging economies, the understanding of the market for auditing services in Thailand remains limited. Because the Thai auditing market is also classified as a segmented market – i.e., a market that is less competitive for large-client firms and more competitive for small-client firms – this study tests audit price competition in an emerging audit market using Thailand as an example. Design/methodology/approach The traditional audit fee model is used to estimate audit fee premiums for a sample of over 300 non-financial companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 2011. Findings Although the market for auditing services in Thailand is consistent with that described in Ferguson et al. (2013) – in which Big N audit firms dominate only the large-client segment – the results show that Big N auditors charge higher audit fees and earn higher fee premiums compared with non-Big N auditors in both the small- and large-client segments of the audit market. Research limitations/implications The evidence from this study reveals the existence of Big N fee premiums across market segmentations. Audit price differentials between Big N and non-Big N firms in both small- and large-client market segments might concern regulators regarding competition in the audit market with respect to whether the Big N firms are charging uncompetitive audit fees. These findings also imply that audit pricing varies across countries and the Big N price deferential is typically larger in emerging markets than in more developed audit markets and that it might be inadequate to study single-country audit pricing. However, the question whether the Big N fee premium results from Big N product differentiation is not directly investigated in this study. Originality/value Because earlier studies focusing on audit fee premiums have been conducted using data from the USA and Australia, the findings add to the limited evidence regarding audit fee premiums in an emerging country such as Thailand.

scholarly journals Earnings Informativeness And Ownership Structure In Japan

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wikil Kwak ◽  
Jack Armitage
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Leverage Ratio ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Earnings Information ◽  
Japanese Firms ◽  
Earnings Response ◽  
Institutional Shareholders ◽  
Recession Period

This paper investigates the association between institutional ownership structures and the quality of earnings information via changes in earnings response coefficients for a sample of Japanese firms during 1990-1998. From these results we can predict that the greater the percentage of institutional shareholders in Japan, the better the quality of earnings information and the higher the foreign ownership; the quality of earnings information is better during Japan’s recession period of 1990-1998. However, keiretsu membership percentage is not important for the quality of earnings information in Japan even though firm size, leverage ratio, and growth are important factors in earnings information in Japan.

Small Audit Firm Membership in Associations, Networks, and Alliances: Implications for Audit Quality and Audit Fees

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 767-792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth L. Bills ◽  
Lauren M. Cunningham ◽  
Linda A. Myers
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Matched Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Association Member ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Control Samples

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine the benefits of membership in an accounting firm association, network, or alliance (collectively referred to as “an association”). Associations provide member accounting firms with numerous benefits, including access to the expertise of professionals from other independent member firms, joint conferences and technical trainings, assistance in dealing with staffing and geographic limitations, and the ability to use the association name in marketing materials. We expect these benefits to result in higher-quality audits and higher audit fees (or audit fee premiums). Using hand-collected data on association membership, we find that association member firms conduct higher-quality audits than nonmember firms, where audit quality is proxied for by fewer Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection deficiencies and fewer financial statement misstatements, as well as less extreme absolute discretionary accruals and lower positive discretionary accruals. We also find that audit fees are higher for clients of member firms than for clients of nonmember firms, suggesting that clients are willing to pay an audit fee premium to engage association member audit firms. Finally, we find that member firm audits are of similar quality to a size-matched sample of Big 4 audits, but member firm clients pay lower fee premiums than do Big 4 clients. Our inferences are robust to the use of company size-matched control samples, audit firm size-matched control samples, propensity score matching, two-stage least squares regression, and to analyses that consider changes in association membership. Our findings should be of interest to regulators because they suggest that association membership assists small audit firms in overcoming barriers to auditing larger audit clients. In addition, our findings should be informative to audit committees when making auditor selection decisions, and to investors and accounting researchers interested in the relation between audit firm type and audit quality.

Does Fee Disclosure Type Matter? Evidence from Price Adjustment in the Audit Market of Taiwan

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 41-61
Author(s):  
Jengfang Chen ◽  
Rong-Ruey Duh ◽  
Kuei-Fu Li
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Price Adjustment ◽  
Regulatory Change ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Impact

ABSTRACT While mandatory audit fee disclosure makes fee information transparent, there have been concerns about the impact of price adjustment on audit quality. Taking advantage of a regulatory change in Taiwan that required public companies to disclose audit fee but allowed two alternative disclosure forms (amount disclosure or range disclosure), this study investigates the impact of the fee disclosure form on price adjustment and the influence of such adjustment on audit quality. Using a dataset including audit fees under the two disclosure forms, we find that, for overcharged companies, the downward adjustment is larger for amount disclosure companies than range disclosure companies and such downward adjustment increase discretionary accruals in amount disclosure companies but not for range disclosure companies. Our study helps understand the impact of different fee disclosure forms on price adjustment and audit quality, which should be of interest to regulators and financial statement users in Taiwan and beyond.

Was Andersen’s audit quality lower than its peers?

2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (8/9) ◽  
pp. 911-962 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krishna Kumar ◽  
Lucy Lim
Keyword(s):  
Big Five ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Lower Likelihood ◽  
Earnings Response ◽  
Pooled Samples

Purpose – This paper aims to examine whether Andersen’s audit quality in the five years preceding its collapse lagged that of other Big-Five auditors. Design/methodology/approach – This paper compares Andersen’s audit quality and the other Big-Five auditors using five methodologies, namely, earnings response coefficients, magnitudes of abnormal accruals, propensities to issue going-concern opinions, usefulness of going-concern opinions in predicting bankruptcy and the frequency of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases. The comparisons are based on both pooled samples of all observations and propensity-score-based matched-pairs. Findings – The preponderance of evidence shows that Andersen’s audit quality did not differ materially in audit quality from other Big-Five auditors prior to its failure. However, it was found that Andersen’s independence was compromised in the year leading to its collapse (2000), as indicated by the lower likelihood to issue going-concern opinions. Originality/value – This paper complements and improves on Cahan et al. (2011) by using more measures of audit quality, as no one measure is perfect, showing that their results using discretionary accruals are sensitive to the model used and showing that there is a more powerful direct measure of audit quality, namely, going-concern opinions.

On the Benefits of Audit Market Consolidation: Evidence from Merged Audit Firms

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (2) ◽  
pp. 463-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qihui Gong ◽  
Oliver Zhen Li ◽  
Yupeng Lin ◽  
Liansheng Wu
Keyword(s):  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Horizontal Mergers ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Market Consolidation ◽  
Unique Dataset

ABSTRACT We examine efficiency improvement associated with audit firm mergers. Our analysis is made possible by a unique dataset of audit hours in China. We find a significant reduction in audit hours, unaccompanied by a deterioration in audit quality, of merged audit firms. Further, we find a larger reduction in audit hours when acquirers are Chinese domestic Big 10 audit firms and when client firms are more complex. These results are consistent with the notion of economies of scale arising from horizontal mergers. However, enhanced efficiency does not necessarily reduce audit fees. Instead, we find an increase in audit fees when acquirers are international Big 4 audit firms even when we control for possible changes in market power. This premium is at least partially due to the certification effect of international Big 4 audit firms.

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