The effect of auditor litigation risk on clients' access to bank debt: Evidence from a quasi-experiment

Author(s):  
Mahfuz Chy ◽  
Gus De Franco ◽  
Barbara Su
2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 183-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy M. Vinson ◽  
Jesse C. Robertson ◽  
R. Cameron Cockrell

SUMMARY A primary concern facing the PCAOB's requirement of disclosing critical audit matters (CAMs) is increased auditor litigation risk. Evidence with Key Audit Matters from the U.K. indicates auditors may subsequently remove a CAM or continue to report the same CAM for several years. Therefore, we investigate the effects of CAM removal and duration on jurors' assessments of auditor negligence when there is a subsequent material misstatement due to fraud in the account related to the CAM. Using the Culpable Control Model, we predict jurors will assess higher auditor negligence when a CAM is removed than when a CAM is reported and when a CAM is reported for multiple years than for one year. Results from two experiments support our expectations, although results vary depending on complexity of the misstated account. Overall, our findings highlight a quandary for audit firms, where subsequent removal of a CAM increases auditor liability.


2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 71-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cory A. Cassell ◽  
Michael S. Drake ◽  
Travis A. Dyer

SUMMARY We investigate whether auditors are sensitive to litigation risk related specifically to having greater numbers of institutional investors that hold the common stock of a given client. Our findings suggest that audit fees are higher when the number of institutional investors holding stock in the company is greater. Additional tests corroborate our inference that the association between audit fees and the number of institutional investors is related to litigation risk. The importance of improving our understanding of auditors' sensitivity to factors that increase litigation exposure is highlighted by the number and magnitude of lawsuits filed against auditors relating to the audits of public clients.


2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman

SUMMARY In this paper, we examine the relation between auditor litigation risk and abnormal accruals over the 1989–2007 time period. We address potential endogeneity in prior studies by jointly modeling abnormal accruals and litigation risk in a simultaneous equation system. Our findings suggest that client-specific litigation risk affects auditor incentives to acquiesce to client demands for earnings management, i.e., the higher the risk of auditor litigation, the greater the auditor's restraining influence on the abnormal accruals reported by the client. We also find evidence that abnormal accruals increase the likelihood of auditor litigation. We also document that the 1995 Public Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) lowered the client-specific risk of auditor litigation. Litigation reform remains a topic of ongoing interest. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the effects of litigation reform (and related changes in legal exposure) on auditor incentives and earnings management.


2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 529-549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aloke (Al) Ghosh ◽  
Charles Y. Tang

SYNOPSIS Although auditor litigation risk is considered as a leading explanation for auditor resignations, audit risk and business risk might also trigger resignations. Auditor litigation risk is defined as the risk of the auditor being involved in a lawsuit, audit risk is defined as the risk that the auditor expresses an inappropriate audit opinion when the financial statements are materially misstated and, finally, business risk is defined as the risk associated with the client's survival and profitability. Because the three risk factors are not mutually exclusive, we examine their relevance and incremental importance using measures from the pre- and post-resignation periods. Using summary indices from the pre-resignation period, we find that all of the three ex ante risk indices are incrementally important for resignations, especially when the predecessor auditor is a Big 4 firm. Because the ex ante risk factors are prone to measurement errors and are less likely to capture the auditor's proprietary information about the client, we analyze data from the post-resignation period when the auditor's proprietary information is likely to become publicly known. We find that within a three-year period following an auditor's resignation, clients are more likely to (1) be involved in class-action lawsuits (ex post litigation risk), (2) have internal control problems (ex post audit risk), and (3) to be delisted from a national stock exchange (ex post business risk). Our research demonstrates that auditors consider all three risk factors, and not just litigation risk, in resignation decisions.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cory A. Cassell ◽  
Michael S. Drake ◽  
Travis Dyer

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