Federal Systems, Decentralization, and Heuristics

In this chapter I argue that federalism has two contrasting effects on the relationship between regional incomes and attitudes toward redistribution. Administrative federalism increases the salience of regional inequality, thereby making the regional income heuristic a more important determinant of attitudes. On the other hand, fiscal federalism, by moving redistributive politics to a within-region conflict, makes regional inequality less relevant to redistributive attitudes.

Redistributive Politics in Russia: The Political Economy of Agricultural Subsidies

This paper explores whether redistributive politics can explain differences in agricultural subsidies in Russia, a country whose autocratic regime represents a fertile ground for strategic redistribution. Relying on political economy literature, we examine the strategies regional and federal Russian politicians utilize to allocate and distribute agricultural subsidies. Using unique 2008–2015 panel data, we test whether politicians target loyal or easily swayed voters and whether they use large farms as vote brokers. We find federal and regional politicians to allocate more agricultural subsidies when political competition against the dominant party is higher. Moreover, they appear to also target large farms for voter mobilization.

Redistributive politics: the case of fiscal transfers in Ghana

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of political influences on fiscal transfers from the central government to district assemblies in Ghana. Design/methodology/approach It adopted a redistributive politics model and estimated the two-step system generalized method of moment using electoral outcomes, and transfers data for 167 districts which were classified into swing and aligned, from 1994 to 2014. Findings The findings reveal that Gh₵6.28m on average was transferred to each district annually, which tend to increase by 8.4 percent in election years. Further, the swing districts received 5.2 percent more than the aligned districts. Practical implications The sharing mechanism is significantly influenced by political considerations as there exists a political budget cycle and a general dominance of swing effects. Social implications The fiscal transfer system disregards the social principles of fairness and efficiency. Therefore, a wider consultative process in reviewing the formula is proposed; and this should be done in intervals of five years to minimize the indiscriminate adjustments of the sharing formula. Originality/value The paper empirically examines the political economy dynamics of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in a decentralized unitary system.