scholarly journals Redistributive Politics with Target-Specific Beliefs

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina M. Fong ◽  
Panu Poutvaara
Keyword(s):  
Redistributive Politics

The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics

1996 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 1132-1155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avinash Dixit ◽  
John Londregan
Keyword(s):  
Special Interests ◽  
Redistributive Politics

scholarly journals Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Bénabou ◽  
Jean Tirole
Keyword(s):  
Just World ◽  
Redistributive Politics

scholarly journals REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT DEBT IN A BORROWING-CONSTRAINED ECONOMY

2013 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-103
Author(s):  
Ryo Arawatari ◽  
Tetsuo Ono
Keyword(s):  
Government Debt ◽  
Redistributive Politics ◽  
Politics And Government

scholarly journals Redistributive Politics in Russia: The Political Economy of Agricultural Subsidies

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasyl Kvartiuk ◽  
Thomas Herzfeld
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
The Political ◽  
Voter Mobilization ◽  
Agricultural Subsidies ◽  
Redistributive Politics ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Autocratic Regime ◽  
Fertile Ground ◽  
Large Farms

Abstract This paper explores whether redistributive politics can explain differences in agricultural subsidies in Russia, a country whose autocratic regime represents a fertile ground for strategic redistribution. Relying on political economy literature, we examine the strategies regional and federal Russian politicians utilize to allocate and distribute agricultural subsidies. Using unique 2008–2015 panel data, we test whether politicians target loyal or easily swayed voters and whether they use large farms as vote brokers. We find federal and regional politicians to allocate more agricultural subsidies when political competition against the dominant party is higher. Moreover, they appear to also target large farms for voter mobilization.

Political Income Redistribution

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Londregan
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Income Redistribution ◽  
Redistributive Politics

This article discusses political income redistribution, beginning with a section on a simple but widely used class of models. These models have a menu of redistributive options that is artificially restricted by limiting taxes and transfers to schemes that make post-tax income a deterministic and non-decreasing function of pre-tax income. The article next discusses models that put emphasis on the potential instability of redistributive politics and models that have built-in sources of stability. The final section focuses on several models of redistributive politics that try to explain the choice of redistributive instruments despite the availability of more efficient alternatives.

Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency

1995 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 856-866 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avinash Dixit ◽  
John Londregan
Keyword(s):  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
Technical Change ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Economic Consequences ◽  
International Competition ◽  
The Political ◽  
Redistributive Politics ◽  
Dynamic Inconsistency ◽  
Declining Industries

The political process often compensates the losers from technical change or international competition in an economically inefficient way, namely by subsidizing or protecting declining industries instead of encouraging the movement of resources to other more productive uses. We find that a dynamic inconsistency in the game of redistributive politics contributes to this outcome. To achieve economically efficient outcomes, it is necessary that those making economically inefficient choices not be given offsetting transfers. But the political process distributes income on the basis of political characteristics, which are in general different from the economic characteristics that are rewarded by the market. We identify circumstances in which the inefficient choosers have desirable political characteristics and are therefore immune from threats of having to face the economic consequences of their choices.

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