PARTAI DEMOKRASI INDONESIA PERJUANGAN DALAM PERSAINGAN POLITIK DI BALI TAHUN 1999-2019

ABSTRACK This study seeks to reveal the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) in the political competition in Bali in 1999-2019. The change in the power system from the New Order to the Reformation has resulted in significant changes in the political system. At the local political level in Bali there is a shift in political power. Previously, during the New Order era, political power was controlled by Golkar, now it has begun to shift to the PDI-P. The problems discussed in this study are (1) how was the PDI-P's role in political competition in Bali from 1999-2019 (2) Why PDI-P managed to emerge as a competitor in political competition in Bali (3) What was the competition from the success of the PDI -P emerged as the dominant party in Bali. This study uses historical theory, especially historical explanations and historical cause and effect as well as theoretical assistance from social science, namely Leadership from Antonio Gramsci. The results show that throughout the post-New Order election, PDI-P managed to emerge as the dominant party in Bali from 1999-2019. The success of the PDI-P to emerge as the dominant party in Bali is inseparable from the success of the PDI-P in utilizing the symbolic capital of the past as Soekarno's party, the PDI-P has also succeeded in building a system of alliances with various community groups that provide political support, and the PDI-P has succeeded in reforming the system. party organization. this had implications for the success of the PDI-P in realizing the party's agenda. Keywords: PDI-P, Election, Political Competition, Domination

The Malaysian Election Commission: Navigating Electoral Authoritarianism and Political Change

The urgency of electoral reforms has long been identified as a key to improving democracy in Malaysia. For decades, electoral manipulation through gerrymandering, malapportionment, and issues with the electoral roll and conduct of elections have undermined democratic quality and competition. The Malaysian Election Commission (EC) has – understandably – come under scrutiny for its role in facilitating and sustaining these problems. However, what requires a greater level of attention is the question of how the EC – despite its position as a constitutional institution that exists independently from the other branches of government – has operated in ways that undermined Malaysia's democracy and maintained a dominant party regime for over six decades. This Article brings this to light by examining the structural, institutional, and political conditions that shape the EC's operation, particularly with regard to re-delineation of constituencies and the conduct of elections. It argues that flaws in constitutional design, along with subsequent constitutional amendments, have rendered the EC vulnerable to partisan capture and thus affected its ability to function as an independent constitutional institution. In addition, this Article demonstrates how changes in political imperatives and judicial restraint in reviewing the EC's decision-making have also contributed to the deficiencies in Malaysia's electoral democracy.

Russian “Party of Power” vs Dominant Party

The article presents a factual analysis of the origin and formation of the “party of power” in Russia. The work demonstrates that at all stages the Russian “party of power” was designed and controlled by the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. The research carried out by the author shows that Russia’s “party of power” does not meet the criteria that would allow to qualify this political party as dominant, in any of its “incarnations”. This fully applies to the United Russia party that does not exert a significant impact on the appointments to the political and administrative positions and does not have any effect on the decisions that determine the state’s policy. The dominance of the United Russia party in the electoral field is ensured primarily by the electoral corruption, as well as by the fact that its “electoral machine” is represented by the system of public authorities at all levels, from federal to local. In turn, the dominance of this party in the State Duma and the rigid and strictly hierarchical administrative structure that it built in the lower chamber of the Russian Parliament allows the Presidential Administration to control the legislative process and parliamentary activity in general. According to the author’s conclusion, the “party of power” is an externally controlled political organization of a party type that protects the interests of Russia’s ruling nomenklatura and implements its goals in the processes of the formation of public authorities through electoral procedures, as well as in the course of the legislative and parliamentary activity. Not only does such an organization fail to meet the criteria of the dominant party, but it also fails to fully correspond to the concept of a political party per se.

Rules and Dominant Party Regimes

This chapter examines how rules have operated in two electoral authoritarian dominant party regimes, Malaysia under Mahathir (1981–2003) and Mexico under the Institutional Revolutionary Party (1929–2000). The nature of the party, one designed to participate in a competitive electoral process (even if unfair because it is tilted in favour of the ruling party), is an important factor in shaping the rules and how they worked. The fact that one is a parliamentary and the other a presidential system also provides scope to see how institutions affect rules and their performance.

Italy’s elections threaten the cohesion of the right

Significance The results have destabilised relations within the alliance involving the League, Brothers of Italy (FdI) and Forza Italia (FI), and increased speculation that FI may ally with moderate parties instead. The election results reflect the popularity of Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s government of national unity. Impacts The stability of Draghi’s government may boost Italy’s chances of influencing reforms to the EU’s fiscal policy framework. The election result reflects the wider recovery in business confidence already evidenced in Italy. Based on polling trends, Giorgia Meloni’s FdI is in a strong position to be the leading populist party after the next election. Meloni’s rise could increase tensions between FdI and the League, as the latter is accustomed to being the dominant party in the polls.

Policies, Programs and Achievements of Ghulam Nabi Azad - led Coalition in Jammu & Kashmir

The coalition government in Jammu and Kashmir during 2002 to 2008 helped build some kind of confidence in the electoral institutions and processes. Breaking the hegemony of the single dominant party also brought an alternative to the PDPCongress coalition power. PDP- Congress formed a coalition government after 2002 Assembly elections as no political party had won majority and it resulted in a fractured mandate. The coalition was significant in the sense that PDP had recently emerged as regional force, and it was its first game in elections as well as coalition politics. The coalition began very well on a good note. The coalition incorporated their election manifestoes with the basic issues which the people were facing. The PDP promised a corruption- free government, unconditional dialogue with militants, providing a healing touch and like. The present paper analyses the performance of PDP- Congress coalition led by Ghulam Nabi Azad. Keywords: Coalition, Jammu and Kashmir, Ghulam Nabi Azad, PDP-Congress.

The Rise of Germany in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries and Sustaining Democracy

This article examines the rise of Germany from the nineteenth century to explain that it is open access in the economic sphere, as well as institutional building related to the protection of property rights, contract enforcement, financial markets, rule of law, and human resource accumulation that determine economic and human development. The case of Germany is not very consistent with the logic of the open access orders of North et al. or the theory of extractive political institutions of Acemoglu and Robinson along the line of contestation and inclusiveness. The case of Germany is, however, able to support the research of Przeworski and Limongi that economic development is more likely to sustain democracy. Germany is certainly not the only case in explaining that stable democracy is not the cause but rather the consequence or outcome of lengthy economic development. The historical evidence from South Korea and Taiwan similarly supports the position that democracy is the outcome of economic and political development. This article, however, does not examine whether western values of human equality and human freedom are essential in economic and human development. They are very likely to be so as human equality is the precondition of open access in the economic sphere and human freedom is closely integrated with the interconnected institutions examined in this article. Future research may investigate the roles of these values in different political systems regardless of whether a political system is under the rule of one party, by a dominant party, or through the utilization of a multiparty system.