Stacking Subsidies in Factor Markets: Evidence from Market Experiments

Government policies employ different support programs such as subsidies to reduce risks, increase efficiency in markets, and enhance societal welfare. In markets such as ethanol markets, where multiple agents receive subsidy, it is often difficult to determine whether recipients of these support programs will transfer some of their payments to other agents in the market. In this study, we use laboratory market experiments to understand subsidy incidence in markets where both buyers and sellers receive subsidies, and there are few buyers relative to sellers. Our results show that when subsidizing both sides of the market, framing effects matter, and when markets are buyer concentrated, subsidy distributions generally tend to favor buyers. With a per-unit subsidy of 20 tokens to both sides and an equal number of buyers and sellers in the market, we find that buyers increase their earnings by 13.4% while seller earnings decrease by 16.1%. On a per-schedule basis, buyer earnings in the concentrated market are similar to what we observed in the competitive market.

Subsidy Incidence in Privately Negotiated Spot Markets: Experimental Evidence

We use experimental methods to investigate subsidy incidence, the transfer of subsidy payments from intended recipients to other economic agents, in privately negotiated spot markets. Our results show that market outcomes in treatments with a subsidy given to either buyers or sellers are significantly different from both a no-subsidy treatment and the competitive prediction of a 50% subsidy incidence. The disparity in incidence across treatments relative to predicted levels suggests that incidence equivalence does not hold in this market setting. Moreover, we find no statistical difference in market outcomes when benefits are framed as a “subsidy” versus a schedule shift.

Fertilizer industry subsidies in China: who are the beneficiaries?

Purpose – Since 2004, subsidies increased by 670 percent in the Chinese fertilizer industry to reduce the farmer's burden. The purpose of this paper is to assess whether subsidies benefit the target groups, the fertilizer subsidy distribution pattern and benefit allocation pattern among fertilizer producers and other sectors were investigated. Design/methodology/approach – The Muth model is extended to evaluate the impacts of a subsidy on multi-stage markets. Findings – It is found that the total benefits from the policy are about RMB 7.7 billion yuans. The fertilizer suppliers gain about RMB 51 billion yuans from the favorable policy with mean subsidy incidence 0.8 and capturing about 70 percent of total surplus. Social implications – The results suggest that transferring parts of subsidies to the non-fertilizer sectors could be considered an efficient way to redistribute welfare indifferent sectors. Originality/value – This study first use the equilibrium displacement model to quantity the distribution of fertilizer subsidy in a vertical market in China.

Subsidy Incidence in Factor Markets: An Experimental Approach

Laboratory market experiments are used to estimate the incidence of a stylized subsidy in factor market negotiations with university student and agricultural professional subjects. In separate sessions with both groups, prices converged approximately four and a half tokens higher when a 20-token per-unit subsidy was paid to buyers; this equates to 44% of the predicted 10-token split. A proportional market incentive treatment clarifies this subsidy effect. Discrepancies between predicted and observed incidence are similar to previous empirical estimates of subsidy incidence in agricultural land rental markets. A behavioral anomaly as well as buyer-buyer market competition may contribute to experimental results.