Nationalism and International Security

This chapter explores the concept and measurement of nationalism and its implications for international security. It surveys canonical approaches and recent contributions to the literature that revise earlier simplistic understandings of nationalist conflict and national identification. It explores the uses of nationalism in diversionary war, self-determination movements, and great power Realpolitik competition, drawing insights from social psychology to explain the changing salience of national identity and analyzing the conditions under which nationalism can foster violent conflict within or between states. Complex connections between nationalism and war are outlined, highlighting the inherently contingent nature of national conflict. Analysts have been quick to predict the decline of nationalist conflict. The chapter considers the broad set of conditions that are consistent with such predictions, while also identifying scenarios in which nationalist conflicts can proliferate.

Starting Off on the Wrong Foot: Elite Influences in Multi-Ethnic Democratization Settings

Elite manipulation theories, particularly the idea of diversionary war, have played a substantial role in the analysis of ethnic civil wars. Some, as Gagnon (2004), argue that political elites have shaped the perceptions of their population to create the illusion of a threatening outside world. This, driven to the extreme, would then give rise to an ethnic security dilemma and potentially, civil war. Even if violence does not break out, divisive elite manipulation increases the likelihood of self-perpetuating injustices between members of ethnic groups. Snyder (2000) argues that democratizing multi-ethnic states face an extraordinarily high risk of such conflict.During and shortly after democratization processes, when political leaders are most in need of popular backing, the temptation to seek the support of a fairly well defined ethnic group rather than that of the multi-ethnic demos that existed so far may be strong. Especially if group identities have been reified through institutionalization – as is frequently the case in multi-ethnic societies – ready-made social cleavages may be available for politicians to exploit. However, Brubaker (1998) convincingly argues that political leaders rarely have both the ability and ideal environment to manipulate identities for their own personal need that the theory of diversionary war suggests.This paper provides an initial analysis of the first in a series of democratization cases in ethnically heterogeneous settings: the Burundian democratization process of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Based on news agency and local newspaper reports, this paper attempts to assess to what degree elites stimulate ethnic hostilities in their bid for political power and to what extend they react to credible already present in the population.

Domestic diversion and strategic behavior by minority groups

Diversionary war theory states that leaders may initiate an international conflict in order to invoke internal cohesion and distract the public from domestic issues. Recent developments in diversionary literature suggest the possibility that leaders can alternately divert against domestic targets, such as minority groups. Empirical support for domestic diversion, though, has been mixed. In this paper we seek to reconcile this by further examining the different dynamics at play between actors who are faced with diversionary incentives. We suggest that a major reason why we do not observe many cases of domestic diversion is strategic behavior by minority groups. Much like states do, minority groups that are potential targets of repression engage in strategic conflict avoidance when they observe diversionary incentives to be present. We test our theory through a multivariate probit model that uses the state–minority group dyad as the unit of analysis.

Diversionary conflict: Demonizing enemies or demonstrating competence?

How do embattled leaders hope to secure their hold on power by initiating conflict abroad? The literature on diversionary war has emphasized two distinct mechanisms by which leaders stand to gain from conflict — the “rally around the flag” and “gambling for resurrection” theories. But despite a massive literature on the subject, these competing theories of diversionary incentives have never been subjected to comparative empirical evaluation. This article seeks to fill this gap. I argue that the rally and gambling theories predict diversionary conflicts to target different types of states. Diversionary conflicts driven by a rally logic will target traditional enemies and out-groups, including rivals, neighbors, and geopolitically incompatible states. Gambling for resurrection, on the other hand, pushes leaders to target powerful states in order to demonstrate competence to their constituents. Challenging the conventional wisdom, I find little evidence to support the rally mechanism. The results offer substantial support for the gambling for resurrection theory, indicating that diversionary conflict may be primarily driven by unpopular leaders attempting to prove their competence domestically.