Lobbying Beyond the Legislature: Challenges and Biases in Women's Organizations’ Participation in Rulemaking

This study, which is based on a survey of women's organizations’ staff members, answers two previously unexamined questions about women's groups’ participation in the rulemaking process: (1) How do women's organizations participate? (2) What are the characteristics of the women's organizations that are the most likely to participate? About one-quarter (27%) of women's organizations reported that they lobby rulemakers, often using relatively low-cost methods, such as submitting comments or signing on to comments written by coalitions or like-minded groups. Women's organizations with large staffs that are structured the most like political insiders or influential economic interest groups were the most likely to participate in the process, potentially biasing participation in favor of relatively advantaged subgroups of women. Together, these results suggest that although rulemaking presents unique opportunities to represent women, the most marginalized women may be underrepresented during rulemaking debates.

Confidence in the Inter-organizational Cooperation of Social and Solidarity Economy Organizations

Today, we are witnessing a growing enthusiasm for inter-organizational cooperation, as it has become the best path for managing organizations. Several authors and practitioners consider confidence as essential for the development and sustainability of this cooperation. According to Gambetta (1988) [1], confidence promotes cooperative behavior and promotes relationships between cooperants. For Social and Solidarity Economy organizations, inter-organizational cooperation is an excellent way to demonstrate the proper use of the principles of confidence. This is a key factor in their success, which is reflected in the practice of their daily activities. Thus, drawing inspiration from the literature dealing with confidence, and according to the measurement criteria proposed by Mayer & al., (1995) [2], we are conducting a quantitative study with three Economic Interest Groups (EIG) and four unions, composed of 59 cooperatives operating in d'Argane, located in Souss-Massa region. The goal is to show how confidence is built within these organizations. To what extent it influences inter-organizational cooperation.

Distributive Conflict and Interest Group Preferences in Surplus Countries

A key characteristic of the Eurozone crisis is that the burden of adjustment was carried almost exclusively by crisis countries. Surplus countries did not contribute to the necessary rebalancing, even though internal adjustment likely would have reduced some of the pressure on deficit states. The chapter argues that surplus countries’ resistance to internal adjustment is rooted in domestic distributive struggles about the design of possible adjustment policies. To explore this argument, original survey data is leveraged from 357 economic interest groups from Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands and qualitative interviews with interest group representatives. The chapter shows that although there is general support for internal adjustment among economic interest groups, they disagree heavily about how exactly to achieve this goal. Together with a broad consensus to avoid a breakup of the Eurozone, the resulting deadlock turned interstate financing—such as bailouts to crisis countries—into a politically attractive strategy. Rather than being rooted only in ordoliberal ideology or export orientation, distributive conflicts thus contributed significantly to surplus countries’ resistance to adjust.

Economic interest groups and policy analysis in France

The research on policy analysis undertaken by French economic interest groups is only marginally addressed in the existing literature. This chapter takes a closer look at this subject and propose a broader analytical framework based on three pillars: the study of selected main sectorial and inter sectorial representative organizations, the monitoring of policy analysis in the development of several significant pieces of legislation, and an exhaustive list of documents issued by these organizations in the electoral context (the 2012 French presidential election). First, the terms of policy analysis are introduced, including actors, their shapes and their objects. Second, it questions the main approach that consists of analyzing policy by checking main economic indicators and reacting to public decisions. Finally, economic actors are identified as agents of public action when they participate in the distribution of public data to their members and their industry.