Overcoming Identity Crisis: Limits of Consociationalism and Stagnation in Northern Ireland Conflict Regulation

For many decades, Northern Ireland has been characterized by a tense conflict of identities with frequent outbreaks of political and religious violence. At the end of the 20th century, a consensus was reached between the opposing sides on the need for a peaceful settlement of the contradictions, which was reflected in the 1998 Belfast Agreement. The most important part of the agreement was a transition to the consociational model of governance. Consociationalism was assumed to “cure” the Northern Irish region, save it from violence and antagonism, and help to establish a dialogue between the representatives of the region’s key collective identities — unionists and nationalists. However, although 22 years have passed since the introduction of the consociational system, the settlement of the conflict has not seen any obvious progress. The article attempts to trace the reasons for this state of affairs and, in particular, to find out whether consociational model could, in principle, live up to the expectations. Based on the analysis of the fundamental characteristics of this model, as well as the institutional patterns in the Northern Irish politics, P.Maksimova comes to the conclusion that consociational practices not only failed to contribute to the elimination of the antagonistic moods in the society, but also helped to preserve them. According to the author, consociational system is merely an instrument of crisis management, which, if misinterpreted, can only intensify confrontation and block the final settlement of the conflict. This is exactly what happened in Northern Ireland, where the specific features of the consociational system made it almost impossible to abandon group identities.

Introduction

The introduction sets out the central aims of the book: to offer a fresh analysis of the factors that sustained violent conflict and prevented a peace settlement in Northern Ireland for so long and to elaborate the distinctive features of negotiations conducted in secret. It describes the approach taken in the book and argues that violence and negotiation must be analysed together as part of a single process of conflict transformation. It sets out the value of existing work on civil wars, contentious politics, and wartime political orders in analysing negotiation in the case of Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland conflict provides a revelatory case of back-channel negotiation. It is one of the few conflicts for which there is extensive, reliable primary documentation of clandestine engagement through an intermediary, and this chapter introduces the unique sources on which the book draws. These include private papers, government archives, and interviews with Irish republicans, British and Irish civil servants, the key intermediary, and others.

Conclusion

The Conclusion considers why it took so long to negotiate an end to the Northern Ireland conflict, examining the role of internal divisions and leadership, emphasizing the importance of strategic action, and suggesting a more agential approach to understanding peace settlements. It outlines how back-channel negotiation allowed two key parties to the Northern Ireland conflict to coordinate their actions, and to assist each other in resolving strategic dilemmas and in overcoming intra-party resistance to compromise when direct contact and open meetings were impossible. It sets out how an analysis of the conflict through the lens of negotiation can enhance understanding of the factors that make for peace agreements.

Deniable Contact

Despite the importance of secret negotiations during the Northern Ireland conflict there is no full-length study of the use of back-channels in repeated efforts to end the ‘Troubles’. This book provides a textured account that extends our understanding of the distinctive dynamics of negotiations conducted in secret and the conditions conducive to the negotiated settlement of conflict. It disrupts and challenges some conventional notions about the conflict in Northern Ireland, offering a fresh analysis of the political dynamics and the intra-party struggles that sustained violent conflict and prevented settlement for so long. It draws on theories of negotiation and mediation to understand why efforts to end the conflict through back-channel negotiations repeatedly failed before finally succeeding in the 1990s. It challenges the view that the conflict persisted because of irreconcilable political ideologies and argues that the parties to conflict were much more open to compromise than the often-intransigent public rhetoric suggested. The analysis is founded on a rich store of historical evidence, including the private papers of key Irish republican leaders and British politicians, recently released papers from national archives in Dublin and London, and the papers of Brendan Duddy, the intermediary who acted as the primary contact between the IRA and the British government during key phases of engagement, including papers that have not yet been made publicly available. This documentary evidence, combined with original interviews with politicians, mediators, civil servants, and republicans, allows a vivid picture to emerge of the complex maneuvering at this intersection.