International Legitimacy

Wight defined international legitimacy as ‘the collective judgment of international society about rightful membership of the family of nations’. International legitimacy derived mainly from prescription and dynasticism, the customary rule of hereditary monarchs, until the American and French Revolutions instituted the popular and democratic principle of the consent of the governed. The increasing reliance on popular politics led to the triumph of national self-determination in the 1919 peace settlement, with certain exceptions, notably the decision not to conduct a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine. New principles, such as territorial contiguity and integrity, influenced decisions about the legitimacy of the frontiers of the states formed from the breakup of European colonial empires after the Second World War. India, for example, referred to the principle of territorial integrity to justify the acquisition of Hyderabad and Goa. Critics of colonial arrangements have regarded them as illegitimate and unacceptable by definition. A state seeking independence via secession can succeed in its bid for self-determination only if it can gain sufficient external support. Therefore Biafra’s bid failed while that of Bangladesh succeeded. Communist principles of legitimacy emphasize the self-determination of the proletariat under the guidance of the Communist party. Legitimacy principles are subject to pragmatic constraints, and in practice governments generally recognize whoever controls state power.

UPAYA PERDAMAIAN UNTUK PENYELESAIAN PERKARA PIDANA Reaktualisasi Kearifan Lokal dalam Hukum pidana Indonesia

One characteristic of Islamic law is not explicitly distinguished between the domain of public law with private law. Sanctions for deliberate murder is Qisas for example, where the victim's heirs have more permanent role to choose the death penalty imposed (Qisas) or give forgive me by asking Diyat (compensation). Amount number of Diyat is also can be negotiated through a kind of mediation method called Shulh (peace). So here the element of private law is more dominant. Even Diyat can be released at all heirs of the victim initiatives. In this last case the State may punish the offender with ta'zir, so here its public law elements recur. This idea is not unknown in Indonesian positive law provisions. The victim had usually been involved as a witness in his father murder case or rape case against her. In customary law in Aceh there are several institutions in efforts to realize peace for criminal cases, namely in the form of adat meulangga, dhiet, sayam or takanai (South Aceh). Principles of peace settlement of disputes may also be considered not only for civil cases but also in criminal cases. Thus the doctrine that says the criminal nature of a case will not remove although there is peace agreement, would need to be revisited. However it is important also to restrict that not every criminal case could be solved by peace agreement. Criminal cases like premeditated murder and rape should be excluded from the possibility of peace agreement.

Introduction

The introduction sets out the central aims of the book: to offer a fresh analysis of the factors that sustained violent conflict and prevented a peace settlement in Northern Ireland for so long and to elaborate the distinctive features of negotiations conducted in secret. It describes the approach taken in the book and argues that violence and negotiation must be analysed together as part of a single process of conflict transformation. It sets out the value of existing work on civil wars, contentious politics, and wartime political orders in analysing negotiation in the case of Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland conflict provides a revelatory case of back-channel negotiation. It is one of the few conflicts for which there is extensive, reliable primary documentation of clandestine engagement through an intermediary, and this chapter introduces the unique sources on which the book draws. These include private papers, government archives, and interviews with Irish republicans, British and Irish civil servants, the key intermediary, and others.

1975 Ceasefire

Back-channel contacts led in early 1975 to an IRA ceasefire that lasted for much of that year. IRA representatives and British government officials now embarked for the first time since the outbreak of the Troubles on a series of regular face-to-face meetings aimed at negotiating an end to the conflict. The venue was the house of intermediary Brendan Duddy in Derry. Chapter Five offers a new explanation for the failure of a serious and sustained effort to bring a negotiated end to the conflict during the IRA ceasefire of 1975. It outlines the mutual understanding and goodwill that developed in the course of these secret talks. It shows the extent of the intra-party divisions that hindered compromise and explains how they contributed to the collapse of the ceasefire and the breakdown of talks. It argues that, in many important respects, this process was a precursor to the peace settlement of the 1990s and shared many of its key features, including a willingness by the IRA to compromise on its core ideological positions and to contemplate alternatives to Irish reunification.

Back To the Back-channel

This chapter focuses on the use of the back-channel between the British government and the IRA from 1991 through 1993 and on the distinctive role of secrecy in the development of a sense of common purpose between the parties. It highlights the contribution of key British officials who advocated the reopening of the channel and an inclusive peace settlement. It also examines the importance of back-channel links between the Irish government and the SDLP on one hand, and Sinn Féin on the other, in creating pressure for progress. From 1989 onwards, the British government and the IRA made conciliatory public statements and gestures. Then, in April 1991, the British government reopened the back-channel to the IRA, sending an emissary to ask Brendan Duddy to act once again as intermediary. The particular back-channel involving Duddy established a joint project of secrecy, creating a shared task that built trust and mutual understanding. Close interpersonal relationships, continuity of personnel with previous phases of conflict, and the exclusion of internal opponents contributed to distinctively strong cooperative dynamics that helped to sustain cooperation and generate substantial progress.

US Interest in Afghanistan and Current Peace Prospects

The long-standing presence of the United States in Afghanistan is coming to an end by April 2021 as a result of the February 29, 2020 US-Taliban Agreement. It was the 9/11 syndrome that increased the interest of the US and its allied partners in Afghanistan. The main objectives of the study include the US interest in Afghanistan, maintenance of security inside Afghanistan by the United States and its allied partners, and the current prospects of peace settlement in Afghanistan. The drawdown of the US forces from Afghanistan started in 2014 and complete withdrawal is going to take place by April 2021 whereby responsibility of the security of Afghanistan would completely shift to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces and the role of the US troops catering to training, assisting and supporting the ANDSF would diminish.

Introduction

Referendums are now common in ‘conflict societies’—societies where a widespread and concerted campaign of violence between groups recently occurred, is occurring, or is liable to occur. In the ideal case, a peace referendum can secure consent for a new formal peace settlement among warring groups and provide the settlement with a popular mandate. In practice, however, settlements, once attained, may struggle to endure. Some may collapse entirely. Against this background we introduced what we call the ‘Deliberative Peace Referendum’, or ‘DPR’. A DPR is a purpose-designed deliberative referendum held under conditions of conflict. As this chapter recognizes, designing a referendum to be more deliberative is a challenge under any circumstances. It may be hardest of all amid armed intercommunal conflict.

Deliberative Peace Referendums

‘Peace referendums’, which seek to manage armed conflict, are increasingly common around the world. Yet such referendums remain erratic forces—liable as often to aggravate as to resolve tensions. In this book we consider when, despite their risks, referendums can play useful roles amid conflict. We argue that this largely depends on a referendum’s design, including how well it incorporates contemporary lessons from the theory and practice of deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy seeks to channel disagreement into reasoned forms of decision-making—for instance, by identifying certain ‘public’ values around which disparate groups may find a measure of common ground. As yet, however, few deliberative democracy scholars have advanced arguments for referendums in conflict societies. This is unsurprising: while designing a referendum to be deliberative is a challenge even in the most peaceable of societies, in a conflict society it is harder still. Nevertheless, discounting deliberative institutional schemes because deliberation appears too difficult, and a society too conflictual, overlooks the possibility that some armed conflict can be traced to scarce opportunities to deliberate in the first place. Using a distinctive combination of deliberative democratic and constitutional theory, and also drawing from the field of conflict studies, we develop what we call the Deliberative Peace Referendum—a referendum held under conditions of conflict and designed to be deliberative. This kind of referendum has two broad objectives: to assist a peace settlement to be achieved, and to secure the settlement’s long-term resilience. After scaffolding a tenuous agreement, the referendum may help to concretize an agreement as a durable constitutional settlement by drawing on deliberative democracy’s perceived legitimacy. A Deliberative Peace Referendum thus takes aim at the standard pathologies of referendums—pathologies that must be addressed if referendums are to avoid repeating the problems of peace referendums in the past. Our purpose with this book is to rescue peace referendums from their habitual under-theorization and poor design, and to rehabilitate them as genuine tools of conflict management.