Non-Self II

The second of two chapters on the central Buddhist thesis of non-self, this chapter explores the Buddhist claim that the person, as the mereological sum of a causal series of sets of psychophysical elements, is a mere conceptual fiction, something thought to exist only due to our use of an opaque enumerative expression. Buddhists use the doctrine of the two truths to express this: persons are only conventionally and not ultimately real, and it is conventionally but not ultimately true that there are persons. The device of the tetralemma as a tool for surveying all the logical possibilities on a given issue is introduced; denial of all four lemmas is shown to involve presupposition failure. The heterodox Buddhist position known as Personalism is introduced, and its refutation explored.

Impossible Presuppositions. On factivity, focus, and triviality

This paper analyzes certain restrictions on polarity focus marking in clauses embedded under emotive factive predicates. It argues that these restrictions arise because this configuration leads to a systematic presupposition failure in virtue of its focus value, which I call impossible presupposition. The main argument offered here supporting this approach involves some novel asymmetries with factive clauses in predicate doubling construction in Spanish. From a theoretical perspective, the larger agenda of this article is to provide new evidence that certain types of ungrammaticality are due to semantic-pragmatic factors, namely, logical triviality.

Empty Names, Presupposition Failure, and Metalinguistic Negation

When it comes to empty names, we seem to have reached very little consensus. Still, we all seem to agree, first, that our semantics should assign truth to (one reading of) negative singular existence statements in which an empty name occurs and, second, that names are used in such statements. The purpose of this paper is to show that ruling out that the names are mentioned is harder than it has been thought. I will present a new metalinguistic account for negative singular existence statements in which an empty name occurs, and I will show that the account can deal both with the objections to the traditional metalinguistic account and with other objections that seem to target my new proposal.

Presupposition Failure and Intended Pronominal Reference: Person Is Not So Different from Gender After All

This article aims to show that (one of) the main argument(s) against the presuppositional account of person is not compelling if one makes appropriate assumptions about how the context fixes the assignment. It has been argued that unlike gender features, person features of free pronouns cannot yield presupposition failure (instead, can yield only falsity) when they are not verified by the referent. The argument is flawed, however, because the way the referent is assigned is not made clear. If it is assumed to be the individual that the audience can recognize as the referent intended by the speaker, the argument is reversed.

Quintum Non-Datur

This chapter looks at the appearance of the catuṣkoṭi in early sūtras. It then looks at the failure of attempts to accommodate it in `standard' logic. Next it shows how it can be accommodated in the logic of First Degree Entailment. Finally it looks at some early Buddhist hints that there might be more to matters than the simple catuṣkoṭi and how these matters cannot be accommodated by appealing to presupposition-failure.

UTILITARIANISM AND PRIORITARIANISM I

Utilitarianism and prioritarianism make a strong assumption about measures of how good lotteries over histories are for individuals, or for short, individual goodness measures. Given some idealizing assumptions about interpersonal and intrapersonal comparisons, they presuppose that any individual goodness measure can be transformed into any other individual goodness measure by a positive affine transformation. But it is far from obvious that the presupposition is correct, so both theories face the threat of presupposition failure. The usual response to this problem starts by assuming that what implicitly determines the set of individual goodness measures is independent of our discourse about utilitarianism and prioritarianism. I suggest reversing this response. What determines the set of individual goodness measures just is the body of platitudes we accept about utilitarianism and prioritarianism. This approach vindicates the utilitarian and prioritarian presupposition. As a corollary, it shows that individual goodness measures are expectational, and provides an answer to an argument due to Broome that for different reasons to do with measurement, prioritarianism is more or less meaningless.

Presupposition, negation and trivalence

Close inspection of presupposition(= P-)cancelling and other metalinguistic negation data shows that natural language semantics must be (at least) trivalent, with the values ‘true’, ‘minimally false’ (assertion failure) and ‘radically false’ (presupposition failure). It is argued that presupposition is a semantic phenomenon originating in a distinction between two kinds of satisfaction conditions for predicates, the PRECONDITIONS generating presuppositions, and the UPDATE CONDITIONS generating classical entailments. The trivalence of language is a natural consequence of the acceptance of occasion sentences in an incremental Discourse Semantics. The logical properties of sentences are considered secondary and derived from their semantic properties. These include, besides propositional content, a speech act quality, specifying the personal commitment taken on by the speaker not only in respect of the propositional content, but also with regard to the linguistic forms selected. It is suggested that the classical truth-functional operators should be redefined as instructions under speech act commitment. The negation operator is singled out: it is redefined as an instruction to reject either an incrementable sentence, which may be a comment about a form used or to be used (P-preserving negation), or an already incremented sentence to be removed from the discourse along with some presupposition (P-cancelling negation).