Proportionality’s Lower Bound

Many philosophers have raised difficulties for any attempt to proportion punishment severity to crime seriousness. One reason for this may be that offering a full theory of proportionality is simply too ambitious. I suggest a more modest project: setting a lower bound on proportionate punishment. That is, I suggest a metric to measure when punishment is not disproportionately severe. I claim that punishment is not disproportionately severe if it imposes costs on a criminal wrongdoer which are no greater than the costs which they intentionally caused to others. I flesh out the implications of this Lower bound by discussing how to measure the costs of crime. Methodologically, I claim that different costs should be compared by considering preferences. Substantively, I claim that many proportionality judgements undercount the costs of crime by focusing only on the marginal and not the average cost. I suggest that we may hold defendants causally responsible for their contribution to the costs of that type of crime.

Respondent Fatigue in Estimates of the Cost of White-Collar Crime: Implications From Willingness-to-Pay Surveys

Contingent valuation (CV) methods are used in many contexts to estimate non-tangible costs, despite some indications that they may not be reliable. In criminal justice, CV has been used to generate “costs of crime” for street, violent, and white-collar crimes. This article explores respondent fatigue using both quantitative and qualitative indicators from an open-ended CV survey where respondents were asked how much they would be willing to pay to reduce certain crimes. Our findings reveal that willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce crime increases when both problematic response patterns and fatigue effects are accounted for in the calculation, indicating that fatigued respondents who also engage in straight lining are driving the WTP estimates down. We conclude by discussing the implications of our results for policymakers and other consumers of CV studies.

Crime and Output

This paper presents a structural model of crime and output. Individuals make an occupational choice between criminal and legal activities. The return to becoming a criminal is endogenously determined in a general equilibrium together with the level of crime and economic activity. I calibrate the model to the Northern Triangle countries and conduct several policy experiments. I find that for a country like Honduras crime reduces GDP by about 3 percent through its negative effect on employment indirectly, in addition to direct costs of crime associated with material losses, which are in line with literature estimates. Also, the model generates a non-linear effect of crime on output and vice versa. On average I find that a one percent increase in output per capita implies about ½ percent decline in crime, while a decrease of about 5 percent in crime leads to about one percent increase in output per capita. These positive effects are larger if the initial level of crime is larger.