A Test of Ontological Relativity

Jung saw a role for the methods of natural science in analytical psychology alongside other ways of developing of knowledge. This paper puts a cryptic and undeveloped idea in Psychological Types to the test using the principles of Karl Popper’s philosophy of science. The idea is a combination of Jung’s philosophy, esse in anima, and his theory of opposites applied to politics. It is explained using a term coined by the philosopher W.V.O Quine—ontological relativity. There are key similarities between the two philosophical concepts, due to Jung and Quine having a common influence in William James’ radical empiricism. The ontological relativity of political opposites is subjected to three tests that attempt to falsify it. All three attempts at falsification fail, which therefore provides some support for the idea. However, there are a number of anomalous results that raise significant questions requiring further research. This paper should therefore be viewed as the first step in a programme of research to examine the ontological relativity of political opposites that is inherent within esse in anima.

In Favor of the Classical Quine on Ontology

I make a Quinean case that Quine’s ontological relativity marked a wrong turn in his philosophy, that his fundamental commitments point toward the classical view of ontology that was worked out in most detail in his Word and Object (1960). This removes the impetus toward (a version of) structuralism in his later philosophy.

Non-ontological Structuralism†

ABSTRACT Historical structuralist views have been ontological. They either deny that there are any mathematical objects (eliminative structuralism) or they maintain that mathematical objects are structures or positions in them (sui generis structuralism). Non-ontological structuralism offers no account of the nature of mathematical objects. My own structuralism has evolved from an early sui generis version to a non-ontological version that embraces Quine’s doctrine of ontological relativity. In this paper I further develop and explain this view.

Three indeterminacies of Quine`s

In this text we shall examine three well known theses that W. V. Quine held. In order, these are the theses of the indeterminacy of translation, ontological relativity and underdetermination of theories. First two theses are interwoven inside Quine?s writings on the possibility of the unambiguous translation from the unknown language, while the third results from the examination of the nature of scientific theories. All three theses are closely related to each other, since we can speak of both indeterminacy and ontological relativity of any single theory. However, Quine considers relativity of scientific theories a temporary matter, while, on the contrary, indeterminacy is the permanent aspect of language.