A Separability Principle, Contrast Cases, and Contributory Dispositions

The aim of this paper is to clarify the use of contrast cases—which are pairs of cases in which the feature under examination is varied and all else is held fixed—in ethical methodology. In another paper, I argue that we must reject a separability principle which is thought to allow one to use contrast cases to infer truths about intrinsic value (Kopeikin, 2019). Here I offer a different criticism that has a positive upshot about what we are licensed to infer from contrast cases. This provides clarification about the epistemic use of contrast cases in value theory and insight into what we can glean from contrast cases.

Playing with Fire

Hume is not a rationalist. This paper attempts to explain why by examining Hume’s argument in Treatise 1.3.3 from his separability principle to the denial of that hallmark of rationalism, the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The surprising source of Hume’s anti-rationalism reveals that his argument against rationalism is even stronger than has generally been appreciated and that only a rationalist such as Spinoza who embraces a strong form of monism is in a position to avoid the force of Hume’s argument. This special resiliency against Hume’s argument may help to explain some of Hume’s invective against Spinoza in Treatise 1.4.5.

The simple duality: Humean passions

Hume views the passions as having both intentionality and qualitative character, which, in light of his Separability Principle, seemingly contradicts their simplicity. I reject the dominant solution to this puzzle of claiming that intentionality is an extrinsic property of the passions, arguing that a number of Hume's claims regarding the intentionality of the passions (pride and humility in particular) provide reasons for thinking an intrinsic account of the intentionality of the passions to be required. Instead, I propose to resolve this tension by appealing to Hume's treatment of the ‘distinctions of reason’, as explained by Garrett (Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).