A Separability Principle, Contrast Cases, and Contributory Dispositions
Keyword(s):
The aim of this paper is to clarify the use of contrast cases—which are pairs of cases in which the feature under examination is varied and all else is held fixed—in ethical methodology. In another paper, I argue that we must reject a separability principle which is thought to allow one to use contrast cases to infer truths about intrinsic value (Kopeikin, 2019). Here I offer a different criticism that has a positive upshot about what we are licensed to infer from contrast cases. This provides clarification about the epistemic use of contrast cases in value theory and insight into what we can glean from contrast cases.
2020 ◽
Keyword(s):
2021 ◽
pp. 103-113
Keyword(s):
2020 ◽
Vol 44
(4)
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pp. 491-507
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2018 ◽
Vol 55
(6)
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pp. 1339-1368
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Keyword(s):
2021 ◽
Vol 18
(8)
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pp. 3987