Quantum Entanglement Undermines Structural Realism

Quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional metaphysical view that an extrinsic property of an object is determined by its intrinsic properties. So structural realists might be tempted to cite quantum entanglement as evidence for structural realism. I argue, however, that quantum entanglement undermines structural realism. If we classify two entangled electrons as a single system, we can say that their spin properties are intrinsic properties of the system, and that we can have knowledge about these intrinsic properties. Specifically, we can know that the parts of the system are entangled and spatially separated from each other. In addition, the concept of supervenience neither illuminates quantum entanglement nor helps structural realism.

The Effect of Similarity Between a Product’s Shape Properties and the Benefit Offered on Judgments and Preferences

Studies show a product's shape affects consumer judgments. Yet, the basic principle that governs shape effects is unclear. In this study, we fill this gap by demonstrating that causal-reasoning considerations govern shape effects. Specifically, people expect cause (e.g., an energy drink) and its effect (e.g., fat burning) to exhibit some degree of resemblance or congruency (“like causes like”). This expectation leads them to use the “law of similarity” heuristic when judging artifacts. In two studies, we focused on a product's shape. For half of the products, the shape was an intrinsic property of the product (i.e., had the causal power to produce the effect), and for the other half, the shape was an extrinsic property of the product. For both kinds of properties (extrinsic and intrinsic), we demonstrate that the same ad (e.g., an energy drink that "claims" to produce fat burning) is more persuasive (willingness to purchase the product, and choice between products) when the product's shape is congruent rather than incongruent (e.g., a “tall” can vs. a “short” can) with the effect promised.We strengthen the notion that leaning on a cause-effect-similarity heuristic is very basic, by showing that choice situations accelerate the effect of congruency more for products for which the focal property is extrinsic than for products for which it is intrinsic.In line with other studies that show causal reasoning considerations govern judgment and choice on artifacts (products), the present study demonstrates causal-reasoning considerations govern judgment and choice concerning the cause-effect-similarity heuristic as well.

Function Is Not Enough

The “nature” of an artifact is often equated with its function. Clearly, an artifactual function must be an extrinsic property. This feature of functions has important implications on the semantics of artifactual kind terms: it enables us to vindicate that artifactual kind terms have an externalist semantics. Any alleged externalist theory, indeed, must show that the referents of the considered terms share a common nature (i.e., an extrinsic property), whether we know or could possibly ever know what that nature is. However, the state of the art shows that function is not enough to represent such “nature”: function does not exhaustively account for important phenomena that characterize artifacts and artifactual kinds, nor does it thoroughly define what they are. Thus, extending the scope of externalism to artifactual kind terms seems doomed to fail. Pace opposite views, it could even be argued that artifacts are a sub-class of social kinds. If so, not only social but also artifactual kind terms cannot refer externalistically, since their referents constitutively depend on human intentions and norms. Either way, externalism fails to apply to those kinds of terms.

Leukemic Stem Cells Identities: A Philosophical Analysis

What are leukemic stem cells (LSCs)? This is a biological, a semantic, and a philosophical question. Leukemic stem cells raise a number of questions for onco-hematologists in particular when it comes to their clinical relevance. What are their functions in the initiation and in the progression of the disease? How to identify them? How to target them without damaging the non-malignant hematopoietic stem cells (HSCs)? Given that LSCs come from HSCs or progenitors, a semantic question arises: should we rather call them leukemic initiating cells? or leukemic propagating cells? As a philosopher, I approach all these biological and semantic issues with a slightly different perspective. Instead of asking what are LSCs, I will start by asking what kind of property is stemness. In previous work, I performed an analysis of the scientific literature on stem cells (including cancer stem cells) and framed a classification of their possible identities (Laplane, HUP 2016; reviewed in Clevers, Nature 2016):Categorical: stemness is a purely intrinsic property (e.g. of categorical property: the atomic number of chemical elements).Dispositional: stemness is an intrinsic property whose expression depends on extrinsic stimuli from the niche (e.g. of dispositional property: fragility).Relational: stemness is an extrinsic property that depends on a relationship between the cell and its environment; the microenvironment can induce stemness (e.g. of relational property: being the sister of someone).Systemic: stemness is an extrinsic property, maintained and controlled at the level of the system (e.g. of systemic properties: soccer positions that depend on the system of play) Here, I applied this framework to LSCs, in particular in acute myeloid leukemia. This analysis of the identity of stemness matters for onco-hematology because we cannot get rid of categorical, disposition, relational, and systemic properties in the same way. Thus, different therapeutic strategies will have different efficacy depending on the identity of LSCs. For example, targeting LSCs will be much more efficient if they are categorical or dispositional. Targeting the stem cell niche will be more efficient if they are dispositional or relational. But both strategies will lack efficiency if they are systemic. In such cases multi-drug treatments will predictably be more appropriate than targeted therapies. We think about properties as having fixed identities. This is how we study, learn, teach, and investigate biology, and more generally this is how we think. This typological thinking, inherited from Aristotle and Plato, applies well to normal hematopoiesis where most if not all reports describe stemness as a dispositional property. However, the progression of hematological malignancies, from clonal hematopoiesis and pre-malignant stages to chronic and acute leukemia, questions the relevance of this typological thinking in cancer. A first question is whether HSCs, pre-LSCs, and LSCs have the same identity. A second one is whether LSCs of different hematological malignancies and the LSCs in one patient all have the same identity. I will discuss cases of genetic and epigenetic alterations that suggest possible switches in stemness identity and their consequences for therapies. To conclude, I used a classical philosophical method developed in three steps: i- analysis of the scientific literature, ii- production of conceptual distinctions, iii- analysis of their consequences. I suggested the distinction between four stemness identities (categorical, dispositional, relational, systemic). HSCs fits the dispositional identity, suggesting that both LSCs-targeting and niche-targeting therapies could be efficient (provided that we can identity and target them properly). However, the identity of LSCs can differ from that of HSCs. Moreover, in contrast with HSCs that have one unique and stable identity, LSCs can be categorical, dispositional, relational, or systemic, and they can switch from one to another identity following particular genetic and epigenetic insults. This drastically complicates the therapeutic approaches and highlights the need to develop multiple therapies. References Laplane L, Cancer Stem Cells: Philosophy and Therapies. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), 2016. Clevers H, Cancer Therapy: Defining Stemness. Nature 2016; 534(7606): 176-177. Disclosures No relevant conflicts of interest to declare.

The simple duality: Humean passions

Hume views the passions as having both intentionality and qualitative character, which, in light of his Separability Principle, seemingly contradicts their simplicity. I reject the dominant solution to this puzzle of claiming that intentionality is an extrinsic property of the passions, arguing that a number of Hume's claims regarding the intentionality of the passions (pride and humility in particular) provide reasons for thinking an intrinsic account of the intentionality of the passions to be required. Instead, I propose to resolve this tension by appealing to Hume's treatment of the ‘distinctions of reason’, as explained by Garrett (Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

KANTIŠKOJI „DAIKTO PATIES SAVAIME“ PROBLEMA RAE LANGTON INTERPRETACIJOJE

Straipsnyje pristatomas ir nagrinėjamas Rae Langton požiūris į kantiškąją „daikto paties savaime“ problemą. Autorė noumeno ir fenomeno perskyrą interpretuoja kaip dviejų „daikto paties savaime“ savybių rūšių perskyrą. Fenomenas – tai išoriškai noumeno atžvilgiu pasireiškiančios jo savybės. Išorinės savybės yra noumeno generuojamos jėgos. Noumenas turi ir vidines savybes, vidinę prigimtį, kuri nepasireiškia išoriškai ir todėl nėra prieinama pažinimui. „Vidinių savybių“ koncepcija kritikuojama teigiant, jog ji pernelyg išplečia Kanto apriorinių intelekto kategorijų taikymo sferą ir yra nesuderinama su noumeno, kaip nekonceptualizuoto ir nepriklausomo nuo juslinio receptyvumo daikto, galima reikšme Kanto filosofinėje teorijoje.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Langton, Kantas, daiktas pats savaime, išorinės savybės, vidinės savybės.Rae Langton’s Interpretation of the Kantian Problem of the Thing-in-ItselfEdvardas Rimkus SummaryThe paper presents and examines Rae Langton’s approach to the Kantian problem of noumena. Langton treats the distinction between noumena and phenomena as a distinction between two kinds of properties of the thing-in-itself. Phenomena are externally manifested qualities of noumena. Appearance is the power generated by noumena. Noumena also have intristic properties or the inner nature, which are not externally manifest and thus are not accessibleto cognition. The paper criticizes such conception of intrinsic properties, since it extends the scope of application of Kant’s intellectual apriori categoriesand are not compatible with the possible significance of noumena as nonconceptual things independent of sensory receptivity.Key words: Langton, Kant, thing-in-itself, intrinsic property, extrinsic property.

Semantics of abstract finals in Algonquian transitive inanimate verbs

A general problem in Algonquian verb derivation is the role of various morphemes conveying abstract meanings, in contrast to those conveying the main concrete meaning of the verb. Usually, the specific action taking place is quite well described by the root, medial and concrete final, but other morphemes appear such as pre-medials, post-medials and abstract finals which have much more abstract but nonetheless vital meanings. The abstract morphemes are especially important because they are few in number, but occur frequently, so that the abstract meaning of any one of them is a component of the meaning of large numbers of verbs. In previous papers I have tried to show what some of these abstract meanings are. In Denny and Mailhot (1976) we showed that, in Cree-Montagnais, pre-medial -ā- indicates that the root expresses an extrinsic property of the object referred to by the medial, e.g., ossisk ā kam-āw ‘cypress-EXTRINSIC-lake-it.is = it is a cypress lake,’ whereas lack of pre-medial -ā- indicates that the root expresses an intrinsic property, e.g., čino-kam-āw ‘long-lake-it.is = it is a long lake.’