Is bribing a good strategy? Imbalanced interdependence and hazard of opportunism in bribery

PurposeIn fragile institutional environments, firms often have no choice but bribery as the means to access the services monopolized by the government. Corrupt government officials whose resources are valuable to many different firms can easily find other firms willing to offer bribes. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how this imbalanced interdependence exposes the bribing firm to the hazard of opportunism from the bribed officials.Design/methodology/approachThis study draws on World Business Environment Survey (WBES) data and the instrumental variable (IV) Probit estimator with Heckman correction for the potential selection bias.FindingsThe authors find that the more firms depend on bribery to acquire governmental resources, the severer the level of opportunism they encounter from the government officials. In addition, the authors find that although the presence of a legal alternative to bribery reduces the level of a corrupt government official's opportunism that a bribing firm experiences, the more firms depend on bribery despite the presence of a legal alternative, the higher the level of the corrupt official's opportunism that the firm will experience. Finally, the authors find that establishing a relational contract with government officials reduces the hazard of opportunism.Originality/valueThe study contributes to the resource dependence literature by finding that a greater imbalance in the interdependence between two parties in bribery exposes the more dependent party to a larger hazard of opportunism. The finding that an ineffective alternative to a current resource provider would not strengthen but weaken a resource seeker's bargaining power expands the literature. The authors also contribute to the corruption research by showing the significant strategic, not legal, risk to bribing firms of engaging in bribery, which to date has not been sufficiently discussed.

Így kell védenie a munkajognak a munkavállalót?

Recenziónkban Kiss György A foglalkoztatás rugalmassága és a munkavállalói jogállás védelme (Egy lehetséges megközelítés a munkaviszony tartalmának vizsgálatához) című könyvét mutatjuk be. A mű a munkajogi szabályozás jövőjének kérdését feszegeti, a múltban elért eredmények és megállapítások felhasználásával. A római jogi gyökerek ismertetését követően a germán, frankofon és angolszász jogrendszerek fejlődésén át ismerhetjük meg a munkajogi szabályozás jelenlegi formájának kialakulását. A történeti sík mellett a dogmatikai alapok felvázolására is sor kerül a munkában, így a munkaszerződés tartalmi feldolgozása több síkon is megtörténik, mielőtt a szerző – az általa felvetett – relational contract elméletének munkajogi alkalmazhatóságáról értekezne. Mindezen alapok ismertetése alkalmassá teszi a művet arra, hogy a munkajog iránt érdeklődők a különböző jogrendszerek szerződéses elméleteit is jobban megismerhessék és megértsék. A recenzió által úgy kívánunk betekintést adni a szerző munkájába, hogy saját személyes szűrőnk és véleményünk is megjelenik a leírtakról.

Exit, Tweets, and Loyalty

Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty highlights the role of “voice” when individuals confront an unexpected deterioration in quality. Yet, voice has received little attention. To motivate our empirical analysis, we develop a simple model of voice as the equilibrium of a relational contract between customers and firms. We use data on 4 million tweets to or about US airlines to study the relationship between quality, voice, and market structure. Voice increases when quality deteriorates. This relationship is greater for airlines that operate a large share of flights in a market. Supplemental analyses support a relational contracting role for voice. (JEL D83, L15, L82, L93)

Factors affecting transaction costs in megaprojects: a qualitative comparative analysis

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to examine the factors influencing the transaction costs (TCs) in megaprojects to provide a basis for controlling project costs.Design/methodology/approachThis study selects six factors influencing the TCs in megaprojects from the perspective of TC theory and relational contract theory (RCT) through literature review. On the basis of crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), this study tests combined factors influencing the TCs and the interaction between them.FindingsResults show that in megaprojects, TCs are affected by combination factors. The combination of asset specificity, uncertainty, transaction frequency and trust and the combination of asset specificity, reputation and trust will control TCs in certain situations. In the configuration leading to high project TCs, the combination of environmental and behavioral uncertainties is a necessary condition.Originality/valueThis paper fills up the research gap in the field of megaproject TCs, and researchers can focus on this field in the future.