How a critical Humean naturalism is possible: Contesting the Neo-Aristotelian reading

Ethical naturalists such as Philippa Foot, John McDowell or Sabina Lovibond have critically distinguished their version of naturalism from the version ascribed to David Hume. This article defends Hume’s naturalism against this criticism in constructing a more plausible version of it. The article briefly delineates John McDowell’s reading of Hume in his well-known ‘Two Sorts of Naturalism’. Based on Nietzsche, the article then offers the concept of ‘historical naturalism’ as alternative to McDowell’s reading, concentrating in particular on the charge of Hume’s naturalism being narrowly empiricistic. The concept of historical naturalism will be contrasted with David Wiggins’ Humean variant of vindicatory naturalism. In conclusion, Annette Baier’s suggestion of reconstructing Hume’s naturalism as critical is taken up and elaborated upon. While the spirit of Baier’s approach is adopted, its application to the problem of deeply entrenched sexism will be treated as overly optimistic.

Disentangling and Shapelessness

This chapter considers a second anti-separationist strategy, namely the thought that if one separates thick concepts into thin evaluation and nonevaluative, descriptive content, as separationists think, one is erroneously committed to thinking that the latter can in some way map onto the evaluative concept that one is analysing such that one can predict novel uses of that concept. This anti-separationist argument is often called the ‘disentangling argument’, something that is reliant on the ‘shapelessness hypothesis’, and is associated with John McDowell and David Wiggins, among others. This famous argument and hypothesis are laid out in great detail. The upshot is that the argument does not work as traditionally given, although a weaker version may have some attraction. Overall it is argued that nonseparationists should pursue a different anti-separationist strategy.

Desire, Infinity, and the Meaning of Life

In his paper ‘Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life’ David Wiggins identifies a certain framework in terms of which to tackle the question of life's meaning. I argue that his criticisms of this framework are justified, and develop an alternative which trades upon some themes from Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Levinas. This alternative remains in the spirit of Wiggins' own preferred standpoint, although he would take issue with its theological implications. I argue that such misgivings are misplaced, and that a move in the direction of God may be precisely what is needed if we are to provide an adequate alternative to the framework under attack.

Bernard Williams on the History of Ethical Views and Practices

How should we look back on the history and the origins of our ethical outlook and our way of life? We know that in the past, strange and appalling ethical views and practices have enjoyed widespread and sincere support. Yet we do not regard our contemporary outlook – to the extent that we do, at the present, have a common outlook – as one option among many. However bemused we may feel in ethical matters, at least on some issues we claim to have reasons that are good (enough). If we do not object to the use of the predicate ‘true’ in ethics, we may say that we are confronted with the (ethical) truth of an outlook. Or, to echo a provocative expression of David Wiggins, we claim that ‘there is nothing else to think’.