How a critical Humean naturalism is possible: Contesting the Neo-Aristotelian reading

2020 ◽  
pp. 019145372094841
Author(s):  
Martin Hartmann

Ethical naturalists such as Philippa Foot, John McDowell or Sabina Lovibond have critically distinguished their version of naturalism from the version ascribed to David Hume. This article defends Hume’s naturalism against this criticism in constructing a more plausible version of it. The article briefly delineates John McDowell’s reading of Hume in his well-known ‘Two Sorts of Naturalism’. Based on Nietzsche, the article then offers the concept of ‘historical naturalism’ as alternative to McDowell’s reading, concentrating in particular on the charge of Hume’s naturalism being narrowly empiricistic. The concept of historical naturalism will be contrasted with David Wiggins’ Humean variant of vindicatory naturalism. In conclusion, Annette Baier’s suggestion of reconstructing Hume’s naturalism as critical is taken up and elaborated upon. While the spirit of Baier’s approach is adopted, its application to the problem of deeply entrenched sexism will be treated as overly optimistic.

2015 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bert Heinrichs

AbstractFor a couple of years, “Aristotelian Naturalism” has been the subject of intensive debates. Among the most prominent proponents of this type of ethical theory are Philippa Foot and John McDowell. At first sight, these approaches are quite attractive for they seem to combine a number of advantages. The central thesis of the present paper is, however, that they do not succeed in developing a convincing ethical theory. To substantiate this claim, Foot’s approach will be presented in a first step. In a second step, McDowell’s critique on Foot will be outlined. Foot’s attempt to provide an external foundation for morality takes centre stage here. In a third step, McDowell’s own version of Aristotelian Naturalism, which has an explicitly anti-foundational shape, will be delineated. Although McDowell’s critique on Foot proves to be valid, it leads him to the wrong conclusions. He ignores that a reason-internal foundation of morality is available which resists his legitimate critique while being superior to his own anti-foundational theory. At the core of such an approach lies a non-reductive concept of person, which stands in clear contrast to Foot’s concept of “life form” as well as to McDowell’s concept of “second nature”.


Author(s):  
Simon Kirchin

This chapter considers a second anti-separationist strategy, namely the thought that if one separates thick concepts into thin evaluation and nonevaluative, descriptive content, as separationists think, one is erroneously committed to thinking that the latter can in some way map onto the evaluative concept that one is analysing such that one can predict novel uses of that concept. This anti-separationist argument is often called the ‘disentangling argument’, something that is reliant on the ‘shapelessness hypothesis’, and is associated with John McDowell and David Wiggins, among others. This famous argument and hypothesis are laid out in great detail. The upshot is that the argument does not work as traditionally given, although a weaker version may have some attraction. Overall it is argued that nonseparationists should pursue a different anti-separationist strategy.


Author(s):  
Craig Smith

Adam Ferguson was a Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh and a leading member of the Scottish Enlightenment. A friend of David Hume and Adam Smith, Ferguson was among the leading exponents of the Scottish Enlightenment’s attempts to develop a science of man and was among the first in the English speaking world to make use of the terms civilization, civil society, and political science. This book challenges many of the prevailing assumptions about Ferguson’s thinking. It explores how Ferguson sought to create a methodology for moral science that combined empirically based social theory with normative moralising with a view to supporting the virtuous education of the British elite. The Ferguson that emerges is far from the stereotyped image of a nostalgic republican sceptical about modernity, and instead is one much closer to the mainstream Scottish Enlightenment’s defence of eighteenth century British commercial society.


Author(s):  
Christopher J. Berry

A collection of essays by a leading scholar. The work selected spans several decades, which together with three new unpublished pieces, cumulatively constitute a distinct interpretation of the Scottish Enlightenment as a whole while incorporating detailed examination of the work of David Hume and Adam Smith. There is, in addition, a substantial introduction which, alongside Berry’s personal intellectual history, provides a commentary on the development of the study of the Scottish Enlightenment from the 1960s. Each of the previously published chapters includes a postscript where Berry comments on subsequent work and his own retrospective assessment. The recurrent themes are the ideas of sociability and socialisation, the Humean science of man and Smith’s analysis of the relation between commerce and morality.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-123
Author(s):  
Farhad Rassekh

In the year 1749 Adam Smith conceived his theory of commercial liberty and David Hume laid the foundation of his monetary theory. These two intellectual developments, despite their brevity, heralded a paradigm shift in economic thinking. Smith expanded and promulgated his theory over the course of his scholarly career, culminating in the publication of The Wealth of Nations in 1776. Hume elaborated on the constituents of his monetary framework in several essays that were published in 1752. Although Smith and Hume devised their economic theories in 1749 independently, these theories complemented each other and to a considerable extent created the structure of classical economics.


2011 ◽  
Vol 76 (First Serie (1) ◽  
pp. 128-132
Author(s):  
Paul Henderson Scott

2006 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 657-658
Author(s):  
Csaba Pléh

Arisztotelész: Lélekfilozófiai írások. (Fordította: Steiger Kornél) Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 2006 David Hume: Értekezés az emberi természetről . (Fordította: Bence György) Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 2006 Kelso, J. A. Scott és Engstrøm, David A.: The complementary nature. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006 Fehér Márta, Zemplén Gábor és Binzberger Viktor (szerk.): Értelem és történelem. L'Harmattan, Budapest, 2006 Márkus Attila: Neurológia. Pszichológia szakos hallgatók számára. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 2006 Cayton, H., Graham, N. és Warner, J.: Alzheimer-kór és a demencia egyéb fajtái . (Fordította: Nikowitz Krisztina) SpringMed Kiadó, Budapest, 2006 Houdé, Olivier: 10 leçons de psychologie et pédagogie . Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2006 Velicskovszkij, Borisz M.: Kognyityivnaja nauka. Osznovi pszichologii poznanyija . Vol. I-II.Academa-Szmüszl. Moszkva, 2006 Fábri György (szerk.): A tudománykommunikáció értelme/értéke. Tudástársadalom Alapítvány, Budapest, 2006 Ropolyi László: Az Internet természete. Internetfilozófiai értekezés. Typotex, Budapest, 2006


2016 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Oppong

Generally, negatives stereotypes have been shown to have negative impact on performance members of a social group that is the target of the stereotype (Schmader, Johns and Forbes 2008; Steele and Aronson, 1995). It is against the background of this evidence that this paper argues that the negative stereotypes of perceived lower intelligence held against Africans has similar impact on the general development of the continent. This paper seeks to challenge this stereotype by tracing the source of this negative stereotype to David Hume and Immanuel Kant and showing the initial errors they committed which have influenced social science knowledge about race relations. Hume and Kant argue that Africans are naturally inferior to white or are less intelligent and support their thesis with their contrived evidence that there has never been any civilized nation other than those developed by white people nor any African scholars of eminence. Drawing on Anton Wilhelm Amo’s negligence-ignorance thesis, this paper shows the Hume-Kantian argument and the supporting evidence to be fallacious. 


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