The Strategic Bias: How Journalists Respond to Antimedia Populism

As populist campaigns against the media become increasingly common around the world, it is ever more urgent to explore how journalists adopt and respond to them. Which strategies have journalists developed to maintain the public's trust, and what may be the implications for democracy? These questions are addressed using a thematic analysis of forty-five semistructured interviews with leading Israeli journalists who have been publicly targeted by Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. The article suggests that while most interviewees asserted that adherence to objective reporting was the best response to antimedia populism, many of them have in fact applied a “strategic bias” to their reporting, intentionally leaning to the Right in an attempt to refute the accusations of media bias to the Left. This strategy was shaped by interviewees' perceived helplessness versus Israel's Prime Minister and his extensive use of social media, a phenomenon called here “the influence of presumed media impotence.” Finally, this article points at the potential ramifications of strategic bias for journalism and democracy. Drawing on Hallin's Spheres theory, it claims that the strategic bias might advance Right-wing populism at present, while also narrowing the sphere of legitimate controversy—thus further restricting press freedom—in the future.

The Revolving Door of Sell-Side Analysts

ABSTRACT Equity analysts are often hired by firms they cover. I document the extent to which this revolving door phenomenon impairs analysts' independence. I do this by examining the presence of biased research reports issued during the year before analysts are employed by a firm they cover. I find that during their final year, revolving door analysts bias their EPS forecasts, their target prices, and their recommendations in a direction that suggests that they are attempting to gain favor from their prospective employers. Specifically, relative to other analysts, revolving door analysts issue more optimistic reports on the firms that hire them, and they issue more pessimistic reports on firms that do not hire them. These results suggest the presence of strategic bias, although more innocuous interpretations cannot be completely ruled out. JEL Classifications: G14; G17; G24; G28; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text.

Dynamic Deception

We characterize the unique equilibrium of a competitive continuous time game between a resource-constrained informed player and a sequence of rivals who partially observe his action intensity. Our game adds noisy monitoring and impatient players to Aumann and Maschler (1966), and also subsumes insider trading models. The intensity bound induces a novel strategic bias and serial mean reversion by uninformed players. We compute the duration of the informed player's informational edge. The uninformed player's value of information is concave if the intensity bound is large enough. Costly obfuscation by the informed player optimally rises in the public deception. (JEL D82, D83, G14)